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Agata Bareja-Starzyńska
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Marek Mejor

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Foreword

In the romantic scenery of a small medieval castle in Liw, some 70 km east from Warsaw, we had the pleasure to host a group of eminent Buddhologists from leading University centres in Europe who made their contributions at the International Seminar “Aspects of Buddhism”, June 25, 1994.

It is for the first time in the history of Polish Indology and Buddhology that an international seminar on Buddhist studies was organized by the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University.

The main purpose of the seminar was, however, to revive our Buddhist studies which after a period of flourishing activity (S. Schayer, C. Regamey, A. Kunst, J. Jaworski) came into decline.

The presence of the group of eminent scholars with their learned contributions at the Seminar has had an immediate impact on the growing interest in Buddhist studies (see below in this volume).

The papers offered by the participants of the Seminar are now edited in a volume which is a special issue of *Studia Indologiczne*, the first Polish academic journal devoted to Indological and related research, founded in 1994 and published by the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University.

The organizers of the Seminar would like to thank the participants (J. Braarvig, D. Jackson, P. Kværne, H. Krasser, M.T. Much, T. Tillemans) and contributors (Ch. Lindtner, V. Uspensky) for their kind acceptance of our invitation.

We also thank Dr Jacek Starzyński for a nice computer layout.

Special thanks are due to Ms Anna Ambroź, the director of the Liw Castle Museum, for her hospitality and making accessible the castle for the Seminar.

Marek Mejer Agata Bareja-Starzyńska

Editors and organizers

Abbreviations

<i>ALB</i>	<i>The Adyar Library Bulletin</i>
BHSD	<i>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary</i> , by Franklin Edgerton, vol. II: Dictionary, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, First Edition 1953, Reprint 1985
D	sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon
<i>IJ</i>	<i>Indo-Iranian Journal</i>
<i>JAOS</i>	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i>
<i>JIABS</i>	<i>Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies</i>
<i>JRAS</i>	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland</i>
<i>JIPH</i>	<i>Journal of Indian Philosophy</i>
P	Peking edition of Tibetan canon
T	<i>Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō</i> , The Tripiṭaka in Chinese
<i>WSTB</i>	<i>Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde</i>
<i>WZKS(O)</i>	<i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- (und Ost)asiens</i>
<i>ZDMG</i>	<i>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</i>

The Essentials of Buddhism in the *Čiqula kereglegči*, a 16th Century Mongolian Buddhist Treatise¹

Agata Bareja-Starzyńska
(Warsaw)

The aim of the present paper is to offer a preliminary study of the third chapter, which contains the Buddhist terminology, from the *Čiqula kereglegči*, a 16th century Mongolian treatise on Buddhism. Its author was Širegetü güüsi čorji, an eminent translator of Tibetan Buddhist writings into Mongolian, a personal pupil of the Third Dalai Lama. The text was compiled in the 16th century, during the second propagation of Buddhism in Mongolia, most probably between 1587 and 1607 (HEISSIG 88, p. 225). The *Čiqula kereglegči* circulated only in manuscripts, unlike other translations by Širegetü güüsi čorji, which, however, were years later printed as xylographs. Twenty three manuscripts in all of the *Čiqula kereglegči* are known to exist in European and Asian libraries today².

¹The present paper is an enlarged version of my paper read in Liw, 1994. It has been prepared on the basis of the research carried at the Department of History of Religion at the University of Oslo in 1993, thanks to the scholarship granted by the NAVF. I would like to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Per Kvaerne for his kind assistance, as well as to Dr. Jens Braarvig for his scholarly guidance. Further study on my Ph.D. project was carried with a help of a research grant of the DAAD at the Seminar für Sprach- und Kulturwissenschaft Zentralasiens at the University of Bonn in 1995. I am very thankful to Prof. Klaus Sagaster and Rev. Loden Sherab Dagyab Rinpoche for their sholarly support and valuable remarks. The present paper and myself benefited a lot from the consultations with Prof. Per Sörensen from Leipzig and Dr. Marek Mejor from Warsaw, whom I would like to thank.

²In W. HEISSIG, “Ein Quellenbezug der Altan Khan Biographie”, *Studia Historica Mongolica*, 1, 1985 – 14 manuscripts are mentioned; in A. BAREJA-STARZYŃSKA, “Additional Notes on the Manuscripts of the *Čiqula kereglegči*”, *Acta Orientalia Belgica*, Leuven 1991 – 18 manuscripts; one more ms has been discovered by V.L. Uspensky at the Sankt Petersburg University Library (D 172); three more copies are preserved in Tuva, A.G. SAZYKIN, “Sobranie mongol’skich rukopisej i ksilografov iz fondov tuvinskogo respublikanskogo kraevedčeskogo muzea im. 60 bogatyrej (Kyzyl)”, *Tiurskie i mongol’skie pis’mennye pamiatniki*, Moskva 1992, pp. 54-55 (I am thankful V.L. Uspensky for calling my attention to this article); and one more ms is found in the Library of the Cultural Palace of National Minorities in Beijing [Minzu Wenhua gong tushuguan] (I am indebted for this information to K. Sagaster).

Before turning to the actual topic of the present paper, a few words of introduction about the *Čiqula kereglegči* should be given. The Western scholarship (O.M. Kovalevskij and his followers) regarded the *Čiqula kereglegči* as a Mongolian version of the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba*, although its title is never mentioned in the Mongolian text.³ However, it seems that this statement was based on wrong assumption that the *Čiqula kereglegči* was a translation of the 'Phags pa bla ma's work. Some differences between the texts have been already commented by the scholars: L.S. Pučkovskij, W. Heissig, C. Hoog and the author of the present article.⁴ Sh. Bira suggested that the *Čiqula kereglegči* could be a compilation written by Širegetü güüsi čorji (BIRA p. 189). He also stated that the *Čiqula kereglegči* may be related to the Tibetan work *Ñer mkho mthong ba don yod*⁵. On the basis of the recent research carried by the present author⁶, it was clarified now that only the second chapter of the *Čiqula kereglegči* is based on the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba*. It is also possible to put forth a hypothesis that the whole work as such has been translated from the Tibetan. The Tibetan original itself could have been a compilation based on different sources. There are two main arguments for such a hypothesis:

1. The author of the Mongolian version, Širegetü güüsi čorji, was a well known Buddhist translator, whose no own composition was ever found, or mentioned. In the colophon of the *Čiqula kereglegči* the author states that the translation was done under the repeated request of two persons – Makata bodisung, probably a noble lady, and Sisrab senge, most probably a Buddhist monk. Unfortunately, the patrons have not been yet identified.⁷
2. Another argument for the *Čiqula kereglegči* as a translation from a Tibetan source is that there exists still another Mongolian work, an Oirat (Western Mongolian) treatise entitled *Üzeqsēr tusatai cuxula keregtü kemēkü*⁸ written

³KOVALEVSKIJ, *Buddijskaja kosmologia*, Kazań 1837, HEISSIG pp. 26-34, facs. pp. 27-83, f. 1-55.

⁴L.S. PUČKOVSKIJ, *Nekotorye voprosy naučnogo opisanija mongol'skich rukopisej*, Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, 11, 1941, p. 264; HEISSIG p. 28; BIRA p. 189; HOOG p. 7; BAREJA 1992 p. 23; BAREJA 1991 p. 5.

⁵BIRA pp. 190-191. I failed to find this Tibetan text in the State Library in Ulan Bator in 1990. Also Prof. Bira was unable to trace a place where he saw it. I could not find in the catalogues either the Tibetan title, nor the name of its author (in a corrupted form?): Blo bčang bzang po'i dpal.

⁶Ph.D. project of a critical edition of the *Čiqula kereglegči* with a Polish translation and a commentary.

⁷*Čiqula kereglegči*, ms. I5 from St. Petersburg, Academy of Sciences, f. 41r *orčiryul keme : ulam ulam dabtan öčigsen-dür...*

⁸I am thankful to V.L. Uspensky for calling my attention to this text, see V.L. USPENSKY, "Some Oirat Manuscripts in the Collection of the St. Petersburg University Library" in the present volume: *Proceedings of the International Buddhist Seminar "Aspects of Buddhism"*, Liw, 1994; Č. DAMDINSÜRÜNG, *Mongγol uran jokiγal-un degeji jaγun bilig orosibai*, Ulaγanbaγatur, 1959, p. 328, no. 40.

by Za ya pandita Nam mkha' rgya mtshan (1599-1662) from Oirat.⁹

The Oirat Za ya Pandita was the most famous and effective translator of the Buddhist writings into Oirat language. He invented also a version of the Uighur script for the Oirat language. In his biography more than 150 translations are listed. No Buddhist works of his authorship are known.

A preliminary research on the Oirat Za ya Pandita's work shows, after a brief comparison with the *Čiqula kereglegči*, that it is a longer treatise, however, it follows the same structure: the same paragraphs appear one after the other in both texts, although in the Oirat version there are in several places passages not found in the *Čiqula kereglegči*. The actual differences existing between these two almost similar treatises might have arisen due to the fact that: 1) either Širegetü güüsi čorji made a shorter version, omitting some paragraphs, or 2) Za ya Pandita enlarged his translation by adding fragments based on other texts. It should also be taken into consideration that 3) the translators might have had different copies of the Tibetan original at their disposal. The wording of both texts is different, so they seem to be two independent translations. Further thorough comparison of both texts is a desideratum.

Both scholars lived during the second propagation of Buddhism in Mongolia, although Za ya Pandita slightly later. There are several Buddhist works that were translated into Mongolian or Oirat by both of them, such as the biography and songs of Mi la ras pa, the story of Molon toyin's journey into the hell and the *Maṇi bka' 'bum*. The fact that they both translated the same, well known Tibetan writings, may indicate that the Tibetan original of the *Čiqula kereglegči* was also a Tibetan composition, offered by the Tibetans to the Mongols during the second propagation of Buddhism in Mongolia. Unfortunately, the Tibetan original which might have served both Mongolian scholars for compiling the *Čiqula kereglegči* and the *Cuxula keregtü* has not been so far identified.

The *Čiqula kereglegči* can be divided into three main parts:

1. Part I: About the Buddha and his teachings, based on the Mahāyāna sūtras and commentaries from the Canon.
2. Part II: The Cosmological part, on the World's Origin and Destruction, includes Indian royal genealogy, brief history of Tibet and Mongolia, and is based on the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba*¹⁰ written in 1278 by 'Phags pa bla ma Blo gros rgyal mtshan.
3. Part III: The Glossary of Buddhist terms, following the example of Abhidharmic *mātrkāś*, without any source mentioned.

⁹He should not to be mistaken with a series of incarnations of the Khalkha Za ya Panditas, among them Za ya Pandita (1642-1715), well known for his achievements as a Mongolian scholar writing in Tibetan language.

¹⁰*Shes bya rab tu gsal ba* in *Sa skya bka' bum*, ed. Toyo Bunko, Tokyo 1968, vol. 6, f. 3r3-21v5; Č.k., Paris ms. f. 10r-42v12.

The second part of the *Čiqula kereglegči*, which occupies sixty percent of the text, was well studied by scholars, starting with J. Kovalevskij, who used it as a source for his *Buddijskaja kosmologija* (The Buddhist Cosmology). The significance of this chapter, and the Mongolian *Čiqula kereglegči* as a whole, is due to the fact, that it laid grounds for the Mongolian Buddhist historiography, similarly to the role played by the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba* for the Tibetan historical writings.

As it was pointed out by S. Dietz, the second chapter of the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba*, about the World's Origin and Destruction, became a standard introduction included in the Tibetan historical works belonging to the genre of *chos 'byung*, i.e. history of the Doctrine. The same pattern was more or less followed in Bu ston's History of Buddhism, in *rGyal rab gsal ba'i me long*, *Deb ther dmar po*, *Deb ther sngon po*, and was also used by dPa' bo gtsug lag phreng ba, Padma dkar po, Tāranātha, the Fifth Dalai Lama and Sum pa khan po.¹¹

In Mongolia the description of the World's Origin and Destruction, including short histories of India, Tibet and Mongolia, served as a model for the 17th century Mongolian chronicles, namely *Altan tobči* (1655) and *Erdeni-yin tobči* (1662), as well as later chronicles written by the Mongols in Tibetan (HEISSIG pp. 60-63, 70-71.). It introduced Buddhist notions of the world and at the same time—as a means of legitimation—connected the Mongolian rulers and their legendary ancestors with the Tibetan royal house, and through them, with the Indian royal progenitor Mahāsammata. The *Čiqula kereglegči* is regarded as an important and authoritative manual of Buddhism in Mongolia, even at present. It served as a source for preparing the modern vademecum of Buddhist knowledge in Mongolian.¹²

The *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba* is an exposition of Abhidharmic topics to the Mongolian prince Čingim (Jingim 1243-85) of the Yüan dynasty, the elder son of the Mongolian emperor Qubilai khan. It was translated into Mongolian already in the 13th century. The 18th century copy of this translation entitled *Medegdegün-i belgetey-e geyigülügči* has been found and studied recently by V.L. Uspensky.¹³

It is worth to mention that the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba*'s sources were: the *Abhidharmakośa*, the *Smṛtyupasthāna*, the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūrya-garbha* and the *Prajñāptiśāstra*. However, it has not been answered yet which of the three texts called *Prajñāptiśāstra* presumably is meant: the *Lokaprajñapti*, the *Karmaprajñapti*, or the *Kāraṇaprajñapti*.¹⁴

¹¹S. DIETZ, "Cosmogony as Presented in Tibetan Historical Literature and its Sources", *Tibetan Studies, Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies*, Narita 1989, Narita 1992, pp. 435-438.

¹²D. DAGVADORŽ, *Mongolyn shashin surtahuuny taiibar' tol'*, Ulaanbaatar, 1995.

¹³The edition of the *Medegdegün-i belgetey-e geyigülügči* by V.L. Uspensky will be published soon by the Russian Academy of Sciences, Sankt Petersburg Branch. V.L. Uspensky has already examined *Medegdegün-i belgetey-e geyigülügči*, finding two passages which are at variance with 'Phags pa's treatise, namely "1. the genealogy of the legendary Indian kings, and 2. the exposition of the fifty one mental functions" – USPENSKY, Introduction to his edition of *Medegdegün-i belgetey-e geyigülügči*. I am very thankful to Mr. Uspensky for making the manuscript of his study available to me.

¹⁴The *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba*, 35r2: *dran pa ñer gzhag ñi ma'i sñing po gdags pa'i bstan*

In contrast to the well studied by scholars second part of the *Čiqula kereglegči*, its first and third chapters did not receive the right attention. Both these parts are not based on the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba*. A brief summary of the contents of the first part was given by W. Heissig (HEISSIG p. 29-30, Teil I-III) and by Sh. Bira (BIRA p. 191-194).

Even less was written about the third part of the *Čiqula kereglegči*, the subject of the present paper. Scholars limited themselves to observe that it contains a list of Buddhist terms.¹⁵ However, given the importance of the *Čiqula kereglegči* for the Mongols, it is interesting to investigate which Buddhist concepts, besides cosmological, it contains, and how they are presented.

The last part of the *Čiqula kereglegči* is introduced with the actual title of the text: *čiqula kereglegči tegüs udqasi eyin ügülesügei*— “Let us say in this way: ‘What Is Important To Be Used’.”¹⁶ Here it should be understood as: ‘What is important to be used by a Buddhist’. No sources have been mentioned throughout the whole chapter.¹⁷ It contains many notions found in the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba*, as well as in the *Abhidharmakośa*, but in a completely different sequence. The chapter follows the Abhidharmic system of questions and answers, which are, however, very short, usually reduced to a mere listing of items. In contrast to the Abhidharma treatises the main terms from tantra teachings are explained as well. On the whole, the idea of arrangement of entries in this chapter is not fully clear, although there is a certain connection between the topics which appear one after another.

The chapter starts with the differentiation between a Buddhist and a non-Buddhist, continues with a list of five paths, ten stages of the Bodhisattva, four bodies of Buddha, five thoughts of Enlightenment, further it contains explanation about tantra, enumeration of the spheres of the universe, explanation about four individuals, list of seven subjects of the Yogācāras, explanation about differences between the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna followers, about the six peaceful paths (?), the twelve links of dependent origination, the seven qualities of higher rebirth,

bcos zhes bya dang // chos mngon mdzod. I am indebted to Per Sörensen for calling my attention to this passage (note different interpretation in HOOG, p. 82). I would like to thank Rev. Loden Sherab Dagya Rinpoche for his kind assistance in the identification of the titles.

¹⁵BIRA, p. 197; HEISSIG p. 32, with a note 1, saying, that this chapter was translated from the Chinese version (of the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba*) by Bagchi. However, although the Chinese version is close to the Tibetan, it has no correspondence to the third part of the *Čiqula kereglegči*, as it has been also pointed out in the previous article BAREJA 1992, because this part of the *Čiqula kereglegči* was not based on the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba*. A brief comparison between the third part of the *Čiqula kereglegči* and the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba* was presented in BAREJA 1992.

¹⁶HEISSIG, facsimile, p. 71, f. 42v13.

¹⁷In the light of the existence of the *Cuxula keregtü*, which can be regarded as a translation of a longer version of the same Tibetan original as the *Čiqula kereglegči*, the last chapter of the *Čiqula kereglegči* should be compared to the relevant part of the *Cuxula keregtü*. This task, however, has not been undertaken for the present paper.

the eight inopportune births, the eight conditions of the world and several other Buddhist notions.

The chapter, which occupies about 11 folios, presents serious difficulties in interpreting due to its compact character and to its specific vocabulary. The method which has been employed in my study of this chapter is to identify Mongolian terms with their Tibetan equivalents, and wherever possible with the Sanskrit terms. The Tibetan language was assumed as the language of the original text, which was translated into Mongolian. One particular feature of the translation is its regular confusion of *srid pa* ‘existence’ and *sred pa* ‘desire’.¹⁸ The Sanskrit terms were traced in order to compare them with the Mongolian terms. It is well known, that during the first propagation of Buddhism, the Mongols used Uighur language as a means for translations. Thanks to that, many early Mongolian Buddhist terms resemble Sanskrit forms, via Uighur. However, in the *Čiqula kereglegči* it seems that only some well known Buddhist terms from the time of the first propagation have been used.¹⁹

Most of the Buddhist notions from the *Čiqula kereglegči* can be traced in the Buddhist terminological dictionaries, like the *Mahāvvyutpatti*, *Merged γarqu-yin oron*, and Sumatiratna’s dictionary, but not all of them. The *Čiqula kereglegči* belongs to the very beginning period of the second propagation of Buddhism in Mongolia. The Mongolian version of the *Mahāvvyutpatti*, as well as the bilingual Tibeto-Mongolian dictionary *Merged γarqu-yin oron* appeared only in the eighteenth century.²⁰ Širegetü güüsi čorji’s translations of Tibetan Buddhist terms might have been based on the early Mongolian Buddhist translations, or/and invented by himself. A number of terms used by Širegetü güüsi čorji are not found in the dictionaries, as they vary from the later “standard” versions.²¹ It should be pointed out that not much research has been done on the subject of the Mongolian Buddhist terminology. For example there existed several editions of the Mongolian *Mahāvvyutpatti* itself. From Ishihama and Fukuda’s edition of the Mongolian *Mahāvvyutpatti* as well as from A. Sárkőzi’s translation and study of this dictionary one can learn about variant readings from different versions. It is interesting to

¹⁸For example: in the list of the Four Defilements (f. 49r2), the second should be the Defilement of Existence [ABHK I, 274-5], Tib. *srid pa’i zag pa*, Sanskrit *bhavāsrava*, however, in Mongolian there is *quričaqu-yin čuburil* meaning ‘the Defilement of Desire’. The same occurs again while listing of the Four Yokes (f. 49r7) *quričaqu-yin barildurγulurγči*, and of the Four Floods (f. 49r13) *quričaquī mören*.

¹⁹For example names like: *viročana* = Vairocana, *včir saduba* Vajrasattva, *aksobi* = Akṣobhya, *amokasidi* = Amoghasiddhi, *ratn-a sambab-a* = Ratnasambhava, *visnu-a* = Viṣṇu, *makesvari* = Maheśvara; terms like: *siravang* = Skt. *śrāvaka*, *bratikabud* = Skt. *pratyekabuddha*, *baramid* = Skt. *pāramitā*, *yoga* = Skt. *yoga*, *budgali* = Skt. *puḍgala*.

²⁰SÁRKŐZI, p. vi-vii; D. SEYFORD RUEGG, “On Translating the Buddhist Canon...”, *Studies in Indo-Asian Art and Culture*, Vol. 3, 1973, p. 243ff.

²¹For example: in the Čk., (f. 49r24) one of the Four Nutriments, *duran-dur sed-kiküi-yin idegen*, is in the Mvy 2286 (dac Tib. S.), St. Petersburg’s version: *sedkil-dür sanaγsan-u idegen*; Tanjur version: *sedkil-dür sanaquī-yin idegen*; SÁRKŐZI p. 177, ISHIHAMA/FUKUDA, p. 121.

observe, that terms from the *Čiqula kereglegči* usually seem to be closer to the *Mahāvvyutpatti* version preserved in St. Petersburg, than to the Tanjur version.²² Several terms from the last chapter of the *Čiqula kereglegči* have not been identified with their Tibetan equivalents, e.g.: the classification of the Path of Vision, the Four *örgüls*, the Six Peaceful Paths *amurlingγui jirγuγan mör*, the Three Knowledges *γurban medeküi*, the Six *onol-un nom*, *burqan-u küsekü oron medekü*, list of *kündü*, the Eight Brightnesses *gegen*. At some places the identifications are not confirmed by dictionaries, for example: the Omniscience, Mongolian *gamuγ belge bilig*, with the Tibetan *thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes*; the Wisdom of Quality *yambar-i kü medegči belge bilig* with the Tibetan *ji ltar ba mkhyen pa* etc. (All doubtful meanings and identifications are indicated in Appendix by a question mark).

Abbreviations and Bibliography

ABHK	<i>Abhidharmakośa</i> (Vasubandhu)
BAREJA 1991	A. BAREJA, “A Note on the Chapter on Tibetan History in ‘ <i>Čiqula kereglegči</i> ’”, <i>Tibetan History and Language</i> . Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Wien, 1991.
BAREJA 1992	A. BAREJA, “A Preliminary Note on ‘ <i>Čiqula kereglegči</i> ’ – A Mongolian Treatise on Buddhism”, <i>Altaic Religious Beliefs and Practices</i> . Proceedings of the 33rd Meeting of Permanent International Altaistic Conference in Budapest. 1990, Budapest, 1992.
BIRA	SH. BIRA, <i>Mongolskaja istoriografija XIII-XVII vv.</i> Moskva, 1978.
CHAUDHURI	DR. SUKOMAL CHAUDHURI, <i>Analytical Study of the Abhidharmakośa</i> . Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series No. CXIV, Calcutta, 1976.
DAS	CHANDRA DAS, <i>Tibetan-English Dictionary</i> . Calcutta, 1902, Reprint 1985.
DH	<i>Dharmasaṃgraha. A Dictionary of Buddhist Technical Terms</i> , ed. by KENJIU KASAWARA, F. MAX MÜLLER (1885). Delhi, 1984.
HEISSIG	W. HEISSIG, <i>Die Familien-und Kirchengeschichtsschreibung</i> . Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1959.

²²For example: The World of Form (f. 47r) *önggetü yirtünčü*, Mvy 3073 St. Petersburg version: *öngge-yin oron* – Tanjur version: *dürsü-tü-yin oron* in: SÁRKÖZI p. 227, ISHIHAMA/FUKUDA p. 157 (similarly the next term, the World of Formlessness Mvy 3074). More detailed study of this subject is presented in my Ph.D. dissertation under preparation.

- HOOG C. HOOG, *Prince Jin-gim's Textbook of Tibetan Buddhism*. Leiden, 1983.
- ISHIHAMA/ FUKUDA Y. ISHIHAMA and Y. FUKUDA, *A New Critical Edition of the Mahāvvyutpatti. Sanskrit-Tibetan-Mongolian Dictionary of Buddhist Terminology*, Materials for Tibetan-Mongolian Dictionaries. Vol. 1, The Toyo Bunko, 1989.
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Appendix 1

Sources of the “Čiqula kerelegči”

<i>Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra</i>
<i>Abhidharmakośa ?</i>
<i>Bhadrakalpikā-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra</i>
<i>jarun silig-tü sudur-un ayimaγ ?</i>
<i>Kuśalamūlaparidhara-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra</i>
<i>Mahāparinirvāṇa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra</i>
<i>Suvarṇaprabhāsottama-sūtreन्द्रarāja-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra</i>
<i>Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā — Sāratamā</i>
<i>Sūtrālamkāra</i>
<i>Samdhinirmocana-sūtra</i>
<i>Yogācārabhūmi-nirṇayasaṃgraha</i>
<i>Vyākhyāyukti ?</i>
<i>Shes bya rab tu gsal ba</i>
<i>Lokaprajñapti</i>
<i>Mahāratnakūṭa</i>
other sources ?

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* Tibetan Compilation

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“Čiqula kerelegči”

Oirat “Cuxula keregtü”

Appendix 2

Contents of the “Čiqula kereglegči”

Prayers [f. 1v1-18]

I. About the Buddha and His Teaching [f. 1v19-8v22]

1. The Twelve Deeds of the Buddha Śākyamuni [f. 1v19-2r16]
according to the *Uttaratantra*
2. The Buddha’s Birth on Earth as Sarvārtha [f. 2r16-2v3]
3. The Explanation of the Bodhisattva and the Buddha [f. 2v3-12]
according to the *sang-un sudur* (*Abhidharmakośa?*)
4. The First Sermon and the Three Turnings of the Wheel of the Law
[f. 2v12-25]
5. The Buddha’s Life Time [f. 2v26-3v5]
according to the *Bhadrakalpikā* [f. 3r1-2]
according to the *jaγun silig-tü sudur-un ayimaγ* (?) [f. 3r3-9]
according to the *Kuśalamūlaparidhara* [f. 3r14-3v5]
6. The Date of the Buddha’s entering into *nirvāṇa* [f. 3v5-15]
according to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa* [f. 3v5-8]
according to Śākyaśrī(bhadra) [f. 3v9-15]
7. Explanation of which of the Buddha’s bodies entered into *nirvāṇa*
[f. 3v15-24]
according to the *Svarṇaprabhāsottama* [f. 3v18-24]
8. Explanation of four Indian (Magadha) languages and the “first phrase”
with prayers to the Buddha as not being His Teachings [f. 4r1-11]
9. Explanation of the Three Turnings of Wheel of the Law as for the
Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna and Mantrayāna followers
[f. 4r12-22]
10. The First Buddhist Council [f. 4v1-6]
11. The Second (Middle) Buddhist Council [f. 4v6-12]
12. The Third (Last) Buddhist Council [f. 4v12-18]
13. The Four Basic Schools and the Eighteen Schools derived from them
[f. 4v18-20]
14. Eighteen Dreams of the King Beresenje (Prasenajit?) [f. 4v20-6v5]
15. The Three Ways in which the Buddha transmitted the Teaching
[f. 6v6-7r16]

16. Explanation for whom which of the Buddha's Teachings are appropriate [f. 7r17-7v10]
17. The Twelve Divisions of the Buddha's Teaching [f. 7v10-17]
according to the *Naiman mingyan silü-g-tü-yin tayilburi*
(the commentary of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* —
Sāratamā?)
18. Explanation of the Three Baskets (*tripiṭaka*) [f. 7v17-8r2]
19. Explanation of the Great Vehicle (*mahāyāna*) [f. 8r2-23]
according to the *Ayimaḡ sudur-un čimeg* (*Sūtrālamkāra*?)
20. Explanation of the Word [f. 8r23-8v1]
according to the *Taḡalal-i tayilurḡsan sastri* (*Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*?)
21. Nine śāstras [f. 8v1-15]
according to the *ḡaḡar-un ayimaḡ sudur* (*Yogācārabhūmi-nirḡayasam-
graha*?)
22. Explanation of what is regarded to be the Buddha's Word [f. 8v15-22]
according to the *Uqarḡan-u sastar-un tayilburi* (*Vyākhyāyukti*?)

II. The World's Origin and Destruction [f. 8v23-42v12]

based on the *sang-un sudur* i. e. *kośa* (*Abhidharmakośa*?),
(actually based on the *Shes bya rab tu gsal ba* [f. 10r3-42v12]);
it includes:

1. Description of the Outer (Inanimate) World [f. 8v23-10r3]
2. Origin of the Outer (Inanimate) World [f. 10r3-19v3]
3. The Inner (Animate) World [f. 19v3-42r10]
with a passage based on the *Lokaprajñapti* [f. 12v12-24]
and a passage based on the *Dabqurlaḡ erdeni sudur*
(*Mahāratnakūṭa*) [f. 30v12-32v20]
The chapter on Inner (Animate) World includes:
 - Indian Royal Genealogy [f. 37v24-39r2]
 - History of Tibet [f. 39r3-39v21]
 - History of Mongolia [f. 40r1-41r10]
 - The Fate of Sentient Beings [f. 41r10-42r10]
4. The Outer (Inanimate) World's Destruction [f. 42r10-42v13]

III. What Is Important To Be Used (a chapter from the *Čiqula kereglegči* containing the Essentials of Buddhist Doctrine in a form of a glossary of Buddhist terms) [f. 42v13-54r7]

The Colophon [f. 54r24-55r20]

Appendix 3

**Topical outline of the 3rd chapter of the
“Čiqula kereglegči”,
“Essentials of the Buddhism” P ff.42v13-54r17.**

Sigla:

P = Paris ms.	Pe = Peking ms.	
UP = Univ. Petersb. ms.	V = Vilno ms.	
M. = Mongolian	T. = Tibetan	S. = Sanskrit
* indicates that a term constitutes a part of another term		
(?) indicates doubts in translation and identification		
[?] indicates that the identification has not been confirmed		
(m.) indicates the number of a term in the Mongolian version of the <i>Mahāvvyutpatti</i> edited by ISHIHAMA/FUKUDA		

I. A difference between a Buddhist and a non-Buddhist [P 42v14-43r3] M. *dotoyadu nom-tan*, T. *nang pa* (Jäschke p. 302a), Mvy *1512 (m. 1515)

M. *γadaγadu nom-tan*, T. *phyi pa* (Jäschke p. 302a), Mvy *1512 (m. 1515)

II. The Five Paths [43r4-43v8] M. *mör*, T. *lam*, S. *mārga* Mvy 1202 (m. 1206)

1. The Path of Accumulation M. *čiyulqu-yin mör*, T. *tshogs lam*, S. *sambhāramārga*
2. The Path of Preparation M. *barilduγulqu-yin mör*, T. *sbyor lam*, S. *prayogamārga*
3. The Path of Vision M. *üjekü-yin mör*, T. *mthong ba'i lam*, S. *darśanamārga* Mvy *1310 (m. 1314)
4. The Path of Meditation M. *bisilγal-un mör*, T. *sgom pa'i lam*, S. *bhāvanāmārga* Mvy *1315 (m. 1319)
5. The Path of No More Training M. *ülü surqu-yin mör*, T. *mi slob pa'i lam*, S. *aśaikṣamārga* Mvy *1320 (m. 1324)
6. The Distinction between the Paths:
 - of the Disciples M. *siravang*, T. *ñan thos pa*, S. *śrāvaka* Mvy *186 (m. 184)
 - of the Pratyekabuddhas M. *bratikabud*, T. *rang sangs rgyas*, S. *pratyekabuddha* Mvy *186 (m. 184)

- of the Mahāyāna [followers] M. *yeke kölgen*, T. *theg pa chen po*, S. *mahāyāna* Mvy 1250 (m. 1254)
7. The classification of the Path of Accumulation:
- M. *čirγulqu-yin mör*, T. *tshogs lam*, S. *sambhāramārga*
- The Limited Path of Accumulation M. *öčüken čirγulqu mör*
 - The Average Path of Accumulation M. *dumda-du čirγulqu mör*
 - The Great Path of Accumulation M. *yeke čirγulqu mör*
8. The classification of the Path of Preparation into five (but only four items are listed)
- M. *barildurγulqu-yin mör*, T. *sbyor lam*, S. *prayogamārga*
- in Mvy 1211 (m. 1215), BHS 305 the first item is: T. *nges par 'byed pa'i cha dang mthun pa*, S. *nirvedhabhāgīya*, here missing
 - The Path of Preparation of Heat M. *baridurγulqu-yin dulaγan mör*, T. *dro bar 'gyur ba*, S. *ušmagata* Mvy 1212 (m. 1216)
 - The Path of Preparation of Peak M. *baridurγulqu-yin üjügür mör*, T. *rtse mo*, S. *mürdhan* Mvy 1213 (m. 1217)
 - The Path of Preparation of Patience M. *baridurγulqu-yin küličenggüi mör*, T. *bzod pa*, S. *kṣānti* Mvy 1214 (m. 1218)
 - the Path of Preparation of Supreme [Wordly] Dharmas M. *baridurγulqu-yin degedü nom-un mör*, T. [*'jig rten pa'i*] *chos kyi mchog*, S. *laukikāgradharma* Mvy 1215 (m. 1219)
9. The classification of the Path of Preparation into twelve:
- M. *barildurγulqu-yin mör*, T. *sbyor lam*, S. *prayogamārga*
- The Limited Heat M. *öčüken dulaγan*
 - The Average Heat M. *dumda-du dulaγan* [missing in UP 42v6]
 - The Great Heat M. *yeke dulaγan* [missing in UP 42v6]
 - The Limited Peak M. *öčüken üjügür*
 - The Average Peak M. *dumda-du üjügür*
 - The Great Peak M. *yeke üjügür*
 - The Limited Patience M. *öčüken küličenggüi*
 - The Average Patience M. *dumda-du küličenggüi*
 - The Great Patience M. *yeke küličenggüi*
 - The Limited Supreme [Wordly] Dharmas M. *öčüken degedü nom*
 - The Average Supreme [Wordly] Dharmas M. *dumda-du degedü nom* [correctly in Pe 52v8-9, V 126,2, but in P 43r20 and UP 42v8: *du degedü nom*]
 - The Great Supreme [Wordly] Dharmas M. *yeke degedü nom*
10. The classification of the Path of Vision:
- M. *üjekü-yin mör*, T. *mthong ba'i lam*, S. *darśanamārga*

- M. *tüidker ügei üjekü-yin mör* (?)
 - M. *tegsi aḡulqui üjekü-yin mör* (?)
 - M. *daḡan oluḡsan üjekü-yin mör* (?)
 - M. *masi aldarsiḡsan üjekü-yin mör* (?)
11. The Five Paths of the Great Vehicle:
M. *yeke kölgen*, T. *theg pa chen po*, S. *mahāyāna*
- The Path of Accumulation M. *čirulqu-yin mör*, T. *tshogs lam*, S. *sambhāramārga*
 - The Path of Preparation M. *barilduḡulqu-yin mör*, T. *sbyor lam*, S. *prayogamārga*
 - The Path of Supreme Bodhisattva (?) M. *erkin bodisung-nar-un mör*
 - The Path of Vision of Great Vehicle M. *yeke kölgen-ü üjekü-yin mör*, T. *mthong ba'i lam*, S. *darśanamārga*
 - The Very First Joyous Stage M. *eng terigün bayasqulang-tu ḡaḡar*, T. *rab tu dḡa' ba*, S. *pramūḡita* Mvy 886 (m. 888)
12. The Path of Meditation of the Great Vehicle - the stages from the second up to the tenth M. *yeke kölgen-ü bisilḡal-un mör*, T. *sgom pa'i lam*, S. *bhāvanāmārga*
13. The Path of No More Training - the eleventh stage M. *ülü surqu-yin mör*, T. *mi slob pa'i lam*, S. *aśaikṣamārga*
- III.** The Ten Stages of the Bodhisattva [P 43v11-18] M. *bodisung nar-un arban ḡaḡar*, T. *sa bcu*, S. *daśa bhūmi* Mvy 885-895 (m. 887-897), BHSD 411a
1. The Twelve Sets of a Hundred Qualities to be obtained at the First Stage M. *arban qoyar ḡaḡun toḡ-a tan erdem-üd*, T. *yon tan brgya phrag bcu ḡñis*, S. *dvādaśaśataḡaṇa*
 2. The Perfections M. *baramid*, T. *pha rol tu*, S. *pāramitā* Mvy 913-923 (m. 915-925) which are considered to be important at the stages:
 - The First – the Perfection of Giving M. *olangki öḡlige baramid*, T. *sbyin pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa*, S. *dānapāramitā*
 - The Second – the Perfection of Morality M. *siḡsabad baramid*, T. *tshul khrims kyi pha rol tu phyin pa*, S. *śīlapāramitā*
 - The Third – the Perfection of Patience M. *küličengḡüi baramid*, T. *bzod pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa*, S. *kṣāntipāramitā*
 - The Fourth – the Perfection of Vigour M. *küčiyengḡüi baramid*, T. *brtson 'grus kyi pha rol tu phyin pa*, S. *vīryapāramitā*
 - The Fifth – the Perfection of Meditation M. *diyan baramid*, T. *bsam gtan gyi pha rol tu phyin pa*, S. *dhyānapāramitā*
 - The Sixth – the Perfection of Wisdom M. *bilig baramid*, T. *shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa*, *prajñāpāramitā*

- The Seventh – the Perfection of Methods M. *arγas-un baramid*, T. *thabs kyi pha rol tu phyin pa*, S. *upāyapāramitā*
 - The Eight – the Perfection of Dedication M. *irüger-ün baramid*, T. *smon lam gyi pha rol tu phyin pa*, S. *prañidhānapāramitā*
 - The Ninth – the Perfection of Power M. *küčün-ü baramid*, T. *stobs kyi pha rol tu phyin pa*, S. *balapāramitā*
 - The Tenth – the Perfection of Knowledge M. *olangki belge bilig-ün baramid*, T. *ye šes kyi pha rol tu phyin pa*, S. *jñānapāramitā*
3. Explanation of the Purity of the Three Circles according to the Act of Giving M. *oγuγata arilurγsan öglige*, = T. *'khor gsum yongs su dag pa*, S. *trimaṇḍala-parisuddham* Mvy 2537 (m. 2545), BHSD 258a
 4. Explanation of the Accumulation M. *čirγulγan*, T. *tshogs*, S. *sambhāra* Mvy *830 (m. 832)
 5. Explanation of the connection between the Accumulation and the Body M. *bey-e*, T. *sku*, S. *kāya* [Limited Path of Accumulation – accumulation of merits]

IV. The Four Bodies of a Buddha (BHSD 277):

- The Truth Body M. *mön činar-un bey-e*, T. *ngo bo ŋid sku*, S. *svabhāvakāya*
 - The Body of Dharma M. *nom-un bey-e*, T. *chos kyi sku*, S. *dharmakāya* Mvy 116 (m. 114)
 - The Complete Enjoyment Body M. *tegüs jirγalang-un bey-e*, T. *longs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku*, S. *sambhogakāya* Mvy 117 (m. 115)
 - The Emanation Body M. *qubilγan-u bey-e*, T. *sprul pa'i sku*, S. *nirmanakāya* Mvy 118 (m. 116)
1. Explanation of the Truth Body and the Body of Dharma as not to be seen and apprehended
 2. Explanation of the Complete Enjoyment Body as accomplished by the Five Certainties M. *tabun maγad*, T. *nges pa lnga*, S. [?] [Ts 66]:
 - The Certainty of the Body M. *maγad bey-e*, T. *sku nges pa*
 - The Certainty of the Disciples M. *maγad nökör*, T. *'khor nges pa*
 - The Certainty of the Teaching M. *maγad nom*, T. *chos nges pa*
 - The Certainty of the Time M. *maγad čaγ*, T. *dus nges pa*
 - The Certainty of the Place M. *maγad oron*, T. *gnas nges pa*
 3. Explanations of each Certainty:
 - of the Body – to be adorned with 32 Marks (S. *lakṣaṇa*) and 80 Minor Characteristics (S. *anuvyañjana*)
 - of the Disciples – to be surrounded by the Disciples of Supreme Bodhisattva of the Great Vehicle

- of the Teaching – to be taught the doctrines of the Great Vehicle
 - of the Time – to live until *samsara* will become Empty
 - of the Place – to live in Akanisṭha
4. Explanation of the Emanation Body M. *qubilγan-u bey-e*, T. *sprul pa'i sku*, S. *nirṃaṇakāya* Mvy 118 (m. 116)
 5. The differences between the two Bodies, the Body of Dharma M. *nom-un bey-e*, T. *chos kyi sku*, S. *dharmakāya* Mvy 116 (m. 114) and the Form Body M. *öngge-tü bey-e*, T. *gzugs sku*, S. *rūpakāya* BHSD 456
 6. The two Wisdoms *jñāna* relying on the two Bodies [Ts 29: two kinds of knowledge]:
 - The Wisdom of Quality (?) M. *yambar-i kü medegči belge bilig* [Ts 29 T. *ji ltar ba mkhyen pa*, S. *yathāvajjñāna*, knowledge of all conventional phenomena]
 - The Wisdom of Quantity (?) M. *tedüi бүкүи medegči belge bilig* [Ts 29 T. *ji sñid pa mkhyen pa*, S. *yāvajjñāna*, knowledge of all ultimate phenomena]
 7. The division of the Wisdoms into four:

[usually five wisdoms are counted, however *Merged* 905-906 gives 4 bodies and 4 wisdoms, according to T-T-Ch 2594-5 also 4, with an explanation, that these four come out from five by excluding *chos dbyings ye shes* which covers all; in Mvy 110 (m. 109) S. *dharmadhātuviśuddhi*, T. *chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa*; BHSD 278b]

 - The Mirror Like Wisdom M. *tolī metü belge bilig*, T. *me long lta bu'i ye shes*, S. *ādarśajñāna* Mvy 111 (m. 110)
 - The Wisdom of Equality M. *tegsi belge bilig*, T. *mñam pa ñid kyi ye shes*, S. *samatājñāna* Mvy 112 (m. 111)
 - The Wisdom through Reflection M. *öber-e öber-e onoqui belge bilig*, T. *so sor rtog pa'i ye shes*, S. *pratyavekṣaṇajñāna* Mvy 113 (m. 112), BHSD 376
 - The Wisdom of the Carrying out of Duty M. *üile-yi бүтүгегчи belge bilig* [P 45r8 bilig is missing, V 133, 3-4 belge bilig is missing, correctly in UP 44v9, Pe 55r18], T. *bya ba nan tan du grub pa'i ye shes*, S. *kṛtyanuṣṭhānajñāna* Mvy 114 (m. 113), BHSD 191a
 - (the fifth wisdom here is missing; according to BHSD 278 b: [?] T. *chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa*, S. *dharmadhātuviśuddhi*, Mvy 110 (m. 109))
 8. Explanation of the connection between the Wisdoms and the Bodies [?] [*Merged* 905-906 connects 4 bodies with 4 wisdoms, listing 4 bodies: M. *mön činar*, T. *bzhin ngo bo ñid*, M. *teyin bolbasural*, T. *rnam par snim pa*, M. *tegüs jirγalang*, T. *longs spyod rdzogs pa*, M. *qubilγan bey-e*, T. *sprul pa'i sku* and 4 wisdoms afterwards]

- The Mirror Like Wisdom M. *tolī metū belge bilig*, T. *me long lta bu'i ye shes*, S. *ādarśajñāna* Mvy 111 (m. 110) is the Body of Dharma M. *nom-un bey-e*, T. *chos kyi sku*, S. *dharmakāya* Mvy 116 (m. 114)
 - The Wisdom of Equality M. *tegsi belge bilig*, T. *mñam pa ñid kyi ye shes*, S. *samatājñāna* Mvy 112 (m. 111) and the Wisdom through Reflection M. *öber-e öber-e onoqui belge bilig*, T. *so sor rtog pa'i ye shes*, S. *pratyaवेक्षणajñāna* Mvy 113 (m. 112), BHSD 376 are the Complete Enjoyment Body M. *tegüs jirγalang-un bey-e*, T. *longs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku*, S. *sambhogakāya* Mvy 117 (m. 115)
 - The Wisdom of the Carrying out of Duty M. *üile-yi bütügegči belge bilig*, T. *bya ba nan tan du grub pa'i ye shes*, S. *kṛtyanuṣṭhānajñāna* Mvy 114 (m. 113), BHSD 191 is the Emanation Body M. *qubilγan-u bey-e*, T. *sprul pa'i sku*, S. *nirmaṇakāya* Mvy 118 (m. 116)
 - The Omniscience M. *qamurγ belge bilig* [?] T. *thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes* [T-T-Ch 1151-52 *thams cad mkhyen pa* 4 wisdoms and 3 bodies] and the Body of All Buddhas M. *qamurγ burqad-un bey-e* (?) is the Body of Dharma M. *nom-un bey-e*, T. *chos kyi sku*, S. *dharmakāya* Mvy 116 (m. 114)
9. Explanation that the Secret Spell tradition M. *niγuča tarni*, T. *gsang sngags*, S. *mantra* Mvy 4237 (m. 4222) teaches about the Five Wisdoms
- V. The Five Thoughts of Enlightenment M. *ile bodičid*, T. *byang chub kyi sems*, S. *bodhicitta* Mvy *2351 (m. 2362), BHSD 402a [P 45r17-45v7]:
- created from the Emptiness M. *qoγusun kü aγar*
 - created from the Earth M. *debisker*
 - created from the Capital of Speech and Writing *jarliγ üsüg-ün köröngge*
 - created from the Signs of Gestures of Thought M. *sedkil-ün mutur-un belges*
 - created from the Complete Perfection of the Body M. *bey-e-yi oγurγata tegüsügsen* [P 45r21 *tegüs geküi*, correctly Pe 55v17]
1. The Three Forms M. *dürsü*, T. *gzugs*, S. *rūpa* by which the Buddha is established:
- The Speech and Writing M. *jarliγ üsüg*
 - The Signs of Gestures of Thought M. *sedkil-ün mutur-un belges*
 - The Complete Perfection of the Body M. *bey-e-yi oγurγata tegüsügsen*
2. The Six Fruits which are stimulating the Buddha's [State]:
- The fruit of Vairocana M. *viročan-a*, T. *rnam par snang mdzod*
 - The fruit of Vajrasattva M. *včir sadub-a*, T. *rdo rje sems dpa'*
 - The fruit of Akṣobhya M. *aksobi*, T. *mi khruγs pa*

- The fruit of Amitābha M. *abidu*, T. *'od dpag med*
- The fruit of Amoghasiddhi M. *amokasidi*, T. *don yod grub pa*
- The fruit of Ratnasambhava M. *ratn-a sambab-a*, T. *rin chen 'byung gnas*

VI. Explanation of Tantra [45v8-47r7]:

- The kṛīya tantra M. *üiles-ün ündüsün*, T. *bya rgyud*
 - The cārya tantra M. *yabudal-un ündüsün*, T. *spyod rgyud*
 - The yoga tantra M. *yoga-yin ündüsün*, T. *rnal 'byor rgyud*
 - The anuttarayoga tantra M. *tengsel ügei ündüsün*, T. *rnal 'byor bla med rgyud*
1. The preachers [M. *nomlaṅč'i*] of Tantra:
 - The Buddha Śākyamuni transmitted the kṛīya tantra and majority of the cārya tantra
 - The Buddha Vairocana – the yoga tantra
 - The Cakrasaṃvara (M. *manadal-un erkin* T. *bde mchog*) [?] – the anuttarayoga tantra (M. *degere ügei niṅuča-yin ündüsün* [note that previously the anuttarayoga tantra was rendered in Mongolian as *tengsel ügei ündüsün*])
 - The Father and Mother Vajradhara M. *včir-a dara ečige eke* – the Vajra [?] cakrasaṃvara M. *včir-a cakr-a sambar-a*; Guhyasamāja M. *niṅuča quriyangγui*, T. *gsang 'dus*; Kālacakra M. *čarγ-un kürdün*, T. *dus kyi 'khor lo* and others
 2. The division into four tantras:
 - preached in the World of Desire M. *amarmaṅ-un yirtinčü*, T. *'dod pa'i kham*s, S. *kāmadhātu* [Mvy 3072 (m. 3069)] like the Rule of Four Attachments M. *tačiyangγui*, T. *chags pa*, S. *rāga*
 - preached for four disciples, stupid or bright M. *bidarγu qurča oyutan*, T. [?] *dbang po rtul ba*; *dbang po shin tu rno ba*, S. [?] *mṛdvindriya*, *tikṣnendriya*
 - preached for people of four origins M. *dörben ijaṅur-tu kümün* (S. *varṇa*)
 - preached for four people, followers of the Heretics M. *ters nom tan-dur darγan oluṅsi*
 3. The four tantras preached similarly to the Attachment of Desire:
 - M. *amarmaṅ-un tačiyangγui*
 - – The kṛīya tantra to satisfy the Attachment of Seeing back and forth (M. *činarγsi inarγsi üjged tačiyangγui*, T. *bltas pa'i 'dod chags* [?] Ts 144) of the gods of *Paranirmitavaśavartin* [class] M. *busud-un qubilγan-u erke-ber üiledügč'i*, T. *gzhan 'phrul dbang byed* Mvy 3083 (m. 3080), BHSD 319

- – The cārya tantra to satisfy the Attachment of Laughing back and forth (M. *činarγsi inarγsi inigegeḍ sača tačiyangγui*, T. *rgod pa'i 'dod chags* [?] Ts 144) of the gods of *Nirmāṇarati* [class] M. *qubilγan-dur bayasuγči*, T. *'phrul dga'* Mvy 3082 (m. 3079), BHSD 302
 - – The yoga tantra to satisfy the Attachment of Touching each other (M. *γar γar-iyān barilčarad sača tačiyangγui*, T. [?] *lag pa bcangs pa'i 'dod chags* Ts 144) of the gods of *Tuṣita* [class] M. *tegüs bayasqulang-tu*, T. *dga'ldan* Mvy 3081 (m. 3078), BHSD 255
 - – The anuttarayoga tantra to satisfy the Attachment of Embracing each other (M. *doroγsi qoyar büri ebüčeldün qamtudqarγsan-iyar tačiyangγui*, T. [?] *gñis gñis 'khyud pa'i 'dod chags* Ts 144) of the gods of *Trāyāstrimśa* [class] M. *γučin γurban*, T. *sum cu rtsa gsum pa* Mvy 3079 (m. 3076), BHSD 257
4. The four tantras preached to convert stupid and bright disciples:
- for stupid and lower class students – the krīya tantra M. *üiles-ün ündüsün*, T. *bya rgyud*
 - for better students – the cārya tantra M. *yabudal-un ündüsün*, T. *spyod rgyud*
 - for students better from them – the yoga tantra M. *yoga-yin ündüsün*, T. *rnal 'byor rgyud*
 - for even better students – the anuttarayoga tantra is preached M. *tengsel ügei ündüsün*, T. *rnal 'byor bla med rgyud*
5. The four tantras for the people of four origins M. *dörben ijaγur-tu kümün*, who are called [*Merged* 515-516 lists 6]:
- the thinkers (M. *sedkigči*) (?) [*Merged* 515 M. *üküküi-e sedkigči nom tan*, T. *'chi bar sems pa'i chos tan*,]
who come to the end by ascetism M. *qatarγužil berke yabudal*
 - the wishers (M. *küsegčid*) (?), who end by falling down M. *qalturmaγ-iyar* (?) [*Merged* 515 M. *baγwraqu nom tan*, T. *ñams pa'i chos tan*]
 - for people of brahmin origin M. *baraman ijaγur-tu kümün* – the krīya tantra M. *üiles-ün ündüsün*, T. *bya rgyud*
 - for people of princely origin M. *noyalirγ ijaγur-tu kümün* – the cārya tantra M. *yabudal-un ündüsün*, T. *spyod rgyud*
 - for people of royal origin M. *qan ijaγur-tu kümün* – the yoga tantra M. *yoga-yin ündüsün*, T. *rnal 'byor rgyud*
 - for people of common origin M. *qaračus ijaγur-tu* – the anuttarayoga tantra is preached M. *tengsel ügei ündüsün*, T. *rnal 'byor bla med rgyud*
6. The four tantras preached to convert the followers of the Heretics:
M. *ters nom -tan-u daγaγči*
- for the followers of Brahma M. *esru-a-yi daγaγči* T. *tshangs pa* Mvy *3115 (m. 3112) – the krīya tantra M. *üiles-ün ündüsün*, T. *bya rgyud*

- for the followers of Viṣṇu M. *visnu-a-yi daḡaḡči*, T. *kyab 'jug* Mvy 3130 (m. 3127) – the cārya tantra M. *yabudal-un ündüsün*, T. *spyod rgyud*
- for the followers of Maheśvara M. *makesvari-yi burqan kemen barimtalaju nökör*, T. *dbang phyug chen po* Mvy 3118 (m. 3115) – the anuttarayoga tantra M. *tensel ügei ündüsün*, T. *rnal 'byor bla med rgyud* is preached
- to convert these three groups of followers – the yoga tantra M. *yoga-yin ündüsün*, T. *rnal 'byor rgyud* is preached

VII. The Three Spheres of the World [P 47r7-48r22] M. *ḡurban yirtinčü*, T. *khamsgsum*, S. *traidhātuka* Mvy 3071 (m. 3068), BHSD 259b

- The World of Desire M. *amarmaḡ-un yirtinčü*, T. *'dod pa'i khams*, S. *kāmadhātu* Mvy 3072 (m. 3069), BHSD 177a
 - The World of Form M. *öngetü yirtinčü*, T. *gzugs kyi khams*, S. *rūpadhātu* Mvy 3073 (m. 3070), BHSD 456b
 - The World of Formlessness M. *önge ügei yirtinčü*, T. *gzugs med pa'i khams*, S. *ārūpadhātu* Mvy 3074 (m. 3071), BHSD 104a
1. The Twenty Places of Desire M. *amarmaḡ-un oron* [not *yirtinčü*] [ABHK III, Chaudhuri 47-48]
 - The Ten Places of Bad Fate M. *maḡui jāyaḡan*, T. *ngan 'gro* [Ts 66 *ngan song gi gnas bcu*, Mvy 4747 (m. 4748) S. *apāya*], S. *durgati* Mvy 47476 (m. 4747)
 - The Ten Places of Higher Rebirths M. *degedü töröl* maybe: T. *mthoris* Su I 960, or Su 127 *skyes mchog*. [One expects here S. *sugati*, T. *bde 'gro* Mvy 5372 (m. 5360) M. *amur yabuḡči*. It seems that M. *degedü töröl* is used instead of T. *bde 'gro*.]
 2. The Ten Places of Bad Fate M. *maḡui jāyaḡan*, T. *ngan 'gro*, S. *durgati* Mvy 4746 (m. 4747)
 - The Eight Hot Hells M. *naiman qalaḡun tamu*, T. *tsha ba'i dmyal* Mvy *4919 (m. 4918)
 - The Eight Cold Hells M. *naiman küiten tamu*, T. *grang ba'i dmyal* Mvy *4928 (m. 4927)
 - The Hungry Ghosts M. *berid*, T. *yi dags*, S. *preta* Mvy 4753 (m. 4754)
 - The Animals M. *adaḡusun*, T. *dud 'gro*, S. *tiryak* Mvy *4752 (m. 4753)
 3. The Ten Places of Higher Rebirths M. *degedü töröl* [See note on VII, 1.]
 - The Four Continents M. *dörben dib*, T. *gling bzhi*, S. **dvīpa* Mvy 3045 (m. 3042)

- The Six Places of Gods of Desire M. *amarmaγun tengri ner-ün jirγuγan oron*, T. 'dod pa'i khams kyi lha, S. *kāmāvacāradeva*
- 4. The Four Continents M. *dörben dib*, T. *gling bzhi*, S. **dvīpa* Mvy 3045 (m. 3042)
- 5. The Six Places of the Gods of Desire M. *amarmaγun tengri ner-ün jirγuγan oron*, T. 'dod pa'i khams kyi lha, S. *kāmāvacāradeva* Mvy 3075 (m. 3072), BHSD 177a
- 6. The Three Stages of the first dhyāna M. *nigedüger diyan-u oron*, T. *bsam gtan dang po'i sa* Mvy 3084-3088 (m. 3081-3085)
- 7. The Three Stages of the second dhyāna M. *qoyaduγar diyan-u oron*, T. *bsam gtan gñis pa'i sa* Mvy 3089 (m. 3086)
- 8. The Three Stages of the third dhyāna M. *γutuγar diyan-u oron*, T. *bsam gtan gsum pa'i sa* Mvy 3093 (m. 3090)
- 9. The Eight Stages of the Fourth dhyāna M. *dötüger diyan-u oron*, T. *bsam gtan bzhi pa'i sa* Mvy 3097 (m. 3094)
- 10. The Four Spheres of the World of Formlessness M. *öngge ügei yirtünčü-yin oron*, T. *gnas gtsang ma'i sa* Mvy 3109 (m. 3106), BHSD 270b
- 11. The Nine Levels of the Three Spheres of the World M. *γurban yirtinčü deki yisün γaǰar* (?)
 - The Level of Desire M. *amarmaγ-un γaǰar*, T. [?] 'dod pa'i sa, S. [?] *kāmadhātu*
 - The Level of the first dhyāna M. *nigedüger diyan-u γaǰar*, T. *bsam gtan dang po'i sa* [?]
 - The Level of the second dhyāna M. *qoyaduγar diyan-u γaǰar*, T. *bsam gtan gñis pa'i sa* [?]
 - The Level of the third dhyāna M. *γutuγar diyan-u γaǰar*, T. *bsam gtan gsum pa'i sa* [?]
 - The Level of the fourth dhyāna M. *dötüger diyan-u γaǰar*, T. *bsam gtan bzhi pa'i sa* [?]
 - (The first sphere of the World of Formlessness) M. *kijaγalal ügei oγtarγui-yin γaǰar*, T. *nam mkha' mtha' yas sñoms 'jug*, S. *Ākāśānantyāyatana* BHSD 101
 - (The second sphere of the World of Formlessness) M. *kijaγalal ügei oγtarγui-yin γaǰar*, T. *rnam shes mtha' yas sñoms 'jug*, S. *Vijñānānantyāyatana* BHSD 101
 - (The third sphere of the World of Formlessness) M. *yaγun ber ügei-yin γaǰar*, T. *ci yang med pa'i sñoms 'jug*, S. *Ākimcanyāyatana* BHSD 101
 - (The fourth sphere of the World of Formlessness) M. *sansar-un üjügür-ün γaǰar* (= T. *srid rtse* = 'du shes med 'du shes med ming gyi sñoms 'jug, S. *Naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* BHSD 101, *Bhavāgra*)

12. The Eight Levels of the Lower Vehicle M. *door-a-du kölge-yin naiman* *ḡaḡar*, T. *theḡ dman sa brgyad* Ts 125a, [S. *hīnayāna*]
- M. *īḡarur-un ḡaḡar*, T. *riḡs kyī sa*, S. *Gotrabhūmi*
 - M. *naimadurḡar ḡaḡar*, T. *brgyad pa'i sa*, S. *Aṣṡamakabhūmi*
 - M. *masī čarḡan-a üjekü-yin ḡaḡar*, T. *dkar po rnam par mthong ba'i sa*, S. *Śuklavidarśanābhūmi*
 - M. *nimgereḡsen ḡaḡar*, T. *bsrabs pa'i sa*, S. *Tanubhūmi*
 - M. *tačiyangḡwi-ača anggiḡiraḡsan ḡaḡar*, T. *'dod chags dang bral ba'i sa*, S. *Vigatarāgabhūmi*
 - M. *üledüḡsen-i uraqui-yin ḡaḡar*, T. *byas pa rtogs pa'i sa*, S. *Kṛṡā-vibhūmi*
 - The Level of the Disciple M. *siravang-un ḡaḡar*, T. [?]
 - The Level of the Pratyekabuddha M. *bradikabud-un ḡaḡar*, T. [?]

VIII. The Four Persons *pudgala*: [P 48r23-49v1]

- The stream-enterer M. *ürgülḡide orurḡsan*, T. *rgyun-du zhugs pa*, S. *śrotaāpanna* Mvy 1009 (m. 1011)
 - The once-returner M. *nigen-te qarīn ireḡči*, T. *lan cig phyir 'ong ba*, S. *sakṛdāḡāmin* Mvy 1012 (m. 1014)
 - The non-returner M. *qarīn ülü ireḡči*, T. *phyir mi 'ong ba*, S. *anāḡāmin* Mvy 1014 (m. 1016)
 - The Holy one M. *dayīn darurḡsan*, T. *dḡra bcom pa*, S. *arhat* Mvy 4 (m. 5)
1. The Five Sins Without Interval Intermediation M. *tabun ḡabsar üḡei niḡül*, T. *mtshams med pa lnga*, S. *pañcānantarya* Mvy 2323 (m. 2333), The Jewel 89
- having killed own mother
 - having killed own father
 - having killed the Arhat
 - shedding the blood of the Tathāḡata body by many bad thoughts
 - causing divisions among the priesthood
2. The Five which are Nearly Ones (like the above) M. *tabun oyiradurḡsan*, T. *ñe ba'i mtshams med lnga*, S. [?] Mvy 2329-2334 (m. 2339-2344) [with small differences Ts 95a]
- having scared a nun (should be 'female arhat') by wrong passion
 - having assassinated in anger (the expression 'in anger' dose not appear in standard expositions) bodhisattvas who are surely to become Buddha

- having assassinated *śrotaāpanna* (in standard versions: the teacher T. *slob-pa*)
 - having robbed property of the palace [here: M. *qarsi* means ‘palace’, however in the standard Tibetan expositions there is: ‘congregation’ T. *dge ’dun*]
 - having destroyed a stupa
3. The Four Evil Ones M. *dörben simnus*, T. *bdud bzhi*, S. [?] *māra* BHSD 430b, DH LXXX
- The Evil One of the Lord of Death, M. *ükül-ün ejen-ü simnus*, [ABHK III, 69 S. *Maraṇa-māra*, T. *’chi bdag gi bdud*]
 - The Evil One of Delusion M. *nisvanis-un simnus*, T. *ñon mongs pa’i bdud*, S. *Kleśa-māra*
 - The Evil of Body M. *bey-e-yin simnus* [?] [should be of S. *skandha*, T. *phung po’i bdud*, S. *Skandha-māra*]
 - The Evil of Gods M. *tengri-yin simnus*, should be ‘the Evil of Sons of Gods’ T. *lha’i bu’i bdud*, S. *Devaputra-māra*
4. The Nine Fetters M. *yiśün sansar-dur qamuγ-a barilduγuluγčī*, T. [?] *kun tu sbyor ba*, S. *saṃyojana* of Cyclic Existence BHSD 538-9:
- The Fetter caused by Desire M. *tačiyangγui-bar qamuγ-a barilduγuluγčī*
 - The Fetter caused by Anger M. *kiling-iyer qamuγ-a barilduγuluγčī*
 - The Fetter caused by Pride M. *omog-iyar qamuγ-a barilduγuluγčī*
 - The Fetter caused by Ignorance M. *mungqaγ-iyar qamuγ-a barilduγuluγčī*
 - The Fetter caused by Distrust M. *sejing-iyer qamuγ-a barilduγuluγčī*
 - The Fetter caused by [False] View M. *üjel-iyer qamuγ-a barilduγuluγčī*
 - The Fetter caused by Sinful Thoughts M. *qarakis sedkil-iyer qamuγ-a barilduγuluγčī*
 - The Fetter caused by Greed M. *qaram-iyar qamuγ-a barilduγuluγčī*
 - The Fetter caused by *śīlavrataparāmarśa* [?] – clinging to practices and observances M. *saγsibad ba törü yabudal-i erilegčī-ber qamuγ-a barilduγuluγčī*
5. The Four Defilements M. *dörben čuburil*, T. *zag pa*, S. *āsrava* BHSD 111
- The Defilement of Craving M. *küsekü-yin čuburil*, S. *kāmāsrava*
 - The Defilement of Lust M. *quričaqu-yin čuburil* [should be the Defilement of Existence T. *srid pa’i zag pa*, S. *bhavāsrava*]
 - The Defilement of Ignorance M. *mungqaγ-un čuburil*, S. *avidyāsrava*
 - The Defilement of View M. *üjel-ün čuburil*, S. *drṣṭyāsrava*

6. The Four M. *örgül* (?) :
- of *skandha* M. *čorčis-un örgül*
 - of *kleśa* M. *nisvanis-un örgül*
 - of *samaya* M. *tangγarγ-un örgül*
 - of *vīrya* M. *kičiyenggüi-yin örgül*
7. The Four Yokes M. *barilduγuluγčiči*, T. *sbyor ba*, S. *yoga* Mvy 2143 (m. 2153)
8. The Four Clingings M. *oir-a abqui*, T. *ñe bar len pa*, S. *upādāna* Mvy 2154 (m. 2154)
9. The Four Torrents M. *müred*, T. *chu bo*, S. *ogha* Mvy 2142 (m. 2152)
10. The Four Knots M. *janggiy-a*, T. [?] *mdud pa*, S. [?] *grantha* [T-T-Ch 1379a T. *mdud pa bzhi*, *Merged* 417] :
- The Knot of Desire M. *küsekü-yin janggiy-a*
 - The Knot of View M. *üjel-ün janggiy-a*
 - The Knot of Morality and Practices M. *saγsibad ba törü yabudal-i erilegčiči-yin janggiy-a*
 - The Knot of Clinging (?) M. *barimtalaračiči-yin oira abqui janggiy-a*
11. The Four Wrong Thoughts M. *buruγu sedkigčiči*, T. *phyin ci log pa*, S. *viparyāsa* BHSD 493, Ts 174-5
- taking for eternal what is not eternal
 - taking for pleasant what is suffering
 - taking for a self what is not a self
 - taking for pure what is not pure
12. The Four Nutriments M. *idegen*, T. *zas*, S. *āhāra* Mvy 2283-87 (m. 2291-95)
- The Food formed in lumps M. *ijaγur-un idegen*, T. *kham gyi zas*, S. *kavaḍḍakārāhāra*
 - The touch-Food M. *kürülčegsen idegen*, T. *reg pa'i zas*, S. *sparśāhāra*
 - The Food of mental thought M. *duran-dur sedkiküi-yin idegen*, T. *yid la sems pa'i zas*, S. *manasamcetanāhāra*
 - The Food for Consciousness M. *medekü-yin idegen*, T. *rnam par shes pa'i zas*, *viññānāhāra*

IX. The Seven Subjects of the Yogācāras [P 49v5-50r10]: M. *yogačari-yin doloγan*

- The Four Application of Mindfulness M. *duradqui oir-a aγuluγsan*, T. *dran pa ñe bar bzhag pa*, S. *smṛtyupasthāna* Mvy 952-956 (m. 954-958)

- The Four Abandonments M. *üneker tebčiküi*, T. *yang dag par spong ba*, S. *prahāṇa* Mvy 957-961 (m. 959-963)
 - The Four Supernatural Powers M. *ridi köl*, T. *rdzu phrul gyi rkang pa*, S. *ṛddhipāda* Mvyu 966-970 (m. 968-972)
 - The Five Faculties M. *erketen*, T. *dbang po*, S. *indriya* Mvy 976-981 (m. 978-983)
 - The Five Powers M. *küčün*, T. *stobs*, S. *bala* Mvy 982-987 (m. 984-987)
 - The Seven Members of Enlightenment M. *bodi möčün*, T. *byang chub yan lag*, S. *bodhyangga* Mvy 988-995 (m. 990-997)
 - The Noble Eightfold Path M. *quturγtan-u naiman gesigün-ü mör*, T. *'phags pa'i lam yan lag bryad*, S. *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga* Mvy 996-1004 (m. 998-1006)
1. **X.** The Differences in practice between the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna followers [P 50r10-50v9]:
- (a) In the Great Vehicle there are:
- The Path of Limited Accumulation, in which the Four Application of Mindfulness are practiced
 - The Path of Average Accumulation, in which the Four Abandonings are practiced
 - The Path of Great Accumulation, in which the Four Supernatural Powers are practiced
 - The Path of Preparation of Heat and the Path of Peak, in which the Five Faculties are practiced
 - The Path of Preparation of Patience and the Path of Supreme [Worldly] Dharmas, in which the Five Powers are practiced
 - The Path of Vision, in which the Seven Members of Enlightenment are practiced
 - The Path of Meditation, in which the Noble Eightfold Path is practiced
- (b) in the Lower Vehicle there are:
- The Path of Accumulation, in which the Four Application of Mindfulness are practiced
 - The Path of Preparation of Heat, in which the Four Abandonings are practiced
 - The Path of Preparation of Peaks, in which the Four Supernatural Powers are practiced
 - The Path of Preparation of Patience, in which the Five Faculties are practiced
 - The Path of Supreme [Worldly] Dharmas, in which the Five Powers are practiced

- The Path of Vision, in which the Seven Members of Enlightenment are practiced
- The Path of Meditation, in which the Noble Eightfold Path is practiced

XI. The Six Peaceful Paths [P 50v9-51r18]: M. *amurlingγui jirγuγan mör* (?)

- The Four Truths M. *ünen*, T. *bden pa*, S. *satya*
- The Four Concentrations M. *diyan*, T. *bsam gtan*, S. *dhyāna*
- The Four Infinitude M. *čaγlasi ügei*, S. *apramāṇa*, T. *tshad med* Ts 217
- The Four Formless Equanimities M. *öngge ügei-yin tegsi orolduγsan*, S. *samāpatti*, T. *sñoms 'jug* Ts 103a
- The Eight Deliverances M. *masida toniluγsan*, S. *vimokṣa*, T. *rnam thar* Ts 157b
- The Nine Gradual States of Equanimity M. *jerger-ber aγsan yisün tegsi orolduqun*, S. *anupūrvavihārasamāpatti*, T. *mthar gyis gnas pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa* Mvy 1498 (m. 1502), Ts 126a Su. I, 954

XII. Miscellaneous (?) [51r18-52v7]

1. The Three Direct Insights M. *ülemji üjekü-yin* [*γurban masi toniluγsan qaγalγa*, T. **lhag mthong*, S. **vipaśyanā* BHSD 491, Mvy 1678 (m. 1684)
2. The Three Differences of the Superior Qualities (?) M. *ülemji erdem-ün γurban ilγal*
 - The Six Higher Spiritual Powers M. *jöng bilig*, T. *mngon par shes pa*, S. *abhijñā* BHSD 50, Mvy 201-207
 - The Concentrations M. *samadis*, T. *ting nge 'dzin*, S. *samādhi* BHSD 568-9,
 - The Four Doors of Dhāraṇi M. *törü toγtoγal-un qaγalγ-a*, T. *gzungs kyi sgo* BHSD 284, Ts 242, Su II 769
3. The Ten Powers M. *küčün*, T. *stobs*, S. *bala* Mvy 120-129 (m. 118-127), BHSD 397b
4. The Four Fearlessnesses M. *ayul ügei*, T. *mi 'jogs pa*, S. *vaiśāradya* Mvy [?130-134, 781-785]
5. The Four Perfect Understandings M. *öbere öbere üneker udqaqui*, T. *so so yang dag par rig pa*, S. *pratisaṃvit* Mvy 196-200, BHSD 370b, Ts 287b
6. The Buddha's Eighteen Special Virtues M. *burqan-u arban naiman nom-ud*, T. *sangs rgyas kyi chos ma 'dres pa bcu brgyad*, S. *aṣṭādaśāveṇīkabuddhadharma* Mvy 135-153 (m. 133-151)

7. The Five Persons M. *budgali*, T. *gang zag*, S. *pudgala*
 - The stream-enterer M. *ürgüljide oruγsan*, T. *rgyun-du 'jugs pa*, S. *śrotaāpanna* Mvy 1009 (m. 1011)
 - The once-returned M. *nigen-te qarin iregči*, T. *lan cig phyir 'ong ba*, S. *sakṛdāgāmin* Mvy 1012 (m. 1014)
 - The non-returned M. *qarin ülü iregči*, T. *phyir mi 'ong ba*, S. *anā-gāmin* Mvy 1014 (m. 1016)
 - The Holy one M. *dayin daruγsan*, T. *dgra bcom pa*, S. *arhat* Mvy 4 (m.)
 - The Pratyekabuddha M. *bradikabud*, T. *rang sangs rgyas*
8. The three Knowledges M. *γurban medeküi* (?)
 - Knowing All M. *büküi-yi medeküi*, S. [?] *sarvākārajñatā*
 - Knowing the Path M. *mör-i medeküi*, S. [?] *mārgajñatā*
 - Knowing All Things M. *qamuγ jüül medeküi*, S. [?] *sarvajñatā* [about *trisarvajñatāviśaya* RUEGG, p. 128]

XIII. The Twelve Links of Dependent Origination M. *sitün barilduγsan*, T. *rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i yan lag bcu gñis*, S. *pratītyasamutpāda* [P 52v7-11]

XIV. Miscellaneous [P 52v11-53v10]

1. The Twelve Persons Remaining/Dying (?) M. *üledküi/ükükü-yin tö-rölkiten* [terms to be found in Mvy. 4668-4683]
 - The Individual Soul M. *bi*, T. *bdag*, S. *ātman*
 - The Being M. *amitan*, T. *sems can*, S. *sattva*
 - The Feeder M. *tejyegči*, T. *gso ba*, S. *poṣa*
 - The Man M. *törölkiten*, T. *skyes bu*, S. *puruṣa*
 - The Individual M. *budgali*, T. *gang zag*, S. *pudgala*
 - The (?) M. *küčüten* maybe for: T. *shed las skyes pa*, S. *manuja*, because T. *shed*='strenght' like M. *küčü(n)*
 - The Ruler M. *küčünü ejen*, T. *shed bu* [?] *-bdag*, S. *mānava*
 - The Doer M. *üledügči*, T. *byed pa po*, S. *kāraka*
 - The One who feels M. *seriküi*, T. *tshor ba po*, S. *vedaka*
 - The Wise M. *medegči*, T. *shes pa po*, S. *jānaka*
 - The Seer M. *üjegči*, T. *mthong ba po*, S. *paśyaka*
 - (one is missing)
2. The Six (?) M. *onol-un nom*

[*onol* = Mvy *7470 T. *rtog pa*, S. **prekṣate* [?]]

 - of Heat M. *dulaγan onol-un nom*
 - of Peak M. *üjegür-ün onol-un nom*
 - of Patience M. *küličenggüi onol-un nom*

- of Supreme [Worldly] Dharmas M. *degedü onol-un nom*
 - of Path of Vision M. *üjeküi mör-ün onol-un nom*
 - of Path of Meditation M. *bisilγal-un onol-un nom*
3. The Five Knowledges of (?) M. *burqan-u küsekü oron medekü*
 - The Self Created Knowledge M. *öbesüben bütügsen*
 - The [Knowledge] of Passions Annihilated M. *tačiyangγui-yi usadqarγsan*
 - The Unhindered Knowledge M. *dürbel ügei*
 - The Eternal Knowledge M. *nasuda aγči*
 - The Knowledge of Giving Answers to the Questions M. *öčigsen-i qarirγu ügüleğči*
 4. The Four [Kinds of] Pure M. *ariγun*, T. *dag pa*, S. *parisuddha* Mvy. 197-200
 5. The Ten Sovereign Powers M. *erke oluγsan*, T. (*byang chub sems dpa'i*) *dbang*, S. (*bodhisattva*) *vaśitā* Mvy 770-780, BHSD 474a
 6. The Three Not to Be Guarded M. *γurban sakiqu ügei*, T. *bsrung ba med pa*, S. *araksya* Mvy. 191-195 [in the Mvy four items are listed], BHSD 64b
 7. The Explanation on the Four Application of Mindfulness M. *duradqui oir-a aγulukγsan*, T. *dran pa ñe bar 'jog pa*, S. *smṛtyupasthāna* BHSD 614b
 8. The Five Eyes M. *nidün*, T. *spyān*, S. *cakṣus* BHSD 221a, Ts168a
 9. The Ten [Kinds of] Recollection M. *daγan duradqui*, T. *rjes su dran pa*, S. *anusmṛti* Mvy 1148-1154 (6), BHSD 36b, Ts 91a
 10. The Two Benefits M. *tusa*, T. *don*, S. *artha* T-T-Ch 1302b, BHSD 66, Ts 134b
 11. The Two Accumulations M. *čirγulγan*, T. *tshogs*, S. *sambhāra* BHSD 580a, Ts 219b
 12. The Two [Kinds of] Truth M. *ünen*, T. *bden po*, S. *satya* Mvy 6544-45 (m. 6520-21), BHSD 541b, Ts 141b
 13. The Two Hindrances M. *tüidker*, T. *sgrib pa*, S. *āvaraṇa* BHSD 107a, Ts 61a
 14. The Seven [Spiritual] Treasures of the Aryas M. *qutuγ-tan-u doloγan ed*, T. *'phags pa'i nor bdun*, S. *dhana* Mvy 1565-1572 (m. 1569-1576), BHSD 275a
 15. The Seven Qualities of Higher Rebirths M. *qutuγtan-u doloγan ed*, T. *mtho ris kyi yon tan bdun*, S. *sapta svargaguṇāḥ*
 16. M. *kündü* T. *lci ba* [?] [53v10-54r7]
 - The Four Discouraging (?) *kündü* M. *sintaraγulaγči dörben kündü*

- The Four Great (?) *kündü* M. *yeke dörben kündü*
 - The Insulting (?) M. *kündü* M. *doromjulaqui kündü*
 - The Four (?) M. *kündü* of non-Buddhist M. *γadaγadu dörben kündü*
 - The Four (?) M. *kündü* of Buddhist M. *dotoγadu dörben kündü*
17. The Eight Inopportunate [Births] (actually in Mongolian: ‘Faults’) M. *naiman buruγu*, T. *mi khom pa bryad*, S. *aṣṭāvakṣaṇā* Mvy 2298 (m. 2307), BHSD 2-3, Das 956b, however, the last two items are different:
- to be born in the Hell because of the sins done from Vajrayāna
 - to be born among Animals because of previously done sins
 - to be born among Pretas because of the wrong ideas
 - to be born among Evils because of wrong deeds
 - to be born among Heretics because of wrong objects of offerings
 - to have obstacles caused by harm because of wrong objects of vows
 - to harm because of wrong understanding of truth
18. The Eight Conditions of the World (literary in Mongolian: ‘the eight dharmas of the world’) M. *yirtinčü-yin naiman nom*, T. *’jig rten gyi chos bryad*, S. *aṣṭalokadharmā* Mvy 2341-2348, BHSD 464, Das 455b
19. The Eight Brightnesses (?) M. *gegen*
- of Mind M. *duran-u gegen*
 - of Intellect M. *oyun-u gegen*
 - of Understanding M. *onol-un gegen*
 - of Knowledge M. *bilig-ün gegen*
 - of Supernatural Knowledge M. *jöng bilig-ün gegen*
 - of Meditation M. *bisilγal-un gegen*
 - (missing)
 - (missing)

Bhavya on Mantras: Apologetic Endeavours on Behalf of the Mahāyāna

Jens Braarvig
(Oslo)

Bhavya's *Tarkajvālā* is important for the historical study of the Mahāyāna, and also for the study of the different Indian schools of philosophy, because of its comprehensive, even encyclopaedic nature. It is thus hoped that this work soon will be published in a complete edition including the Sanskrit fragments as well as the Tibetan versions, and with indices. At present the various fragments are included in a number of separate publications.¹ Bhavya's philosophical standpoint of *svatantra* is also important in the history of Madhyamaka philosophy as an interpretation of the early Madhyamaka tradition. In accordance with his *pakṣa*, or position, Bhavya's works are full of apologetic endeavours on behalf of the Mahāyāna, the philosophical viewpoints and ethics of which he extolls as correct and superior to those of the Śrāvakayāna, the Mīmāṃsā, the Vedānta, the Sāṃkhya etc. One of the main accusations of the Śrāvakayāna was that the Mahāyāna writings were fake: from the earliest Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, through the śāstras of the Yogācāra such as the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, and right up to Bhavya's *Tarkajvālā*, great pains were taken to refute such insults from the Śrāvakayāna.² Thus defending the *saddharma* Bhavya strives to safeguard the integrity of the Mahāyāna canon, and in the process provides much valuable historical information on the origin of the sects and of the Mahāyāna – at least if we judge his work according to the standards of Indian historiography, if such a term may be used at all.

In his apologetic endeavours Bhavya also struggles to defend the *mantras*, the meaningless strings of syllables of which the Mahāyāna sūtras are overflowing, and which, as Xuanzang states in his "Account of the journey to the West", were also included in the canonical collections of the Mahāsāṃghikas.³ But, even though such mantras were part of the canonical collections of the Śrāvakayāna, as

¹Vide OLLE QVARNSTRÖM (ed. & tr.), *Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective: The Vedāntatattvaviniścaya Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*, Lund, 1989, for a bibliography.

²*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* (Tr. ÉTIENNE LAMOTTE, Louvain 1962) ch. XII, § 18, p. 389; *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* p. 3_{3ff}: *naivedaṃ mahāyānaṃ buddhavacanaṃ* etc., and p. 4₂₅ - 5₆.

³XUANZANG, *Datang xiyu ji*, Taishō no. 2087, p. 923a.

is also documented by other Hīnayāna scriptures, there were in Bhavya's *milieu* people who held such absurd strings of syllables to be unworthy of inclusion into the proper Buddhist teachings. And indeed, many modern researchers have also related such *abracadabra* to the more dubious Tantric parts of Buddhism as a degenerate form of Buddhism – the presence of such formulae has been taken as evidence of the late origin of sūtras, see for example Paul Demiéville.⁴ This, however, does not seem to be the case, as such formulae go far back in Indian history.

Elsewhere I have suggested that the syllables may have been intended as *aides-mémoire*, related to the *mātrkāś*, the lists of abhidharma concepts summarizing the teachings.⁵ Thus the word *dhāraṇī* originally means memory, and is defined as such in several central scriptures of the Mahāyāna. The *dhāraṇīmantra*, then, may originally have been designed as an expression to help remember the basic teachings – indeed many of these mantras in the Mahāyāna sūtras do in fact contain key concepts of the Buddhist teachings in addition to the meaningless strings of syllables. The presence of these syllables may also possibly be explained as mnemonic – in contexts such syllables may have carried certain meanings like the otherwise meaningless syllables used both in classical Sanskrit grammar and musicology. The *arapacana* alphabet, which is treated as a *dhāraṇī* in several sūtras, is thought to contain the whole of the dharma encrypted in the syllables – the syllables, apart from being the so-called essence of language, are even interpreted as defined parts of the teachings. But, be the origin of the *dhāraṇīmantras* as it may, they certainly quite soon changed into formulae by which both worldly and spiritual advantages could be attained quickly and easily by merely reciting them - without study or any other kind of effort. This of course also has a long tradition in Indian religion – as far back as in Vedic times mantras were designed for all kinds of magical use. The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* treats all the connotations of the word *dhāraṇī*, both those concerned with memory and those concerned with the meaningless syllable part of the mantras, and does his best to protect the rationality of the Buddhist teachings by dividing *dhāraṇī* into four types. Firstly, *dharmadhāraṇī* is remembering the teachings, and, secondly, *arthadhāraṇī* is the remembrance of the meaning of the teachings, while, thirdly, *mantradhāraṇī* is retaining the magical formulae in the thoughts and by means of them attaining the power of concentration, *samādhivaśītā*. As the fourth type comes the *dhāraṇī* to attain the tolerance, *kṣānti*, of all bodhisattvas, namely tolerance of the fact that all words really are bereft of definite meaning in the same way as the strings of syllables in the meaningless mantra. The meaninglessness of the mantra is supposed to produce an understanding of the meaninglessness of existence by way of analogy – if the mantra is recited again and again – and the tolerance of unbornness, emptiness etc., is realized concomitantly.⁶

⁴PAUL DEMIÉVILLE, *Choix d'Études bouddhiques*, Leiden, 1973, p. 196.

⁵JENS BRAARVIG, “*Dhāraṇī* and *Pratibhāna*: Memory and Eloquence of the Bodhisattvas”, *JIAS*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1985, p. 17-29.

⁶*ibid.*, p. 19f.; *Bodhisattvabhūmi* p. 272_{12ff}.

In Bhavya's times, however, it seems that the memory part of the *dhāraṇīmantras* had almost been lost. Indeed, Bhavya, in his apologetic efforts on behalf of the Mahāyāna sūtras, is mainly concerned with giving the mantras a rational explanation as props to aid concentration, foci or "forms" of meditation, *bhāvanākāra*, and as such the origin of insight, *prajñā*. But he still contends that the mantras "contain" the secrets and the teachings of the Buddha hidden in the more or less meaningless syllables, secrets which meditation on the mantras will reveal. Thus Bhavya tried to defend a part of the Mahāyāna texts which was only reluctantly accepted by the intellectual elite of his time, as is also the case today: Buddhism has been appreciated as a great intellectual tradition, but it has been difficult for many people to reconcile the belief in the efficacy of mantras and magical rituals with its great intellectual achievements.

So Bhavya's solution to the problem – in the face of religiously authoritative texts which claimed the mantras to be the Words of the Buddha – was to try to justify the mantras as foci of concentration, which, of course, was very much in accordance with the various traditions of yoga. In so doing he tried to remove the irrational part of his religion keeping the primitive magical aspects of religion at a distance. The emergence of the Tantric aspects of Buddhism and other traditions from about the time when Bhavya lived must have accentuated the problems related to mantras. Bhavya's understanding of the mantras is also one which seems to be part of at least some of the Tantric traditions. There is, however, as is well known, also a strong magical aspect to the Tantras, which indeed accepts the magical efficiency of mantras. Although the line between the magical aspect and the concentrational aspect of the mantras seems not to be a sharp one, and the two aspects are seldom made explicit in the Tantric literature, Bhavya stresses that the magical use of mantras, as for placing curses on people, inducing fear, etc., was not an explicit item on the Mahāyāna agenda.

As mentioned, the accusations of belief in a fake canonical collection comes from the Śrāvakayāna: thus Bhavya's apology for the mantras is part of the chapter rejecting the Śrāvakayāna arguments, i.e., the *Śrāvakatattvaniścayāvatāra*,⁷ the fourth chapter of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā Tarkajvālā*, which has as its explicit purpose to show that the Mahāyāna contains the True Words of the Buddha. The Śrāvaka argument against him, in Bhavya's own words, is that the three types of mantras listed, namely *dhāraṇīmantras*, the *guhya*mantras and *vidyā*mantras, found in the Mahāyāna, are conducive to knowledge of neither the letter (*akṣara*) nor the meaning (*artha*) of the Buddha's teaching. Even though they are highly praised, the teachings concerning them are only able to fool people of inferior intelligence, and as such the *vidyā*mantras are akin to the *Vedic* tradition and not in accordance with the Buddha's teachings. Furthermore, since the *dhāraṇīmantras* really have nothing to do with meditation, *bhāvanā*, they are also not able to remove even the smallest vice, or *kleśa*. And if the *kleśas* are still there, as well as their causes, then there will be no cessation of sinful action, *pāpa*. Thus the

⁷Derge Tanjur *dbu ma dza* fol. 144a₇ff., the section on mantras 183a₆-184b₄ is transliterated in the Appendix.

dhāraṇīmantras are not able to abolish the sins, and, since they have no ability to counteract the cause of the sins, the teachings concerning them are similar to that of the Ājīvikas and other sects – presumably sects not concerned with uprooting the vices. Similarly, the secret mantras, the *guhya-mantras*, are also of no avail in getting rid of sinful actions, even though they are in another language, namely that of the Mlecchas. This last assertion of the *śrāvaka-pakṣa* seems to refer to a historical fact: As shown by Franz Bernhard,⁸ the words of the much quoted mantra *īne mīne dapphe daḍapphe* may have a Dravidian origin and may contain the four truths in such a language. But Bhavya’s opponents did not seem to be impressed by this outlandish display of words.

Such were the opponents’ objections to the presence of such sentences among the True Words of the Buddha. Bhavya, however, has the following to say in defence of the *dhāraṇīmantras* and the two other types of mantras. Firstly, with regard to the *dhāraṇīmantras*, they evidently have to do with meditation, with *bhāvanā*, since indeed they are, as mentioned, foci of meditation, *bhāvanākāra*. To support this Bhavya quotes as his authority the *Anantamukhasādhakadhāraṇī*,⁹ a Mahāyāna sūtra, which states that the bodhisattva practising *bhāvanā* does not construct, grasp for, stay with, cling to or make into conventional concepts neither the conditioned nor the unconditioned, he only cultivates, *bhāvayati*, the recollection of the Buddha by means of the *dhāraṇī*. Bhavya also quotes the *Sāgaranāgarājapariprechā*¹⁰ to show that the Mahāyāna type of *dhāraṇīmantra* has nothing to do with cursing people or inciting fear, rather it deals with knowledge and true Buddhist practices. It is then quite clear that Bhavya wishes to disassociate himself from the irrational, or “darker”, sides of the mantras. The *akṣayakaraṇḍadhāraṇī*, “the *dhāraṇī* of the never emptying basket” in the sūtra is described as being the origin of knowledge (*pratisaṃvid*, *jñāna*, *prajñā*) as well as of eloquence (*pratibhāna*) and other virtues of the Mahāyāna such as *vīrya*, etc. Moreover, since insight, *prajñā*, is the basis of meditation, *bhāvanā*, Bhavya claims to have refuted the above mentioned contention of the *śrāvaka-pakṣa* that the mantras produce no *prajñā* or *bhāvanā* – again by quoting a Mahāyāna sūtra as his authority. His argument is not very convincing, however, since it merely states the opposite of his critics’ thesis: by merely quoting his own authoritative sources which are not accepted by his opponents, he claims to have rejected his opponents’ contentions. On the same basis he also rejects the *śrāvaka* contention that the cause of vices is not eliminated by the *dhāraṇīmantra*: Bhavya says that bewilderment (*moha*) disappears when there is *prajñā*. This, of course, would be accepted by the *śrāvakas*, but they would not accept that the *mantradhāraṇī* produces *prajñā*, as Bhavya asserts. So Bhavya’s argument is in fact rather weak. Bhavya also claims that the *dhāraṇīmantra* is in opposition to the non-Buddhist Sophists, whereas the *śrāvaka-pakṣa* contends it is not. The *dhāraṇīmantra*, namely,

⁸“Zur Entstehung einer Dhāraṇī”, *ZDMG* vol. 117, 1967, pp. 148-68.

⁹Tibetan and Chinese versions, L.R. LANCASTER, *The Korean Buddhist Canon: A Descriptive Catalogue*, Berkeley, 1979, nos. 324-331, 1279 for references.

¹⁰Tibetan and Chinese versions, *ibid.* nos. 377, 495, 1140.

according to Bhavya, is in opposition to the cause of vice (*kleśa*) by virtue of being a focus of meditation, *bhāvanākāra*, in the same way as meditation on the ugly, *aśubhabhāvanā*, eliminates the cause of vice. This last argument could possibly have been accepted by Bhavya's *śrāvaka* opponents, who might have accepted that concentration on meaningless syllables is a form of concentration, and since they would agree that meditative states counteract vice.

After the treatment of the *dhāraṇīmantra* Bhavya directs his apologetic efforts towards the *guhyanmantra*, i. e. the "secret formulae", and the *vidyāmantra*, but his arguments here are even less convincing: The essence of these sentences is the secrets of the Tathāgatas' wisdom when they are used in meditation. Thus the *guhyanmantras* fulfil whatever one wishes – they are in accordance with one's wishes, *yathāśaya* – in producing *bhāvanā*, and they are like the *kalpavṛkṣa*, the wish-fulfilling tree, in granting personal strength. The *vidyāmantras*, "knowledge" mantras, are concerned with (the knowledge of?) the *pāramitās*, the four truths, etc., and, in teaching these basic elements of Buddhism, they are indeed able to appease the vices, says Bhavya. As an example he quotes a mantra typical of the *vidyā* class: *sāmaya sāmaya dānte sānte dharmarāja bhāṣite mahe mahāvidyā sarvasādhana*.¹¹

Next a mantra well-known from its use in the Tantras and in Tibetan Buddhism is given as an example, viz. the ten-syllable mantra of Tārā: *oṃ tāre tuttāre ture svāhā*. The syllable *tāre* is explained as *uttaradhārmika*, "originated from the superior reality", *tuttāre* as *prathamadhārmika*, "originated from the original reality", and *ture* as *anabhilāpyadhārmika*, "originated from the ineffable reality". Understanding the mantra in this way one is released from ignorance (*avidyā*), and, having achieved this, one is able to produce knowledge (*vidyā*) in others, and, accordingly, it is rhetorically asked: "How can the four kinds of sin avoid being appeased if this mantra is recited?" In this capacity the mantra is also related to friendliness, etc.¹²

Commenting on the *vidyāmantra*, Bhavya states that the reason why the

¹¹Cf. the Tibetan text, some evident misspellings have been corrected. Or, were these in the original mantra? Many Tantric mantras are not too accurate with respect to spelling and grammar.

¹²It is generally accepted that Bhavya lived in the early 6th century. An interesting question in this respect is whether Tārā, and also the main mantra by which she is invoked in later Tantric religion, was already in existence at the time of Bhavya. If so, then this is the earliest reference to Tārā and the mantra. The first epigraphical evidence is a Javanese inscription from 778, but there is good reason to suppose that the Tārā cult existed in the early 7th century by the evidence connected to the Nepalese princess of king Srong brtsan sGam po, Xuanzang's descriptions and the Sanskrit author Subandhu. See STEPHAN BEYER, *The Cult of Tārā*, Berkeley, 1973, pp. 6-8 and his references to further literature on the subject of the age of the Indian Tārā cult. The *Tarkajvālā*, however, contains a few anachronisms which may have been inserted by the great Atīśa who in the beginning of the 11th century played a role in the process of translating the work into Tibetan. See V.V. GOKHALE, "Madhyamakahrdayakārikā Tarkajvālā, Chapter I" in *Miscellanea Buddhica, Indiske Studier*, vol. 5, ed. CHRISTIAN LINDTNER, Copenhagen, 1985, p. 76f. It would not be surprising if Atīśa, who, according to the documentation,

“words of wisdom” (*vidyāśabda*) are not understood, is that they are in a language beyond this world (*lokottaravākya*), or in the language of Devas, Nāgas, Yakṣas, etc. As for the strange words in the mantras, he also quotes the *Guhyamatisūtra*¹³ as “evidence” that the mantra *īne mīne dapphe dadapphe* refers to the four truths – not in the language of the Mlecchas as the *śrāvaka* probably rightly contended, but in that of the *caturmahārāja*, the four divine protector kings of the world. To the contention of the *śrāvaka* that the mantras do not teach the true dharma, Bhavya responds that the mantras are within the field of knowledge of vows (*samaya*) and of attaining memory (*dhāraṇī*). The two last types of mantra, the *guhya*- and *vidyā*-, are not properly distinguished in Bhavya’s treatment, and it is not in fact certain that the distinction between them was clear to Bhavya.

So the *śrāvaka* is wrong, according to Bhavya: the three types of mantras are in accordance with the True Way as described by the Buddha, the Way which brings about the cessation of the vices. One cannot help, however, but be left with the impression that Bhavya’s arguments *in casu* do not have the required strength to establish his position. He still chooses to defend what seems to be the position of orthodox Mahāyāna of his time, that mantras should be part of the True Religion. To this end he employs arguments that the mantras are conducive to meditation, trying to present a case in accordance with Buddhist scholastic reason, in order to defend the irrational parts which are prescribed by scriptural authority. The arguments that the mantras are the secret language of the gods, etc., were met with little sympathy, evidently, by the *śrāvaka*, and they can scarcely be called rational arguments. Certainly such arguments would find little sympathy even today when Buddhism is regarded as one of the most rational forms of religion.

Appendix

Derge Kanjur *dbu ma*, *dza*, 183a6-184b4:

| *theg pa chen po las yi ge dang don shes par mi rung ba'i gzungs sngags dang |*
gsang sngags dang | rig sngags la sogs pa phan yon mang po can byis pa'i skye bo
slu bar byed pa bstan pa de rnams ni gzhan gyi rig byed dang dra'o || bsgom pa
med pa ni skyon phra rab tsaṃ yang zad par byed nus pa ma yin te | ñon mongs
pa bsags pa dang de'i rtsa ba yod na sdiḡ pa zad pa ga la 'byung bar 'gyur | gzungs
sngags kyis kyang sdiḡ pa zhi bar byed pa ma yin (183b) te | de'i rgyu dang mi 'gal
ba ñid kyī phyir 'tshē ba la sogs pa bzhiṅ no || de bzhiṅ du gsang sngags kyis kyang
sdiḡ pa zad par byed pa ma yin te | skad gzhan gyis brjod pa'i phyir kla klo la sogs
pa'i skad bzhiṅ no zhes kyang smra bar nus so zhe na | gang yang theg pa chen po'i
gzungs sngags la sogs pa yi ge sbyar ba tsaṃ du 'dod pa 'di la brjod par bya'o || re
zhig gzungs sngags ni bsgom pa'i rnam pa ñid yin te | ji skad du sgo mtha' yas pa

was a fervent devotee of Tārā, thought that this mantra above any other should be mentioned as an important example of a *guhya*mantra, vide STEPHAN BEYER, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-15.

¹³Reconstruction from *gsang ba blo gros kyī mdo*, not identified.

sgrub pa'i gzungs las | gzungs 'di sgom par byed pa'i byang chub sems dpa' ni 'dus
 byas dang 'dus ma byas kyi chos rtogs (read rtog) par yang mi byed | len par yang
 mi byed | gnas par yang mi byed | mngon par zhen par mi byed | tha sñad 'dogs par
 yang mi byed | sangs rgyas rjes su dran pa 'ba' zhig sgom par byed do zhes bya ba
 la sogs pa gsungs pa dang || || dbu ma'i sñing po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba | bam po
 bcu drug pa | de bzhin du klu'i rgyal po rgya mtshos zhus pa'i mdo las kyang | klu'i
 rgyal po gang yang bstan pa thams cad ni mi zad pa ste | 'di ni mi zad pa'i za ma
 tog ces bya ba'i gzungs yin no || so so yang dag par rig pa dang | ye shes dang |
 shes rab dang | spobs pa bzhi yang mi zad par rjes su 'byung ba dang | de bzhin
 du shin tu rtogs par dka' ba dang | ngoms pa med pa'i brtson 'grus 'bar ba dang |
 mthar thug pa med pa dang | mthong ba med pa dang | rton pa med pa dang | dmod
 pa med pa dang | 'jigs pa med pa bzhi po rnams dang | sñing po dang | nges par
 'byed pa dang | snang ba dang | stobs kyi gter bzhi 'byung ba dang | de bzhin du
 gang yi ge'i lugs dang | ming dang | brda dang | chos kyi brda'i rjes su 'jug pa de
 dag thams cad kyang mi zad pa'i za ma tog gi gzungs 'di'i rjes su zhugs pa'i byang
 chub sems dpa's shes te | 'di lta ste | chos thams cad ni gdod ma nas dag pa'o zhes
 bya ba la sogs pa dang | de bzhin du gzungs sngags 'di la gnas pa'i byang chub sems
 dpa' ni yi ge kho (184a) na las byang chub tshol bar byed | rjes su 'jug par byed
 de | yi ge ni stobs so || dgod pa ni lus so || chos kyi sgo la 'dzud pa'i mgo bo blta
 ba ni dpral ba'o || shes rab ni mig go zhes bya ba la sogs pas bsgom pa'i rtsa ba ni
 shes rab yin la | shes rab yod pa'i phyir gti mug med par 'gyur ro || rtsa ba med na
 'dod chags dang zhe sdang 'byung bar mi 'gyur te | rtsa ba dang 'gal ba yod pa'i
 phyir ro || des na rtsa ba dang 'gal ba med pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i don ma grub pa
 yin no || phyir rgol ba'i rtog ges kyang bsgrub par bya ba la gnod pa ñid de | gzungs
 sngags kyis ni sdig pa zhi bar 'gyur ba ñid yin te | bsgom pa'i rnam pa yod pa ñid
 kyi phyir de'i rtsa ba dang 'gal bar gyur pa ñid kyi mi sdig pa la sogs pa bsgom pa
 bzhin no || de bzhin du gsang sngags kyang de bzhin gshegs pa'i ye shes kyi gsang
 ba ston par byed pa'i sbas pa'i yi ge sbyor ba ngo bos bsgom pa la rab tu 'jug pa
 rgyud la gnas pas ji ltar 'dod pa'i bsam pa yang dag par sgrub par nus pa yin te |
 mthu chen po'i bdag ñid yin pa'i phyir dpag bsam gyi shing bzhin no || rig sngags
 kyang phal cher pha rol tu phyin pa drug dang | 'phags pa'i bden pa dang | byang
 chub kyi phyogs kyi chos ston par byed pa'i yi ge dang don gyis ñon mongs pa zad
 par byed pa ston par byed pa ñid yin te | ji ltar sa ma ya sa ma ya | dante sante
 dharma ra dza | bha si te ma te ma ha bida | sarbārtha sa dha na ni | zhes bya
 ba lta bu dang | de bzhin du chos kyi mchog las byung ba ni tā re | dang po'i chos
 las byung ba ni tuttā re | brjod du med pa'i chos las byung ba ni tu re zhes bya ba
 lta bu ni mngon par rtogs pa gsal bar byed pa ste | bdag ma rig pa dang bral bar
 gyur pas gzhan dag gi rig pa yang bskyed par nus pa yin na de bsten par gyur na
 ci'i phyir sdig pa bzhi dang bcas pa zhi bar mi 'gyur te | de'i nus pa dang ldan pa'i
 phyir byams pa la sogs pa bzhin no || rig pa'i tshig gang dag gi don rtogs par ma
 gyur pa ni de dag 'jig rten las 'das pa'i skad kyis bstan pa'i phyir dang | lha dang |
 klu dang | gnod sbyin la sogs pa'i skad kyis (184b) bstan pa'i phyir ro || chos ñid
 ston par mi byed pa yang ma yin pas dam tshig rig pa dang | gzungs thob par gyur
 pa rnams kyi spyod yul yang yin te | ji skad du gsang ba blo gros kyi mdo las |
 gang 'di na sdug bsngal dang | kun 'byung dang | 'gog pa dang | lam zhes bya ba

*rnams la rgyal chen bzhi'i ris kyi lha rnams kyi ni e ne dang | me ne dang | dam
 po dang | da dam po zhes bya ba la sogs par brjod do zhes 'byung bas 'jig rten pa'i
 don ston par byed pa bzod par dka' ba'i ñon mongs pa bdo bas 'khrigs pa tsa munḍa
 la sogs pa'i rig pa dag dang | sgrol ma la sogs pa'i don dam pa'i rig pa rnams 'dra
 ba lta ga la yin | des na dpe ma grub pa yin te | bsgrub par bya ba'i chos dang mi
 ldan pa'i phyir ro || 'di skad brjod par yang nus te | gzungs sngags dang | gsang
 sngags dang | rig sngags rnams de bzhin gshegs pa'i man ngag bzhin du ngag tu
 brjod pa dang | bsams pa dang | bsgoms pas sdig pa rgyu dang bcas pa zhi bar byed
 pa yin te | lam dang rjes su mthun pa yin pa'i phyir mdo sde la sogs pa'i gsung
 rab bzhin no ||*

On the Date of the Tibetan Translation of Aśvaghōṣa's *Buddhacarita*¹

David P. Jackson
(Hamburg)

The *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghōṣa (fl. 1st century C.E.) is important in Indian literature as one of the earliest examples of Sanskrit ornate poetry (*kāvya*).² The poem tells the life story of the Buddha Śākyamuni, and it is quite long, running as it does to some twenty-eight chapters or *sargas*. Yet only about the first half of the poem survives in the original Sanskrit.³ For the remaining half, one must rely on the Chinese or Tibetan translation.

As is well known, a Tibetan translation such as this can often be a very valuable aid for understanding the original Indian Buddhist text. The translators typically tried to follow a literal, "calque" style of rendering the Sanskrit into Tibetan, and thus their translations sometimes closely mirror even the phraseology of the original.⁴ But in the case of the *Buddhacarita*, the quality of the Tibetan

¹This paper was originally written some years ago for the *Tibet Journal* special issue in memory of Barmiak Athing, which has yet to appear. In the meantime I have been able to correct and expand it on several points. I would like to acknowledge here my debt to Prof. M. Hahn for several useful suggestions.

²On Aśvaghōṣa's poetical writings, see for instance A.K. WARDER, *Indian Kāvya Literature* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), vol. 2, pp. 142-181.

³For the partial Sanskrit text (edited from a Nepalese manuscript tradition) and a full English translation, see E.H. JOHNSTON, *The Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha* (Lahore: 1936) (reprinted Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), and "The Buddha's Mission and Last Journey: *Buddhacarita*, XV to XXVIII," *Acta Orientalia*, vol. 15 (1937), pp. 26-111 and 231-292. Other editions, translations and studies of the *Buddhacarita* include: F. WELLER, *Das Leben des Buddha von Aśvaghōṣa* (Leipzig: Eduard Pfeiffer, 1926-1928), Tibetan text and German translation of I-XVII, v. 41, in 2 vols.; *Zwei zentralasiatische Fragmente des Buddhacarita* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1953), Sanskrit fragments of III, 16-29, and XIV, 20-36; *Untersuchung über die textgeschichtliche Entwicklung des tibetischen Buddhacarita* (Berlin: 1980); C. VOGEL, "On the First Canto of Aśvaghōṣa's *Buddhacarita*", *Indo-Iranian Journal*, vol. 9 (1966), pp. 266-290; and M. HAHN, "Buddhacarita I, 1-7 und 25-40", *Indo-Iranian Journal*, vol. 17 (1975), pp. 77-96.

⁴But see SEYFORTH RUEGG 1992, pp. 382-385, who cites examples from differing parallel translations from Sanskrit into Tibetan, showing that translation for the Tibetans was not a purely mechanical or absolutely regular exercise.

translation is uneven and in places disappointingly poor.⁵ From the fifteenth chapter on, where there is no Sanskrit to compare it with, the sense of the Tibetan is highly obscure in many places. What could account for the poor quality of that translation? This question cannot yet be answered in any detail, but there do exist a few clues at least about how and when the Tibetan translation was executed. The present paper is therefore an attempt to determine more precisely the chronology and circumstances of that translation.

The basic source for dating the translation is the colophon to the translation that is preserved in all four printed editions of the Tanjur. This is what it says:⁶

By order of the Noble Guru, King of Religion, highest lord of the Doctrine [everywhere] on the earth, as far as the ends of the ocean, matchless in virtues of wisdom, great treasure of numerous perfections, guru of scholars, glorious wealth of all beings, [and]

Because of the pure intention to attain the realization of enlightened activities of that best of men, matchless in all the world, and because of the patronage of the noble religious ones, such as the lord of men,

⁵Cf. WELLER 1980, p. 45, and the comments of Johnston in JOHNSTON 1937, p. 27.

⁶See for example *Sangs rgyas kyi spyod pa zhes bya ba'i sñan ngag chen po*, Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition (P no. 5656), bsTan 'gyur, mDo 'grel, sKyes rabs II, vol. 129, p. 172.1 (*nge* 124b):

sa stengs rgya mtsho'i mthar thugs [sic] bstan pa'i bdag po'i mchog ||
yon tan mtshungs med phul byung du ma'i gter chen po ||
mkhas pa rnam kyi bla ma skye dgu rnam kyi dpal ||
bla ma dam pa chos kyi rgyal po'i bka' lung gis ||

'jig rten kun na zla bral skyes mchog de ñid kyi ||
phrin las sgrub pa brñes pa'i thugs dgongs nam dag dang ||
mi rje lha sras gung thang rgyal mo yum sras dang ||
chos la gcig tu dkar ba'i lha cig kun dga' 'bum ||

mang yul skyi rong bzo mo yon tan skyid la sogs ||
chos ldan dam pa rnam kyi sby[i]n bdag bgyid pa'i ngor ||
'phags pa rta dbyangs kyi mdzad thub pa'i mdzad pa 'di ||
sa dbang bzang po dang ni blo gros rgyal pos bsgyur ||

'di bsgyur bsod nams rgyal po gang des pha ma dang ||
'gro rnam lam gyi rgyal po [dam pa] 'dir zhugs te ||
ñes tshogs tshang tshing kun dang bdud bzhi'i rgyal po rnam ||
bcom nas chos kyi rgyal po [dam pa] thob par shog ||

dg[e] des thub bstan yun du gnas par shog ||

A critical edition of the Tibetan text by Professors Y. KAJIYAMA and K. MIMAKI based on all four editions of the Tanjur is forthcoming from the International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo. I am indebted to both scholars for showing me their typescript, which enabled me to verify several readings in the colophon to the Peking edition.

the divine [royal] son, queen [and prince] of Gung-thang-mother and son—the princess Kun-dga’-’bum, who is single[-minded]ly devoted to Dharma, and bZö-mo Yon-tan-skyed of Mang-yul sKyi-rong, this *Career of the Sage* composed by Ārya Āśvaghoṣa was translated by Sa-dbang-bzang-po and Blo-gros-rgyal-po.

By that king of merit [resulting from] translating this, may father, mother, and [all] beings enter into this [noble] king of paths, and having vanquished all wrongs and evils, and also the King of the four Māras, may they become [noble] kings of religion!

By that virtue may the Doctrine of the Sage long endure!

1 Patronage

The colophon of course does not specify the date of translation, but it does reveal some details about its patronage, and it also mentions the names of the translators. Though almost none of the people mentioned are well known, more can be learned about them if one searches through the available historical sources.

The main geographical focus indicated by the colophon is Mang-yul, a principality in the western Tibetan borderlands between gTsang and mNga’-ris whose capital was Gung-thang rDzong-dkar and which was the Tibetan region closest to the Kathmandu Valley. This region is also indicated by the mention of one of the patrons, a certain bZö-mo (or bZang-mo?) Yon-tan-skyid of Mang-yul sKyi[d]-grong. Mang-yul sKyid-grong, the location of the ’Phags-pa Wa-ti Jo-bo statue, was incidentally also the cite of another important kāvyā translation project, namely the translation of Kṣemendra’s *Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā* in 1270.⁷

A precise dating of the *Buddhacarita* translation is more difficult because in order to determine it, one must also be able to identify the patrons and translators. Still, one can establish at least a preliminary *terminus ad quem* for the translation based on external evidence. It must have been completed before ca. 1322 because Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub (1290-1364) lists this translation of the *Buddhacarita* in the catalogue section of his great history of Buddhism (completed 1322) as the last item in the *Jātaka* (*sKyes rabs*) section.⁸ He also listed the work in his later

⁷See MEJOR 1992, pp. 53-4. Here “’Phags-pa” refers not to the great bla-ma Chos-rgyal ’Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan but rather to the sacred ’Phags-pa Wa-ti image.

⁸BU-STON RIN-CHEN-GRUB, *bDe bar gshegs pa’i bstan pa’i gsal byed chos kyi ’byung gnas gsung rab rin po che’i mdzod*, Collected Works (Śatapiṭaka Series, New Delhi, 1971, vol. 64), vol. 17 (*ya*), p. 964.2 (166b). See also the edition by S. NISHIOKA, “Index to the Catalogue Section of Bu-ston’s ‘History of Buddhism’ (II)”, *Annual Report of the Institute for the Study of Cultural Exchange, The University of Tokyo*, no. 5 (1981), p. 63, no. 885: *slob dpon rta dbyangs kyi mdzad pa’i sangs rgyas kyi spyod pa ston pa’i sñan dngags chen po khams pa dge long blo gros rgyal po’i ’gyur*. Bu-ston may have been a younger contemporary of Blo-gros-rgyal-po; in any case his characterization of Blo-gros-rgyal-po as being a monk of Khams was based on some other source of knowledge about him besides the colophon.

On the date of Bu-ston’s composition of his history, see SZERB 1990, p. xi. G. Tucci

catalogue to the Tanjur, which is dated 1335.⁹

The earliest possible date of translation cannot be so easily arrived at. For although the major introduction of *kāvya* studies and translation in Tibet took place under the patronage of 'Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan (1235-1280), i.e. not before the 1260s, this does not guarantee that a given poetical work was not translated before then. The systematic, formal teaching and learning of Sanskrit poetics is usually said to have begun in Tibet with 'Phags-pa's uncle, Sa-skyā Paṇḍita (1182-1251), who began his studies in ca. 1205 and who about twenty-five or thirty years later presented a partial translation of Daṇḍin's *Kāvyaḍarśa* in the first chapter of his *mKhas 'jug* treatise. But a full translation and transmission of the basic texts such as the *Kāvyaḍarśa* had to wait for the contributions of 'Phags-pa's contemporary Shong rDo-rje-rgyal-mtshan.¹⁰

1.1 Gung-thang rgyal-mo yum-sras

According to the colophon, the main patrons who provided material support seem to have been a queen of Gung-thang and her son (*gung thang rgyal mo yum sras*). The line mentioning them begins “ruler, divine prince” (*mi rje lha sras*)—titles that together normally applied only to male descendants of the old Yar-klung dynasty. But here they seem to refer collectively to the queen and crown prince, and the word *yum* (“mother”) apparently refers again to the queen in her capacity as mother.

1.2 The Princess Kun-dga'-'bum

The colophon itself does not give the personal names of this queen and prince. But with the next person mentioned we are perhaps luckier. A princess with the name Kun-dga'-'bum is known from other sources, and if she is the one mentioned in the colophon, this helps narrow down the possibilities of who the others were.

[TUCCI 1949, p. 141], recorded seeing a colophon dating the work to the *khrag skyug* year (1323, not 1347). D. Seyfort Ruegg, [SEYFORT RUEGG 1966, pp. xvii] corrected the date to 1322 (according to Szerb, this mistake had also been noticed by Stein). On this see also HADANO 1963, p. 47, as was indicated to me by Mr. S. Onoda.

⁹BU-STON, DKAR-CHAG, p. 615 (108a.4): *nge pa la | sangs rgyas kyi spyod pa zhes bya ba'i sñan dngags chen po slob dpon rta dbyangs kyis mdzad pa | paṇḍita sa dbang bzang po dang | lo tsā ba blo gros rgyal po'i 'gyur |*. On the composition of this, the catalogue to the Zhwa-lu Tanjur, see also SEYFORT RUEGG 1966, p. 114, and HADANO 1963, p. 58. Incidentally, NGOR-CHEN KUN-DGA'-BZANG-PO in his catalogue to the Glo-bo Tanjur, Collected Works, vol. a, f. 302a.5 (=94a.5; Tōyō Bunko reprint, vol. 10, p. 365.4.5), lists neither translator nor paṇḍita, though the *Buddhacarita* is one of his “*sñan ngag gi gzhung gsum*.”

¹⁰On the early history of Sanskrit poetical studies in Tibet, see the preliminary remarks of E. G. SMITH, introduction to *Encyclopedia Tibetica* [Bo-dong Paṇ-chen's *De ñid 'dus pa*] (New Delhi: Tibet House, 1970), vol. 6, p. 1. Smith had previously written a related study which was never published, namely his paper “The Tradition of Philology & Literary Theory in Tibetan Scholasticism”, Unpublished paper presented to the Inner Asia Colloquium, University of Washington, on February 6, 1964. U. W. Archives, acc. no. 85-42, box 6. See now also MEJOR 1992, pp. 88-90.

At least two Tibetan historical sources mention a “princess” by this name: she was a daughter of the Sa-skyapa hierarch bDag-ñid-chen-po bZang-po-dpal (1262-1324), being the second of three children given birth to by his sixth wife, Lha-cig Ñi-ma-rin-chen.¹¹ Kun-dga’-’bum was born sometime between the time of her father’s return to Sa-skyapa in 1298 and the birth in 1308 of her younger brother Kun-dga’-legs-pa’i-’byung-gnas (1308-1336).

According to the detailed genealogical history of the Sa-skyapa ’Khon family (*Sa skya gdung rabs chen mo*) by A-mes-zhabs Ngag-dbang-kun-dga’-bsod-nams (1597-1659), Kun-dga’-’bum was a female religious teacher (*slob dpon ma*) from the ’Khon lineage.¹² She was born at Khabs-so bKra-shis. When she was young, she became the consort of the mNga’-ris Gung-thang ruler who had the Mongol rank *tu-dben-sha* (“regional commander”).¹³ She is said by this source to have given birth to two sons: one the royal monk and religious master Slob-dpon Lha-btsun Phun-tshogs-dpal and the other the ruler mNga’-bdag bZang-po-lde. The former is said to have given religious teachings at Sa-skyapa for many years.¹⁴ At a later period in her life, Kun-dga’-’bum reportedly returned to Sa-skyapa, where the chief administrators (*dpon chen*) gZhon-dbang-pa and his son offered her the religious palace Bla-brang Seng-ge-sgang.¹⁵ She is said to have died there, immersed in her

¹¹A-MES-ZHABS, p. 449 (225a). For the full text of the passage on Kun-dga’-’bum, see below, Appendix A.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³Kun-dga’-’bum’s son bKra-shis-lde (alias bZang-po-lde?) begot his son Khri Phun-tshogs-lde-dpal-bzang-po in 1337 or 1338. If he was young at the time—say about 16 years old—he would have been born in ca. 1321. If his mother too was of that age when she gave birth to him, she would have been born in ca. 1305, which fits the known chronology. In any case, she probably went to Gung-thang as a young bride sometime between 1315 and 1320. On the rank *tu-dben-sha*, see PETECH 1990, pp. 39-40.

¹⁴This mention of a Lha-btsun Phun-tshogs-dpal is probably a confusion on A-mes-zhabs’s part with Kun-dga’-’bum’s grandson Khri Phun-tshogs-lde-dpal-bzang-po (1338-1370), whose mother according to the history of the Gung-thang kings was another Sa-skyapa princess, bSod-nams-’bum. Kaḥ-thog rig-’dzin Tshe-dbang-nor-bu [TSHE-DBANG-NOR-BU f. 11b] gives very few details about his life, but does mention his staying at Sa-skyapa when he conceived his son Khri mChog-grub-lde, whose mother was a lady of Red-mda’. His younger son Khri-rgyal bSod-nams-lde (b. 1371) was the son of his official consort Nam-mkha’-’bum, the daughter of the Byang Ta-dben. I am indebted to Barmiok Athing Densapa for preserving this genealogy and to Mr. E. Gene Smith for letting me consult his hand-written copy of it. This history has been recently published from the original manuscript in a compilation of historical *rGyal rabs phyogs sdebs* by the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives. See also the new edition that appeared in the *Gangs can rig mdzod* series (Bod ljongs bod yig dpe rñing dpe skrun khang, 1990), vol. 9, pp. 87-150.

¹⁵This reference to gZhon-dbang-pa may be anachronistic. He was chief administrator before and immediately after Ang-len or Ag-len, who was ruling in the year 1290. I am not sure, however, which later administrator was his son. On gZhon-dbang-pa, see TUCCI 1949, pp. 628, 652, and Genealogical Table A (between pp. 705 and 707); and TUCCI 1971, pp. 186f.


profound meditative practices.

The same Kun-dga'-'bum is mentioned not only in the *Sa skya gdung rabs chen mo* but also in the genealogical history of the Gung-thang kings compiled by Tshe-dbang-nor-bu (1698-1755), for as stated above, she married one of the kings of Gung-thang. The account about her in the latter source is shorter. There only one son is mentioned, and he is called by a different name. But this source does specify the name and death date of her husband: he was the king Chos-skyong-lde, who reportedly died in the water-dragon year (1352).¹⁶

He and Kun-dga'-'bum are said not to have enjoyed harmonious relations at first, but their differences were smoothed out through the intervention of her father bDag-ñid-chen-po (bZang-po-dpal, 1262-1324) and his son (her younger half-brother bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan?). If this information is accurate, the marriage thus must have taken place before the death of bZang-po-dpal in 1324. The son who resulted from their union is said to have been the ruler Khri bKra-shis-lde. He married his cousin bSod-nams-'bum, the daughter of dBang Kun-dga'-legs-pa. bKra-shis-lde himself is said to have died in the wood-snake year (1365).

Now, if the patrons included a queen of Gung-thang, her son, and the above-mentioned princess Kun-dga'-'bum, then this "queen of Gung-thang" was probably the consort of Khri Rin-chen-bzang-po, and her son was probably Chos-skyong-lde, husband of the princess Kun-dga'-'bum. A possible problem with this identification is that the mother of Chos-skyong-lde, the lady Lha-mo-'bum of the Shar-pa bla-brang in Sa-skya, is not recorded to have acted as "queen" in Gung-thang. She is said to have conceived Chos-skyong-lde in Sa-skya during a brief union with Khri Rin-chen-bzang-po just before his departure for China where he died soon

¹⁶TSHE-DBANG-NOR-BU f. 10a. In an earlier article "The Early History of Lo (Mustang) and Ngari," *Contributions to Nepalese Studies*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Dec. 1976), p. 46, I confused the succession of these generations as well as their relation to Kun-dga'-'bum. The correct genealogy as given by TSHE-DBANG-NOR-BU, ff. 9a-11b, is:



afterward.¹⁷ I have not yet found any reference to another queen of Gung-thang in the early 1300s who had a son. Chos-skyong-lde's uncle Khri-lde-'bum (b. 1268), who was the main ruler in his generation, apparently died without male issue, so his consort could not have been this queen. But whoever these patrons may have been, they were no doubt members of the Gung-thang royalty who lived in the late-13th or early-14th century.

The last patron who contributed material support seems to have been a lady of wealth and perhaps of nobility: bZo-mo Yon-tan-skyid of Mang-yul sKyi[d]-rong, but she is otherwise unknown to me, as is her name or title *bZo mo* ("Female Crafts-worker"?), which some texts give as *bZang mo* ("Kind Lady"?).

1.3 Bla-ma-dam-pa Chos-kyi-rgyal-po

The one remaining major patron in the colophon who requires discussion is the "Noble Guru, King of Religion" (*bla ma dam pa chos kyi rgyal po*), who is mentioned very prominently at the beginning of the colophon. He was a crucial figure in the project; he is said to have been the ultimate sponsor, for he is the one who ordered the others to undertake it. G. Tucci in his *Tibetan Painted Scrolls* identified this main patron as 'Phags-pa [Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan] (1235-1280),¹⁸ probably because "King of Religion" (*chos kyi rgyal po*) is one of 'Phags-pa's standard titles and because 'Phags-pa was the first major patron of *kāvya* translations in Tibet, supporting as he did the activities of Shong-ston rDo-rje-rgyal-mtshan. Tucci may have based himself on CORDIER's Tanjur catalogue (part 3, 1915), where the "bla-ma dam-pa chos-kyi-rgyal-po" of the colophons had already been identified as "Matidhvajaṅgībhadrā de Sa-skyā."¹⁹

But in light of the possible identity of the princess Kun-dga'-'bum suggested above, that would now seem to require further verification. Can it be confirmed, for instance, by the more detailed historical sources of Sa-skyā and Gung-thang? There was indeed another Sa-skyā-pa teacher who was a prominent political and religious leader of the mid-14th century and who had the fixed epithet "Noble Guru" (*bla ma dam pa*). He was Kun-dga'-'bum's half-brother, the outstanding teacher Bla-ma-dam-pa bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan (1312-1375).²⁰ But this master

¹⁷According to TSHE-DBANG-NOR-BU, p. 9b: *thog mar sa skyar phebs te cung zad bzhugs pa na mdza' ba'i bshes shar pa kun dga' rin chen pas na re | mnga' bdag pa khyed yul thag rings su gshegs pa 'dug pas sku tshe yun pa yang dka' | de tshe gdung rgyud chad par 'phangs pas nga yi khyim bdag mo 'di la sras 'tshol zhes mtshams sbyar bzhin ma gcig lha mo 'bum dang rtsen pas rings por ma thogs par bud med de yang sbrum par gyur te lha rin chen bzang po gshegs pa'i lor sras sgro spangs su byung ba mtshan chos skyong lder btags |.*

¹⁸TUCCI 1949, p. 104.

¹⁹See CORDIER 1915, pp. 421 and 459. The Tibetan corresponding to Matidhvajaṅgībhadrā is Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan-dpal-bzang-po, 'Phags-pa's monastic ordination name. This same identification was made by DE JONG 1972, p. 509.

²⁰Bla-ma dam-pa bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan reportedly served as the 15th Sa-skyā khri-pa, between the rules of his brother 'Jam-dbyangs-don-yod-rgyal-mtshan (1310-1344) and Ta-dben Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan (1332-1364). The latter is said (in A-MES-ZHABS, p.

would have been only eleven years old in 1322, which was the date of Bu-ston's mention of the translation in his history of Buddhism. A great religious leader who might have sponsored the project in the period ca. 1315-1322 was bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan's (and Kun-dga'-'bum's) father bDag-ñid-chen-po bZang-po-dpal (1262-1324) who according to one source occupied the Sa-skyia see from about 1298 to 1324.²¹ Or just possibly it might have been one of the latter's older sons, such as the Ti-shri Kun-dga'-blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan-dpal-bzang-po (1299-1327), an imperial preceptor at the Yüan court who received his full ordination in Central Tibet in 1322.²²

Nevertheless, these later candidates seem unlikely since none of the masters after 'Phags-pa were normally referred to as "Chos-kyi-rgyal-po." 'Phags-pa, moreover, is referred to in other translation colophons precisely as "Bla ma dam pa chos kyi rgyal po."²³ The paṇḍita Lakṣmīkara even composed Sanskrit verses in 'Phags-

660.5) to have occupied the see for 18 years, i.e. beginning in ca. 1346, but he would have been only 14 years old in 1346. In any case Bla-ma dam-pa's tenure was probably from 1344, the year of his brother's death. See below, Appendix C.

A modern study asserts that Bla-ma dam-pa was the last Sa-skyia-pa ruler of Tibet and that his tenure was cut short in ca. 1350-1352 by the victories of Byang-chub-rgyal-mtshan, the founder of the Phag-mo-gru-pa hegemony. See TSEPON W. D. SHAKABPA, *Tibet: A Political History* (reprint New York: Potala Publications, 1984), p. 72: "In 1350, during the administration of Ponchen Gawa [*sic*] Zangpo and the reign of the ruling lama, Sonam Gyaltzen, the province of U in central Tibet fell into the hands of the powerful myriarch, Changchub Gyaltzen of Phamo Drupa." However, in his subsequent account of Byang-chub-rgyal-mtshan's rise to power, pp. 77 and 81, Shakabpa simply refers to the Sa-skyia khri-pa as "the Sakya Lama" and does not specify his name. Cf. also TUCCI 1971, p. 208: "Thus in the year earth-female-ox [1349], the greatest part of dBus came into his [i.e. Byang-chub-rgyal-mtshan's] hands. . . . There is a rumor that the Ti śri Kun dga' rgyal mtshan was the occupant of the [Sa-skyia] see, but this is not clear from the documents." The Tibetan text, f. 72, verso, line 5: *gdan sa ti shri kun dga' rgyal mtshan bzhugs thang na'ang yi ge gsal ba ma mthong*. Ti-shri Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan-dpal-bzang-po (1310-1358) is not, however, to be found among any of the lists of Sa-skyia khri-pas known to me.

²¹The years 1298-1324 as his tenure seem to be indicated by A-mes-zhabs's biography of bZang-po-dpal in A-MES-ZHABS. See KHETSUN SANGPO vol. 10, pp. 260-261, and 566. In the *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo* [BOD RGYA..., p. 2891] the dates 1304 to 1322 are given. See also below, Appendix C.

²²Another powerful and important religious master who might have had a special connection with the patrons was the Shar-pa bZhi-thog-pa 'Jam-pa'i-dbyangs Rin-chen-rgyal-mtshan, who served as gdan-sa-pa of Sa-skyia at least until bZang-po-dpal's return to Sa-skyia from China, and possibly for several years even after that. The ruler Lha Rin-chen-bzang-po conceived his son Chos-skyong-lde while on his way to China, through the intervention of the Shar-pa Kun-dga'-rin-chen. See TSHE-DBANG-NOR-BU, p. 9b, as quoted above in note 17.

²³See the colophon to Kṣemendra's *Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā* as quoted in MEJOR 1992, p. 52 and note 1, where he is identified as 'Phags-pa. On this title Mejer also refers to DE JONG 1972, pp. 509 and 525. See also VERHAGEN 1991, p. 67, note 185, who refers further to CORDIER 1915, p. 459; and see now the corresponding passages

pa's honor (a Tibetan translation of which is preserved in the Tanjur), the title to which referred to him with this very same epithet (Skt. *sadgurudharmarāja*).²⁴

2 The Translators

These doubts about the identity of the great religious and noble patrons cannot be settled without turning to a detailed investigation of the translators. In the translation colophon, the names of the two persons responsible for the translation are preserved: Sa-dbang-bzang-po and Blo-gros-rgyal-po.²⁵ Previously almost nothing was known about these two. As mentioned above, Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub (1290-1364) listed the *Buddhacarita* in the catalogue section of his history of Buddhism (1322) as the last item in the *Jātaka* (*sKyes rabs*) section. There as translator he mentions only Blo-gros-rgyal-po. But he adds there the information that Blo-gros-rgyal-po was a monk who was a native of Khams (*kham pa dge slong*).²⁶ And in Bu-ston's later catalogue to the Tanjur (1335), both the names Sa-dbang-bzang-po and Blo-gros-rgyal-po appear—but the former is listed as “paṇḍita” and the latter as “translator” (*lo tsā ba*).²⁷

That is all that is known about Blo-gros-rgyal-po. But the information that Sa-dbang-bzang-po was a *paṇḍita* and not a Tibetan translator is a vital clue that must be followed further. Indeed there exists another work in the Tanjur that had been translated through the assistance of the Paṇḍita Sa-dbang-bzang-po. This was the grammatical treatise *Rab dbye'i tshig le'ur byas pa* (*Vibhaktikārikā*). The translation colophon as preserved in the Peking edition runs as follows:²⁸

in VERHAGEN 1994. Could the “Chos kyi rgyal po bzang po” mentioned as the one at whose instigation an early Mongol-sponsored edition of Sa-pan's *Tshad ma rigs gter* was carved also be a reference to 'Phags-pa? On this see VAN DER KUIJP 1993, pp. 281 and 291.

²⁴This is Peking Tanjur no. 2060, Derge Tanjur no. 1172. Its text is reproduced in MEJOR 1992, p. 93f.

²⁵See the third verse of the colophon as quoted above, note 6.

²⁶See above, note 8.

²⁷See above, note 9. The mention of the two as paṇḍita and translator is also found in the catalogue to the Narthang Tanjur: NARTHANG DKAR-CHAG vol. *tso*, p. 128b.5: *paṇḍita sa dbang bzang po dang | lo tsā ba blo gros rgyal po'i 'gyur |*.

²⁸Peking Tanjur, sGra rig pa, *le*, f. 82a.2 (= vol. 140, p. 35.1.2): *yon tan mtha' yas pa dang ldan pa bla ma dam pa chos kyi rgyal po'i bka' lung gis | bho ṭa paṇḍi ta yis bskul ba bzhin du bal po'i paṇḍita dpal sa dbang bzang po'i zhal snga nas | bod kyi lo tsā ba dge slong shong blo brtan gyis bal po'i mthil du bsgyur ba'o ||*. The paṇḍita Sa-dbang-bzang-po was not involved in the translation of any of the available versions of the *sDeb sbyor rin chen 'byung gnas*; they are the works of later translators. See for instance NARTHANG DKAR-CHAG vol. *tso*, p. 138b.7, which records the presence of a translation by sTag-tshang lo-tsā-ba. And in the same work, another version is described. See *ibid.*, p. 134a.5: *'di rtsa ba zha lu lo chen gyi 'gyur dang | rang 'grel chos ldan ra sa pas bsgyur ba'i 'phro | lo tsā ba grags pa rgyal mtshan gyis rdzogs par bsgyur ba las slar yang lo tsā ba nam mkha' bzang pos bcos pa'i 'gyur |*.

By order of the Noble Guru, King of Religion, who possesses infinite virtues of wisdom, [and] in accordance with the urging of the Tibetan Paṇḍita, this was translated by the Newar Paṇḍita Sa-dbang-bzang-po [and] the Tibetan translator dGe-slong Shong Blo-brtan at Bal-po mThil [a central settlement of Nepal].

The Paṇḍita Sa-dbang-bzang-po is here clearly identified as a Newar (*bal po*), and he was active in a main center of the Kathmandu valley (*bal po'i mthil*, Patan?).²⁹ Perhaps he had a Sanskrit name such as Mahīndrabhadra.³⁰ He worked with the Tibetan translator dge-slong Shong Blo-gros-brtan-pa, who flourished in the late 1200s and possibly in the early 1300s.³¹ Shong Blo-gros-brtan-pa was the younger brother (*gcung*) of the famous Shong-ston rDo-rje-rgyal-mtshan, who under the encouragement and patronage of 'Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan had introduced the study of Sanskrit grammar and poetics in Tibet in a big way.


In addition, there exists still other references to Sa-dbang-bzang-po that make his importance and historical position even clearer. According to the records of teachings received (*gsan yig*) of the Fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682) and Zhu-

²⁹“Bal-po'i mthil” has been provisionally identified as Patan. See the references gathered by VERHAGEN 1991, p. 54, II.3.2, and notes 259 and 260. Perhaps this was short for “*bal po'i mthil ye rang gi grong khyer*.”

³⁰See DE JONG 1972, p. 509. SHAGDARYN BIRA and O. SUKHAATAR in their article “On the Tibetan and Mongolian Translations of the Sanskrit Grammatical Works”, *Sanskrit and World Culture* (Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des alten Orients 18) (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1986), p. 155, misread the paṇḍita's name as dBals-dBañ bZaṅ-po, and misidentified Shong Blo-brtan as dPang Blo-brtan. A paṇḍita Sa-sbang-bzang-po is also mentioned as an authority on the Mahābodhi legend by TĀRANĀTHA in his *rGya gar chos 'byung*, (pp. 16, 18-20). This is cited by PER K. SØRENSEN in his published M.A. thesis, “A Fourteenth Century Tibetan Historical Work: *rGyal rabs gsal ba'i me lon*. Author, Date and Sources, A Case Study,” Copenhagen, Akademisk Forlag, 1986), p. 208. Sørensen suggested the possible Sanskrit reconstruction of Sa-dbang-bzang-po as Kṣemendrabhadra, though it should be noted that the standard rendering of Kṣemendra is dGe-ba'i-dbang-po. VERHAGEN 1991, p. 49, (=II.2.2), note 185, and p. 168 (=App. A CG6) leaves the name in Tibetan.

³¹For more details on him, see VERHAGEN 1991, p. 49, II.2.6, who gives his birth date as “c. 1235/1245.” This Blo-gros-brtan-pa is definitely **not** to be identified with dPang lo-tsā-ba Blo-gros-brtan-pa (1276-1342), as G. ROERICH mistakenly did in a parenthetical remark in his translation of the *Blue Annals*, p. 786. He was correctly identified as the second great “Blo-brtan,” i.e. as Shong Blo-gros-brtan-pa (dPang-lo being the third) by VAN DER KUIJP 1983, p. 289f, n. 2247, who also suggested that he flourished at the beginning of the 14th century. See also MU-DGE BSAM-GTAN, p. 57, and now VERHAGEN 1991, p. 50, II.2.8. See also the record of teachings received (*gsan yig*) lineages cited below in a subsequent footnote. dPang lo-tsā-ba is said to have studied under a Shong lo-tsā-ba, but the only studies recorded in the Fifth Dalai Lama's record of teachings received with anyone other than mChog-ldan-legs-pa'i-blo were with a nephew of Shong-ston, namely dbon-po Chos-skyong-dpal, under whom he studied Kṣemendra's *Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā*. See Dalai bla-ma V, *Zab pa dang...*, vol. 1, p. 29.6. On dPang-lo see now VERHAGEN 1991, p. 50, II.2.9.

chen Tshul-khrims-rin-chen (1700-1769), the Paṇḍita Sa-dbang-bzang-po was the main teacher of Sanskrit metrics (*sdeb sbyor: chandas*) to the Shong brothers; in particular he taught them the basic work of Ratnākaraśānti, the *Chandoratnākara* (*sDeb sbyor rin chen 'byung gnas*). The lineage given in those *gsan yig* for the study of this work begins:³²



Sa-dbang-bzang-po and Shong Blo-brtan's translation of the above-mentioned grammatical work *Rab dbye'i tshig le'ur byas pa* (*Vibhaktikārikā*) was also undertaken at the command of a "Bla-ma-dam-pa Chos-kyi-rgyal-po," who in this context can hardly be anyone but 'Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan, given the latter's well-known relations with the elder Shong.³³ In addition, the work was encouraged by a certain "Tibetan paṇḍita" (*bho ta paṇḍi ta*), probably the elder Shong himself, rDo-rje-rgyal-mtshan, since he was one of very few—if not the only—Tibetan in that period who could claim that title.

3 Conclusions

These references to Sa-dbang-bzang-po enable a somewhat firmer dating of the *Buddhacarita* translation. Two possibilities were suggested by the historical sources. The first was that the project was undertaken during the earliest period of *kāvya* translation, more or less contemporaneously with (though perhaps slightly later than) the work of Shong-ston rDo-rje-rgyal-mtshan, i.e. probably in the 1260s or 1270s. 'Phags-pa would then have been the "Noble Guru, King of Religion" who provided the main impetus. The poor quality of the work would have been due not only to the inferior skills of the translator, but also to the elementary level

³²DALAI BLA-MA V, Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-rgya-mtsho, *Zab pa dang rgya che ba'i dam pa'i chos kyi thob yig gang ga'i chu rgyun*, vol. 1, p. 31.6 (*ka16a.6*), and ZHU-CHEN TSHUL-KHRIMS-RIN-CHEN, *dPal ldan bla ma dam pa rnam las dam pa'i chos thos pa'i yi ge don gñer gdengs can rol pa'i chu gter* (Dehra Dun, D. Gyaltsan, 1970), vol. 1, p. 93. For related lineages, see also VERHAGEN 1991, p. 238f, Appendix B: Transmission-Lineage of Sanskrit grammatical studies in Tibet.

³³See also VERHAGEN 1991, p. 49 (=II.2.2), note 185, and p. 168 (=App. A CG6); and VERHAGEN 1992, p. 384, n. 14, where he is also identified as 'Phags-pa.

of Sanskrit *kāvya* studies existing among Tibetans in that period (though other factors such as a corrupt Sanskrit text and even an imperfect later transmission of the Tibetan text may also have played their parts). Perhaps a translation had been ordered by the Tibetan ruler, but the other patrons simply could not find a translator who was equal to the task. The paṇḍita at least can be assumed to have been competent, since he was a main transmitter of the study of Sanskrit metrics to the most eminent Tibetan scholars of the day. In this case, the queen of Gung-thang could have been the mother of the king 'Bum-lde-mgon (1253-1280), another Sa-skya “princess” Ñi-ma-'bum, and in this case the princess Kun-dga-'bum is not otherwise identifiable at present, though she may have been a so-far unknown sister or aunt of that king, who had the same name. In that period, too, the Gung-thang royal line had matrimonial alliances with the Sa-skya 'Khon. According to Tshe-dbang-nor-bu, the *de facto* ruler then (i.e. in ca. the 1250s and 1260s) was the nun Lha Rin-chen-mtsho, who was 'Bum-lde-mgon's youngest paternal great aunt. That nun's older sister Lha-cig mDzes-ma had married Sa-skya Paṇḍita's younger brother Zangs-tsha bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan (1184-1239). The princess Ñi-ma-'bum was one of the offspring from this union.³⁴

The second interpretation suggested by the sources was that Sa-dbang-bzang-po flourished considerably later than Shong-ston's main teacher, the paṇḍita Lakṣmīkara. This would account for Shong-ston's having studied only a little with him, and with Sa-dbang-bzang-po's (later) collaboration with Shong-ston's younger brother as well as with the presumably later Blo-gros-rgyal-po. It is not impossible that this paṇḍita could have been still active ca. 1310-1315. In that case his collaborator Blo-gros-rgyal-po would have been a contemporary of Shong Blo-brtan and of the latter's disciple Lo-chen mChog-ldan-pa, and even of dPang-lo Blo-gros-brtan-pa. Again, the inferior skills of Blo-gros-rgyal-po would have been mainly to blame for the poor work, though in this later period one might have expected better. In this second case, the princess Kun-dga-'bum would be the known Sa-skya princess by that name, and her patronage could be dated to about the time of her marriage (ca. 1315-1320?) to the Gung-thang king Chos-skyong-lde.

These two possibilities are, however, irreconcilable. The Sa-skya princess Kun-dga-'bum's birth cannot be pushed back much beyond 1300, and her marriage, even if it happened when she was quite young, can hardly be placed much earlier

³⁴TSHE-DBANG-NOR-BU ff. 2b.8-4a.3, gives the following succession of rulers in the 13th century:

sKyob-pa-lde. (He had three daughters and one son, the latter being:)

mGon-po-lde. (He was killed by the Mon army of Ye-tshe. His real consort had no son, but he had a son by [the nun] Ra-la'i btsun-ma Byang-chub-'dren, niece of gÑos-ston mkhan-chen Byang-chub-gzungs. That son was born in the year of his father's death.)

bTsun-pa-lde. (During this period, the actual ruler was his youngest paternal aunt [ne ne], a nun named Lha Rin-chen-mtsho. Meanwhile her older sister Lha-cig mDzes-ma married Sa-skya Paṇḍita's younger brother, Zangs-tsha bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan. She bore him two daughters, bSod-nams-'bum and Ñi-ma-'bum, of whom bDag-mo Ñi-ma-'bum became the consort of bTsun-pa-lde.)

Khri-rgyal 'Bum-lde-mgon. (He was born in the water-female-ox year, 1253).

than 1310. That would still have been thirty years after 'Phags-pa's death. The period ca. 1315-1320, the likely time of the Sa-skyā princess Kun-dga'-'bum's coming to Gung-thang, would probably have been too late for the continuation of 'Phags-pa's patronage, even as a sort of funeral memorial.

Therefore a choice is necessary, and to me the first possibility—which places the translation in the earlier period—seems much more plausible. This mainly hinges upon the association of Sa-dbang-bzang-po with both Shong brothers, and the mention of “Bla-ma-dam-pa Chos-kyi-rgyal-po” in both colophons of the two works that Sa-dbang-bzang-po helped translate. Taking everything into account, that “Noble Guru, King of Religion” in the translation colophon of the *Buddhacarita* was probably none other than the famous 'Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan, just as Tucci (and even Cordier) proposed long ago, and the translation work was thus probably done in the 1260s or 1270s.

APPENDIX A

The Account on Kun-dga'-'bum
in A-MES-ZHABS'S *Sa skyā gdung rabs chen mo*

A-mes-zhabs Ngag-dbang-kun-dga'-bsod-nams, *'Dzam gling byang phyogs kyi thub pa'i rgyal tshab chen po dpal ldan sa skyā pa'i gdung rabs rin po che ji ltar byon pa'i tshul gyi rnam par thar pa ngo mtshar rin po che'i bang mdzod dgos 'dod kun 'byung* (New Delhi: Tashi Dorje, 1975), p. 449 (225a):

bla ma bdag ñid chen po'i btsun mo spyi grangs kyi drug pa | gdung brgyud spel cig pa'i lung phud nas khab tu bzhes pa'i btsun mo lnga pa yul red mda' ma | pha ming re mda' ba'i rtsed po | ming lha cig ñi ma rin chen zhes bya ba la sras lcam sring gsum 'khrungs pa de'i nang nas gen slob dpon chen po ñi ma dpal zhes bya ba dus mchod bla brang du sku 'khrungs mod kyang gzhon nu la gshegs nas bstan pa la phan pa zhiḡ ma byung | bar ma slob dpon ma kun dga' 'bum zhes bya ba ste 'di ni khab so bkra shis su 'khrungs nas sku nar son pa na mnga' ris gung thang du mnga' bdag tu dben sha'i jo mo mdzad cing | sras slob dpon lha btsun phun tshogs dpal dang | mnga' bdag bzang po lde gñis byung ba'i lha btsun phun tshogs dpal gyis gdan sa chen po dpal ldan sa skyar lo mang po'i bar du chos 'chad mdzad ces grags shing | de nas dus phyis slob dpon ma des gdan sa chen por phebs pa na dpon chen gzhon dbang pa yab sras kyis bla brang seng ge sgang phyag tu phul nas | gnas der thugs dam zab mo'i ngang nas sku gshegs so |.

APPENDIX B

The Account of Kun-dga'-'bum
in Rig-'dzin TSHE-DBANG-NOR-BU'S *Gung thang rgyal rabs*

Kaḡ-thog rig-'dzin Tshe-dbang-nor-bu, *Bod rje lha btsad po'i gdung rabs mnga' ri* [sic] *smad mang yul gung thang du ji ltar byung ba'i tshul deb gter dwangs shel 'phrul gyi me long*, cursive manuscript copy (library of Mr. E. G. Smith) made from an original 22-folio manuscript in the library of Barmiok Athing, f. 10a:

lha sras chos skyong lde yi btsun mor sa skya nas bdag ñid chen po bzang po dpal ba'i sras mo kun dga' 'bum zhes lha gcig red mda' ma la bltams pa dbang kun dga' legs pa'i gcen mo de khabs su bsus | bdag mo pha ming gi reg sde [?] thog mar rgyal po dang thugs mi mthun pa'i rnam pa byung yang bdag ñid chen po yab sras thugs brling zhing byams pa'i zhal dang bzang pos khyab pa yis phyis thugs mdza' shing gshim pa'i sras spyod [?] gu ru gter kha du ma dang | khyad par rig 'dzin rgod ldem can gyi rtsa ba'i chos bdag gter [10b] ston ñid dang mñam par lung bstan pa khri bkra shis lde sku bltams | de yang ji skad du | khyad par mang yul sku lha'i byang shar du || sa khar dung gi so mang 'ar ba 'byung || de ru rgyal rigs bong thung byang sems can || chos rgyal bkra shis lde zhes bya ba dang || gter 'di 'phrad na bod yul bstan pa ni || mi lo lnga bcu rtsa gsum bsdings [?] nus so || zhes pa mtshon mang du 'byung ba ñid do | khri chos skyong lde chu 'brug gi lo la sku gshegs nas bkra shis lde la cod pan bcings nas rgyal thabs kyi bdag por mnga' gsol ba'i btsun mo dbang kun dga' legs pa'i sras mo bsod nams 'bum khabs su bsus | lo shas rings yab yum ha cang thugs gshim ma byung yang nang blon rgyam chen po dang sa gtso ba dkar po dpal sogs 'dzangs pa rnam kyis legs par bsodum nas shin tu mthun gshim su gyur | khri bkra shis lde yab kyi dgongs rdzogs su ston mchog shākya senge'i sku brñan dang yum gyi ched du 'phags ma sgrol ma'i sku brñan gñis mi tshad las ches mtho zhing g.yu rñing khyad par can sogs rin po che'i 'phra rgyan gyis shin tu mdzes par byas pa dang | gzhan yang rdzong dkar gyi lcags ri .

. . .

APPENDIX C

The Chronology of the Early Occupants of the Sa-skyā See

- (I) The following is drawn from the *Sa skya'i gdung rabs* found in A-MES-ZHABS, as excerpted in KHETSUN SANGPO, vol. 10, pp. 562-568. The only correction I have made is not to list Kun-dga'-sñing-po twice. A preliminary study of this account can also be found in JEFFREY SCHOENING, "The Sa-skyā Throne Holder Lineage," unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Washington, 1983, pp. 13-21.
- (1) **'Khon dKon-mchog-rgyal-po** (1034-1102). Founds Sa-skyā in *chuglang* (1073). [Tenure 1073-1102].
 - (2) **Ba-ri lo-tsā-ba Rin-chen-grags** (1040-1112). Tenure from 1102 until 1110 (*lcags-stag*).
 - (3) **Sa-chen Kun-dga'-sñing-po** (1092-1158). Tenure from *lcags-yos* (1111), for forty-seven years until *sa-stag* (1158).
 - (4) **bSod-nams-rtse-mo** (1142-1182). Tenure from *sa-stag* (1158)? Or else he is to be omitted from the list.
 - (5) **Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan** (1147-1216). Tenure from *sa-yos* (1159).
 - (6) **Sa-pan Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan** (1182-1251). Tenure from *me-byi* (1216) until *chu-yos* (1243).

- (7) The see held in common by **Shar-pa Shes-rab-'byung-gnas**, **'U-yug-pa Rigs-pa'i-seng-ge** (d. 1253?), and **Shākya-bzang-po**? Or by **Shākya-grags** alone? Tenure from *shing-'brug* (1244) until *shing-byi* (1264).
- (8A) **'Phags-pa Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan (1235-1280)**. First tenure *shing-glang* to *me-phag* (1265-1266).
- (9) **Rin-chen-rgyal-mtshan** (1238-1279). Tenure for nine years (1267-1275?).
- (8B) **'Phags-pa**. Second tenure, from *me-byi* until *lcags-'brug* (1276-1280).
- (10) **Dharmapāla** (1268-1287). Tenure from *lcags-sbrul* (1281) until *me-phag* (1287).
- (11) **Shar-pa 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhi-thog-pa** (1258-1306?). Tenure from *sa-byi* (1288) until *me-bya* (1297).
- (12) **bDag-ñid-chen-po bZang-po-dpal** (1262-1324). Tenure from *sakhyi* (1298) until *shing-byi* (1324).
- (13) **mKhas-btsun-chen-po [Nam-mkha'-legs-pa]** (1305-1343). Tenure from *shing-glang* (1325) until *chu-lug* (1343).
- (14) **'Jam-dbyangs-don-yod-rgyal-mtshan** (1310-1344). Tenure “for about three years” (*lo gsum tsam*).
- (15) **Bla-ma-dam-pa bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan** (1312-1375). Tenure from his “thirty-third” year (1344) for a short while (*yun mi ring tsam zhig*).
- (16) **Ta-dben Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan** (1332-1364). Tenure “for eighteen years” (ca. 1347-1364?).
- (II) The following account is given by the BOD RGYA..., p. 2891, in the article *Sa skya'i gdan rabs*:
- (1) **'Khon dKon-mchog-rgyal-po** (1034-1102). Founds Sa-skya in *chuglang* (1073). Tenure 1073-1102.
- (2) **Ba-ri lo-tsa-ba Rin-chen-grags** (1040-1112). Tenure 1102-1111?
- (3) **Sa-chen Kun-dga'-sñing-po** (1092-1158). Tenure from *lcags-yos* (1111), for 47 years (until 1158).
- (4) **bSod-nams-rtse-mo** (1142-1182). Tenure from *sa-stag* (1158).
- (5) **Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan** (1147-1216). Tenure from *chu-'brug* (1172).
- (6) **Sa-paṅ Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan** (1182-1251). Tenure from *me-byi* (1216).
- (7) **'Phags-pa** (1235-1280). Tenure from *lcags-phag* (1251).
- (8) Younger brother (**Rin-chen-rgyal-mtshan**). When 'Phags-pa was at the capital.

- (9) **Dharmapāla** (1268-1287). Tenure from *sa-'brug* (1268!). [This is a mistake for his birth date. Better *lcags-sbrul* (1281)].
- (10) **Shar-pa 'Jam-dbyangs-bzhi-thog-pa** (1258-1306?). Tenure from *me-phag* (1287).
- (11) **bDag-ñid-chen-po bZang-po-dpal** (1262-1324). Tenure from *shing-brug* (1304), for 19 years. The see was vacant for three years, from *chu-phag* (1323) onward.
- (12) **mKhas-btsun-chen-po [Nam-mkha'-legs-pa]** (1305-1343). Tenure from *shing-glang* (1325). [N.B.: **'Jam-dbyangs-don-yod-rgyal-mtshan** omitted from list].
- (13) **Bla-ma-dam-pa bSod-nams-rgyal-mtshan** (1312-1375). Tenure from *shing-sbrul* [read: *shing-sprel*, 1344], for three years.
- (14) **Ta-dben Blo-gros-rgyal-mtshan** (1332-1364?). Tenure from *me-phag* (1347). In the third year of his tenure, the Sa-skyapa's power was eclipsed.

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rNgog lotsāba on the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*

Helmut Krasser
(Vienna)

Although rNgog lotsāba Blo ldan shes rab *alias* Blo ldan bzang po¹ (1059-1109) was one of the principal exponents of the later phase of the pre-classical period of the development of *tshad ma* in Tibet,² from among the huge number of his works³ only a few have come down to us. A brief topical outline or summary (*bsdus don*) of the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* was published in 1985; editions of his commentaries to the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the *Abhisamayālamkāra*⁴ with an introduction by David Jackson are now under preparation. Thus, information on rNgog lotsāba and his followers, the representatives of the so called *rNgog lugs*, has been available only from secondary sources. Many of these materials have been collected in Leonard van der Kuijp's pioneer study of the early period of Tibetan epistemology⁵ and have been supplemented by David Jackson.⁶ From among his works on *tshad ma*, only two seem to have survived: a commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (*rNam nges kyi ṭī ka*), and his *Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka' gnas rnam par bshad pa*, "Explanation of the difficult points in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*".⁷ The publication

¹Cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1983 p. 31.

²For this periodization cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1989 p. 8-18.

³A list of his work is to be found in VAN DER KUIJP 1983 pp. 34&57.

⁴For references cf. JACKSON 1987 p. 148⁸.

⁵Cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1983, Chapter 1 Rngog lo-tsa-ba Blo-ldan shes-rab and the *Rngog-lugs* of epistemology.Ž

⁶Cf. JACKSON 1987 pp. 127-131 & 165-169, and DAVID JACKSON, "An Early Biography of rNgog lotsaba Blo ldan šes rab". In: *Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies. Fagernes 1992*. PER KVAERNE (ed.). Vol. I. Oslo 1994, 372-392.

⁷Both texts are kept in the Library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities (CPN); cf. ERNST STEINKELLNER, "Early Tibetan Ideas on the Ascertainment of Validity (*nges byed kyi tshad ma*)". In: *Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies. Narita 1989*. SHÖREN IHARA and ZUICHŌ YAMAGUCHI (eds.). Narita 1992 [257-273] p. 264⁵¹. The *Lo chen gyi mdzad pa'i rnam nges ṭī ka* (CPN no. 5139[1]) is incomplete and consists of 132 *folios*; the last portion is missing; cf. LEONARD VAN DER KUIJP, "On Some Early Tibetan *Pramāṇavāda* Texts of the China Nationalities Library of the Cultural Palace of Nationalities in Beijing"

of the latter text has been announced for the near future. The work consists of three chapters on *pratyakṣa*, *svārtha*- and *parārthānumāna* and covers 124 *folios* made up of 8 lines; *folio* no.1 is missing. The manuscript is written in a legible *dbu med* script sometimes preserving an old orthography, so that in most cases – but not always – we find a subscribed *y* in front of the palatal vowels such as *myed pa* for *med pa*, or *dmyigs pa* for *dmigs pa*. Instead of *snang ba*, *snang pa* is mostly written and the term *dam bca' ba'i don* also occurs in the variants *dam bcas pa'i don*, *dam bcwa' ba'i don* and *dam bcwa ba'i don*. In some instances the genitive *i* such as in *pa'i* is separated from the preceding consonant by a *tsheg* so that we read *pa 'i*. Moreover, the post-post-fixed *d* (*da drag*) is used as in *gyurd pa*. The initial consonant of final particles and the like is quite often omitted, e.g. *thalo* for *thal lo*, or *'thade* for *'thad de*. The use of abbreviations seems to be restricted to *thamd* for *thams cad*. Finally, it should be mentioned that units of the text belonging together are separated from each other by writing two or three dots in vertical order between a double *shad*. Smaller units are separated by using two dots either before or after the *shad*. This method, however, is not consequently applied. From this manuscript I shall reproduce a small portion, namely rNgog lotsāba's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* proof as propounded in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, in order to gain some insight into his style, into the development of textual analysis, the so called *sa bcad* technique, and, of course, into his way of understanding the theme and his appropriation of the ideas of his Indian predecessors.

The last section in the *pratyakṣapariccheda* of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PVIN I 78,12-100,26)⁸ is devoted to the distinction between a means of cognition and its effect (*pramāṇaphala*) in order to prove that any cognition (*jñāna*) bears two aspects, one grasping or subjective (*grāhaka*) and one to be grasped or objective (*grāhya*). The equivalent to this in the *Pramāṇavārttika* is to be found in the *pratyakṣa* chapter vv. 301-366⁹ and vv. 388-391¹⁰. Having first explained what should be known as *pramāṇa* and its *phala* in accordance with the doctrine that an external object exists (*bāhyārthavāda*) and that in the end it is not necessary to assume the existence of an object external to cognition (PVIN I 78, 12-90, 16), Dharmakīrti proceeds to establish their difference without assuming an external object. In this context he presents two proofs according to the teaching that everything is just cognition (*viññaptimātra*).¹¹ The first of these two proofs runs as follows:¹²

(unpublished).

⁸The entire section has been translated into English in GEORGE DREYFUS & CHRISTIAN LINDTNER, "The Yogācāra Philosophy of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti". *Studies in Central & East Asian Religions* 2, 1989 pp. 27-52.

⁹VETTER in his edition of PVIN I refers to the respective parallels.

¹⁰Cf. IWATA I 15ff.

¹¹Cf. the introduction of this sub-section in PVIN I 94, 14: *'di rnam par rig pa tsam ñid yin na . . .*

¹²This proof as well as the second one (*rig pa zhes bya ba yang de'i bdag ñid yin pa'i phyir de ltar gsal ba'o* | | PVIN I 98, 7f) are the subject of Iwata's study on *sahopala-*

sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ |v.55ab
 (lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir | sngo dang de blo gzhan ma yin |)
 ... *dvicandrādivat (zla ba gñis la sogs pa bzhin no)*. PVIN I 94,22f

The passage is normally translated as: Blue and its cognition are not different from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together ... like the two moons (seen by one suffering from a *timira* eye disease).¹³

According to rNgog lotsāba who was quite familiar with this topic – he not only cooperated in the translation of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* but also in that of Dharmottara's *Tīkā* and Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* – there are two points to be dealt with in this proof: (§1.) the subject of the thesis (*dam bca' ba'i don, pratiññārtha*), and (§2.) the faults of the reason (*gtan tshigs kyi skyon, hetudoṣa*) as criticized by the opponents. Because with regard to the *hetudoṣas* rNgog lotsāba does not provide us with any new information, but only disproves the criticism of Śubhagupta as formulated in his *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* which is refuted in the epistemological tradition of Dharmakīrti with more or less the same arguments, I will not discuss them here.

Concerning the subject of the thesis in this proof, rNgog lotsāba distinguishes (§1.1.) the locus of properties (*chos can, dharmin*) and (§1.2.) the property to be proved (*bsgrub bya'i chos, sādhyadharmā*). The *dharmin* is determined to be made up only by the objective aspect consisting of something blue etc. He stresses the point that the subjective aspect should not be regarded as *dharmin*, for the *grāhakākāra* in this proof is different from the *grāhyākāra*. This is due to the fact that the *grāhakākāra* has to be understood as being real (*bden pa, satya*) while the *grāhyākāra* is said to be unreal or false (*brdzun pa, alīka*).

The property to be proved, i.e. *abheda*, is interpreted as being of the nature of a non-implicative negation (*myed par dgag pa, prasajyapraṭiṣedha*) and he dispels the assumption of its being an implicative negation (*ma yin par dgag pa, paryudāsapraṭiṣedha*). This means that by the negation in the term “*abheda*” only “the being different” is negated, but it should not be understood in the sense that Dharmakīrti intended the identity of the two aspects.

The determination of the *sādhyadharmā* now is a point where the difference

mbhaniyama (cf. IWATA I, II), in which the commentators' interpretations are considered as well. On Śubhagupta's criticism of the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof in his *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* together with the reaction on it in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, in Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, and in Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* and on Haribhadrasūri's refutation of this proof in his *Anekāntajayapatākā*, cf. MATSUMOTO 1980.

¹³Apart from the interpretation of *saha* the various translations do not in essence differ: [Ferner] gibt es keine Verschiedenheit zwischen Blau und seiner Erkenntnis, weil sie notwendig gleichzeitig wahrgenommen werden. Ž VETTER transl. of PVIN I 95; Blue and the cognition of blue are not different from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together. Ž MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 2; There [really] is no difference between something blue and the idea of the [blue thing] because [the “two”] must be perceived simultaneously. Ž DREYFUS/LINDTNER 1989 p. 46 (cf. fn. 8); Das Blaue und die Erkenntnis davon sind nicht verschieden, weil sie ausschließlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden. Ž IWATA I 15.

between Dharmakīrti's commentators regarding the interpretation of this proof most clearly finds expression. This in part applies to the locus of the properties as well, but the *dharmin* was not a theme of their discussions and thus their views can be understood only by implication. In order to see the impact of the Indian tradition on rNgog lotsāba we first have to look at the respective interpretations. In roughly presenting the commentators' explanations I will make use of the results of Iwata's study on the topic and more details can be found there. Except for the concepts of Dharmottara who comments on the PVIN and those of Śākyabuddhi and Kamalaśīla who explicitly relate their statements to the passage of the PVIN under consideration, the interpretations of the other commentators are comparable with those of rNgog lotsāba only to a certain degree, for the contexts in which this argument is applied and explained may differ.

Devendrabuddhi in his commentary on PV III 388 deduces from the reason "being necessarily perceived together" the identity (*ekatva*) of blue and its cognition.¹⁴ Thus the *dharmin* consists in the subjective and objective aspect and the *sādhya* is their identity. Śākyabuddhi shares this opinion. He quotes PVIN I 55ab and blames an opponent who takes the *sādhya* to be a mere negation of the difference (*bhedapratīṣedhamātra*) for his ignorance regarding the intention of Dharmakīrti.¹⁵ Śāntarakṣita's position is not clear.¹⁶ Kamalaśīla, however, explicitly determines that the *dharmin* consists of the blue and its cognition and that the *sādhya* is their non-difference.¹⁷ In Prajñākaragupta's *Alaṃkāra* there are several passages which indicate that he understands the term "*abhedā*" in the meaning of "identity". He explains, for example, that in the *dṛṣṭānta* used by Dharmakīrti, *dvicandrādivat*, the two moons seen by one suffer-

¹⁴Cf. IWATA I 113 (transl.) & II 93¹²: PVP [P No. 5717(b)] 276b1: *sngon po la sogs pa dang de nams su myong ba dag ni lhan cig dmigs pa'i phyir tha dad par snang ba can nīd yin na yang gcig yin no zhes bya ba'i don to* | | Ž = Although blue etc. and the awareness of it appear to be different, they are identical because they are perceived together.Ž

¹⁵Cf. ... *cig car dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir* | *sngon po de blo tha dad med* (PVIN I 55ab) *ces bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa yin no* | | *tha dad pa dgag pa tsam de bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi* **tha dad pa med do** *zhes bya ba* (P; D: *zhes pa*) *ni ma yin te* | *de yang bshad na bstan bcos mdzad pa mi mkhas par ston par 'gyur ro* | | PVṬ P (5718 *Ñe*) 255b1f (D [4220 *Ñe*] 207a2f) = If one explains that (the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but not the "non-difference"¹⁾ [as formulated by Dharmakīrti] one demonstrates that the *sāstrakāra* is not learned.Ž Cf. IWATA I 141f & II 107⁷⁵.

¹⁾ As *bhedapratīṣedhamātra* here probably is to be interpreted as *prasajyapratīṣedha*, the term *tha dad pa med (pa)* may be understood in the meaning of "identity".

¹⁶Cf. IWATA I 184ff.

¹⁷Cf. *dharmy atra nīlākārataddhiyau. tayor abhinnavam sādhya* *dharmaḥ. yathoktaḥ sahopalambhaniyamō hetuḥ. idṛśa evācārīye sahopalambhaniyamāt* (PVIN I v. 55ab) *ityādaḥ prayoge hetvartho 'bhipretaḥ*. TSP 691,23-25. = The locus of the property in this (proof) are the blue aspect and its cognition. Their not being different is the property to be proved. The reason, as it is stated [by Śāntarakṣita], is the being necessarily perceived together. Such a meaning of the reason is intended in the formulation as applied by the teacher: "**because they are necessarily perceived together**" etc.Ž

ing from a *timira* eye disease are identical (*ekatā*).¹⁸ In the same way, Ravigupta claims the identity of blue and its cognition.¹⁹ Finally, we should have a look at Dharmottara's comments in his *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, the text of which was translated by rNgog lotsāba and on which he wrote a topical summary (*bsdus don*).²⁰

In the PVINṬ there is no passage where Dharmottara identifies the *dharmin*. However, as he explains that in Dharmakīrti's verse *abhedah* has to be construed with *nīlataddhiyoḥ*,²¹ meaning that blue and its cognition are not different from each other, the *dharmin* can be understood as consisting of the blue and its cognition, as was clearly stated by Kamalaśīla who seems to rely on Dharmottara in this point. In determining the *sādhyadharmā* Dharmottara does not use the terms *prasajya-* and *paryudāsapraṭiṣedha* applied by rNgog lotsāba, but only speaks of a mere negation (*praṭiṣedhamātra*) of difference. However, that *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* is intended can be seen from his denial that the property to be proved is identity.²²

¹⁸Cf. *ayam eva bhedahetur yad uta bhinnayogakṣematā. indudvayapratibhāsasya tu bhinnayogakṣemābhāvāt ekataiva.* PVBH 410,11f = Only the fact of having a different fate [i.e. cause and effect] is cause of a difference. The two moons that appear, however, do not have a different fate. Therefore they are merely identical.Ž Cf. also *abhinnayogakṣematvād ekatvam arthasya jñānena durvāram ...* PVBH 430,32 = The object's identity with cognition cannot be denied, for it does not have a different fate.Ž These and some other passages are referred to in IWATA I 145.

¹⁹PVṬ (P 5722) 167a3: *de'i phyir tha dad par snang yang lhan cig par dmigs pa'i phyir don dang shes pa dag gcig ñid yin no ||* = Although they therefore appear to be different, blue and its cognition are identical because they are perceived together.Ž Cf. IWATA I147 & II 111⁸⁸.

²⁰Cf. VAN DER KUIJP 1983 p. 34.

²¹Cf. *sngo* (D: *sngon* P) **dang de'i blo dag gzhan ma yin zhes bya ba ni tha dad pa med pa'o || bsgrub par bya ba'i cha 'dir bstan pa'i phyir gsungs pa ni | gang gi phyir** (PVIN I 94,20) *zhes bya ba'o ||* PVINṬ P 182b6-7 (D 157a3-4) = **Blue and its cognition are not different from each other**, i.e. non-different. In order to show the part to be proved he said "for".Ž

²²**don gzhan pa'i rang bzhin ñid ma yin te** (PVIN I 94,21) *zhes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba ston pa'o || 'di skad du 'di dag gcig par ni bsgrub par bya ba ma yin gyi | 'on kyang tha dad bdag¹⁾ dgag pa tsam yin no zhes ston pa yin no || ci'i phyir tha dad pa dgag pa tsam bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi | gcig ñid du ni bsgrub pa ma yin no zhes smra | ...* P 182b8-183a2 (D 157a5-6) = [The formulation:] "**It is not of the nature of an other thing**" (*na ... arthāntararūpatvaṃ*) shows (the property) to be proved. It shows that it is not to be proved that the two are identical, but the mere negation of the being of different nature [is to be proved]. [Question:] Why do you say that (the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but not their identity? ... Ž

¹⁾ The reading of *bdag* is problematical. Derge reads either *bdag* or *pa dag*. Peking reads only *dag*. The variant *tha dad (pa) dag dgag pa* would be equivalent to *bhinnayor praṭiṣedhaḥ* which does not make sense. *tha dad bdag dgag pa* could translate a Sanskrit *bhinnātma(tva)praṭiṣedha* meaning negation of their being of different nature.Ž Perhaps the correct reading is, as in the following *pūrvapakṣa*, just *tha dad pa dgag pa*. IWATA II 122¹³⁹ and MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 18f both interpret *tha dad (pa) dag dgag pa* in the sense of *bhedapraṭiṣedha*.

Moreover, he specifies the subjective aspect to be real (*vastu*)²³ and the objective aspect to be unreal (*asatya*)²⁴.

As can be easily seen, from among the interpretations of the Indian commentators that of rNgog lotsāba is quite close to the perception of Dharmottara. rNgog lotsāba as well as Dharmottara understand the property to be proved to be of the nature of a *prasajyapratishedha* and both consider the subjective aspect to be real and the objective one to be unreal or false. In determining the locus of property, however, they differ insofar as Dharmottara regards both aspects to constitute the *dharmin* while rNgog lotsāba denies the *grāhakākāra*'s being part of it. The reasons for this interpretation put forward by rNgog lotsāba are that in this argument the subjective aspect must be different from the objective one and that the negation of difference is an activity towards the objective aspect. But what does he mean by this? The purpose of this section of the PVIN is, as already mentioned, to establish that any cognition (*jñāna*) bears two aspects²⁵ according to the *vijñaptimātratā*-theorem.²⁶ It must be added that Dharmakīrti is still arguing on the level of *sāṃvyaḥārikapramāṇa*.²⁷ This means, as rNgog lotsāba explains afterwards (§1.2.1.), that on this level the subjective aspect is said to be existent (*yod pa, sat*), for it is not only experienced as being illuminated but it is also reliable (*mi slu ba, avisamvādin*). Thus it is real (*bden pa, satya*). The objective aspect is, although experienced as being illuminated, not reliable, for

²³ *rnam par shes pa mi* (P: *ni D*) *bden pa gsal* (D: *bsal P*) *bar nus pa ma rig pa'i bdag nīd can ni dngos po yin gyi brtags* (P: *brtag D*) *pa ni ma yin no* || sc PVINṬ P 177b2f (D 152b2) = The cognition which is capable of illuminating something unreal (*asatya*) (and) which is of the nature of ignorance (*avidyā*) is real (*vastu*), but it is not imagined (*kalpita*).Ṣ (cf. IWATA I 179 & II 126¹⁶⁵). Cf. also ... *mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i rang bzhin yang rdzun pa ni ma yin no* || PVINṬ P 177b5f (D 152b6) = ... and the aspect which illuminates something unreal is not false (*alīka*).Ṣ

²⁴ *gang gi phyir gang ji sned snang ba de kho na ltar thams cad bden pa ni ma yin te* | *'khrul pas med pa yang snang ba'i phyir ro* || PVINṬ P 182b8 (D 157b5) = For not everything is real in just that way as it appears [in cognition], because due to an error [consisting of *avidyā*]¹⁾ something non-existing also appears [in cognition].Ṣ

¹⁾ Cf. *de'i phyir ma rig pa'i nus pa dang ldan pa'i shes pa mi bden pa'i rang bzhin gsal ba'i byed pa yin pa'i phyir ma rig pa'i dbang gis gsal ba yin no zhes brjod pa la ni kha na ma tho ba yod pa ma yin no* || PVINṬ 184b6f (D 158b5f) quoted in *Syādvādaratnākara* 170,17-19 (identified in IWATA II 123¹⁴⁴, transl. in I 174): *etena Dharmottareṇa yad abhidadhe – tasmād avidyāśaktiyuktaṃ jñānam asatya-rūpam ādarśayatīty avidyāvaśāt prakāśata ity ucyata ity anavadyam iti* = Therefore a cognition that is connected with ignorance shows an unreal form. Thus it is no fault to state that [cognition] by force of ignorance illuminates [an unreal form].Ṣ

²⁵ Cf. *des na blo ni tshul gñis pa* | v. 59c *de'i phyir yul dang shes pa'i rang bzhin dag gis blo tshul gñis su grub pa yin no* || PVIN I 100,4-6 = Thus, mind is two-fold. Therefore it is established that mind by way of the form of the object and that of cognition is two-fold.Ṣ

²⁶ Cf. above fn. 11.

²⁷ Cf. *sāṃvyaḥārikasyaitat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam*. PVIN I 100,20 = What we have explained is the nature of a valid cognition of everyday life.Ṣ

its reliability is invalidated by a correct or valid cognition (*tshad mas gnod pa, pramāṇabādhita*)²⁸ and thus it is false (*brdzun pa, alika*). This constitutes the difference between them.²⁹ Moreover, the objective aspect cannot be real, for then neither of the two kinds of connections (*'brel pa, pratibandha*) would be possible. A causal connection, *tadutpatti*, contradicts their existence at the same time,³⁰ and identity, *tādātmya*, of two really existing entities is not possible by definition.³¹ These seem to be the main reasons for rNgog lotsāba's position.

What does this explanation mean for Dharmakīrti's *sahopalambhaniyama* proof? According to this interpretation the verse (*sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ* | v. 55ab) should be translated as follows:

Because blue and its cognition are necessarily perceived together,
[blue] is not different [from its cognition].^Ž

If we now look at rNgog lotsāba's own translation of this passage *lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir* | *sngo dang de blo gzan ma yin* | such an interpretation is, as is the case with the Sanskrit version, neither supported nor contradicted, although one is inclined to understand *nīlataddhiyoḥ* as referring to both, *sahopalambhaniyamād* and *abhedo*. However, this understanding obviously contradicts a later formulation of Dharmakīrti in verse 59ab where he says that even in the case that an external object exists, blue and its cognition are not different from each other. This he explains as follows: By the two [reasons explained above, namely] "being perceived together" and "consciousness" it is established that the manifestation of blue and the like [in cognition] and its consciousness are not different from each other even in the case that an external object exists.^Ž³² In this statement the *dharmin* definitely is not the objective aspect alone but consists of the blue and its cognition. Did rNgog lotsāba consciously deviate from Dharmakīrti or is it possible that he overlooked this statement?

²⁸For the translation of the term *tshad ma, pramāṇa* as "valid cognition" which I adopt in the following, cf. TOM J.F. TILLEMANS, *Persons of Authority. The sTon pa tshad ma'i skeyes bur sgrub pa'i gtam of A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar* ... Stuttgart 1993 pp. v-vi.

²⁹Cf. §1.2.1. *lan ni 'dzin pa ni myong pa dang myi slu ba yod pas* | *de yod par brjod kyī* | *bzung pa ni gsal bar tshor yang tshad mas gnod pas myi slu ba myed de* | *des na gsal bar tshor bar khyad par myed kyang gang yang gnod byed myed par grub pa'i myi slu ba yod pa de ni bden la de myed pa ni brdzun pas na khyad par grub bo* | |

³⁰This means that rNgog lotsāba understands *saha-* in the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof as meaning "at the same time". On the different interpretations of *saha-* cf. IWATA I 66-103.

³¹Cf. §1.2.1. *gzhan yang bzung pa bden par gsal bar thal ba yang ma yin te* | *bden pa dang 'brel pas myi 'thad pas ste* | *dus cig pa dang rang bzhin myi gcig pa la 'brel pa gnīs ga 'gal ba'i phyir dang* | *gsum pa yang myi srid pa'i phyir ro* | |

³²<¹ *de phyir snang don blo de dag* | *phyi don yod kyang tha dad min* |¹> v. 59ab *lhan cig dmigs pa dang rig pa dag gis phyi rol gyi don yod kyang sngon po la sogs pa snang ba dang de rig pa dag tha dad med par grub bo* | | PVIN I 98,29-100,3.

<¹> Quoted in *Īśvarapratyabhīṅgāvivṛttivimarsinī* III 32,14: *bāhye 'py arthe tato 'bhedo bhāsamānārthatadvidoḥ* |; identified in ELLIOT M. STERN, "Additional Fragments of Pramāṇaviniścaya I-II." *WZKS* 35, 1991 [151-168] p. 161.

I do not think either is the case, for rNgog lotsāba's interpretation exactly follows Dharmakīrti's own explanation of the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof which says: For blue is not of the nature of a thing that is different from (its) awareness, although it appears to be different because the two are necessarily perceived together, like the two moons (seen by one suffering from a *timira* eye disease).³³ Here Dharmakīrti only speaks of the non-difference of the blue from its awareness, but not of their being mutually not different. Thus, in this passage, the *dharmin* consists of the blue and its non-difference from its awareness is the property to be proved (*sādhya*dharma). Further, in the whole following section up to the second proof by means of consciousness (*rig pa*) (PVIN I 97,7), there is not a single remark which could be understood in the sense that the cognition's non-difference from the blue is intended. In the same way, in the explanation of the second proof, Dharmakīrti only states that the blue is not a thing that is different from its awareness.³⁴ As we now should not assume that Dharmakīrti in his explanation of this verse in prose formulates a new idea different from that in the verse, the verse has to be understood in the very same way.

The contradiction to the passage mentioned above (PVIN I 98,29-100,3) can be explained in such a manner that the argument expressed in the verse has to be formulated in two different ways. When formulated from the standpoint of the *viññaptimātratā*, only the non-difference of the blue is intended and it is only the blue that constitutes the *dharmin*. And when it is applied assuming an external object (*bāhyārtha*), the presuppositions are different and the mutual non-difference of blue and its cognition is to be proved. This also seems to be the reason why rNgog lotsāba translated the verse in such a way that it may be applied according to both views.

We now have seen that rNgog lotsāba in his interpretation of the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof, with one exception, follows Dharmottara's explanation and that he ignores the comments of the other Indian predecessors. In determining the *dharmin* of this proof on the *viññaptimātratā* level he is more precise when he regards it to consist of the *grāhyākāra* alone. At other occasions in his dKa' gnas rnam bshad, however, he does not follow Dharmottara at all but refutes his views.³⁵ These facts corroborate Śākya mchog ldan's account of rNgog lotsāba's assimilation of Dharmottara's ideas, for he reported that rNgog lotsāba refuted many points in the exposition of Dharmottara that he took to be unacceptable,

³³ *gang gi phyir tha dad par snang ba ñid yin yang sngon po ni ñams su myong ba las don gzhan pa'i rang bzhin ñid ma yin te | de dag lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa'i phyir | zla ba gñis la sogs pa bzhin no | | = na hi bhinnāvabhāsīve 'py arthāntararūpatvaṃ nīlasyānubhāvāt, tayoh sahopalambhaniyamād, dvicandrādivat* PVIN I 94,20-21.

³⁴ *sngon po la sogs pa myong ba las don gzhan ma yin na ni de'i bdag ñid du gyur pa de ltar gsal ba'i phyir sngon po la sogs pa myong bar 'gyur ro | |* PVIN I 98,9-12 = *anarthāntaratve tu nīlāder anubhavāt tadātmabhūtaḥ prakāśate tathā nīlādyanubhavaḥ syāt*. Kāśikā II 100,4f; identified in STERN 1991 p. 161 (cf. fn. 32).

³⁵ Cf. 'di la **slob dpon chos mchog** ñid na re | zhe'o | 'di yang bden pa ma yin te | . . . dKa' gnas rnam bshad 44a8 and **slob dpon chos mchog** na re zhe'o | | de ni ma yin te | . . . 44b1f.

having retained as they were those [passages] he thought were acceptable.³⁶

Regarding his *sa bcad* technique one can see by the paragraph numbers which I added that the text was well organized according to this method, although we do not always find the beginning of a paragraph indicated by a *dang po* or *gñis pa*. However, the text under consideration does not allow a statement as to the extent to which the imposition of a logical structure upon a text commented on by means of topical outlines was developed by rNgog lotsāba, for the *dKa' gnas rnam bshad* is, as the title already indicates, not a detailed explanation of all the points of the PVIN, but only of the difficult ones. The topical outlines we find here seem to indicate the main points that rNgog lotsāba considered to be essential for his teaching of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and the different opinions of his Indian predecessors concerning some specific subjects. For he not only refers to Śubhagupta's comments, although without mentioning his name (§2.), or to Dharmottara's view,³⁷ but in other parts of his *rNam bshad* he also refutes the opinions of Prajñākaragupta, Śāntabhadra and others.³⁸

As to rNgog lotsāba's style, one may say that his remarks are very short and in many cases only comprehensible after having understood the detailed discussion in Dharmottara's PVINṬ which he quite often summarizes in a few words.

Regarding the *sahopalambhaniyama* proof in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, he finally provides us with a new interpretation that is not to be found in the Indian tradition and which accords well with Dharmakīrti's formulations.

Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka' gnas rnam par bshad pa
on *sahopalambhaniyama* (PVIN I 94,18-98,6)

Additions in the manuscript are indicated by <xxx>; my additions to the ms. by (xxx); my corrections by xxx [corr. : yyy]; variant readings such as *gzung - bzung ba - pa*, *kyi - gyi*, *ste - te*, *cig - gcig* and the like are not corrected. Omissions of an initial consonant of final particles etc., e.g. *thalo* instead of *thal lo*, are indicated by *thal-lo* etc.; *thamḍ* is the abbreviation used in the ms. for *thams cad*. It also should be noted that the *tsheg* before a *shad* never is omitted, but always written.

[45a6] ***lhan cig dmyigs pa nges pa'i*** (PVIN I v.55a) *gtan tshigs ni | 1. dam bcas pa'i don dang |: 2. gtan tshigs kyi skyon spang pa gñis kyis shes par bya'o |:*

³⁶... ***chos mchog gi bshad pa las thugs yul du 'thad pa rnam thad sor bzhaḡ nas mi 'thad pa la dgag pa mang du bshad do*** || Śākya mchog ldan, *Tshad ma'i mdo* ... (Collected Works Vol. 19 pp. 1-137) pp. 29,3-30,4; transl. JACKSON 1987 p. 167. A longer portion of this text dealing with rNgog lotsāba together with a translation is given in VAN DER KUIJP 1983 pp. 49-56.

³⁷Cf. above fn. 35.

³⁸Cf. ***slob dpon shes rab 'byung gnas sbas pa dang | zhi ba bzang po la sogs pa na re | zhe'o | | de ni myi 'thad de | . . . 46b4-6; . . . des na kha cig . . . thal ba 'dir 'gyur ro zhe'o | | de ni thal ba ma yin te | . . . 43b7f; kha cig na re zhes zer ro | | de ni myi thad de | . . . 44a6; gzhan na re | zhe'o | | de 'ang myi thad de | . . . 44a7.***

1. | *de la dam bca' ba'i don yang* **1.1.** *chos can kyi rang bzhin dang* :| **1.2.** *bsgrub bya'i chos dpyad pa* [corr. : *spyad pa*] *gñis so* |:
- 1.1. | *de la chos can ni 'dir sngon po la sogs pa gzung* ⁷ *pa'i rnam pa kho na yin gyi* | *'dzin pa ni ma yin te* | *'dzin pa ni gzung pa las tha dad par sgrub pa'i skabs yin pa'i phyir ro* | *tha dad pa ldog pa yin pas gzung pa myed pa las tha dad par 'thad do* | *des na tha dad pa dgag pa ni gzung pa'i rnam pa la bya ba yin gyi* | *'dzin pa la ni ma yin no* |
- 1.2. | *bsgrub par bya ba'i chos ni 'dir myed par dgag pa'i rang bzhin yin gyi* ⁸ *ma yin par dgag pa ni ma yin no* | | *de yang* **1.2.1.** *myed par dgag pa la gnod pa spang pa dang* | **1.2.2.** *ma yin pa la gnod pa bsgrub pa gñis kyis nges par bya'o* |
- 1.2.1. | *dang po ni gal te gzung pa'i rnam pa gsal bar tshor ba myed na 'dzin pa yang yod par myi 'grub pas thams cad 'jig par thal ba dang* | *gzhan myed pa(r) dgag pa shes pa'i rang bzhin ma yin pa gsal na* [45b] *phyi rol gyi don nam* | *shes pa gzhan tha dad par yang gsal bar thal bas gzung 'dzin grub par thal lo* | | *de lta na 'dzin pa myi 'grub pa dang gzung pa gzhan bden par thal lo zhe na* |: *lan ni 'dzin pa ni myong pa dang myi slu ba yod pas* | *de yod par brjod kyi* | *bzung pa ni gsal bar tshor yang tshad mas gnod pas myi slu ba myed de* | *des na gsal bar tshor* ² *bar khyad par myed kyang gang yang gnod byed myed par grub pa'i myi slu ba yod pa de ni bden la de myed pa ni brdzun pas na khyad par grub bo* | | *gzhan yang bzung pa bden par gsal bar thal ba yang ma yin te* | *bden pa dang 'brel pas myi 'thad pas ste* | *dus cig pa dang rang bzhin myi gcig pa la 'brel pa gñis ga 'gal ba'i phyir dang* | *gsum pa yang myi srid pa'i* ³ *phyir ro* | | *de ni myed pa(r) dgag pa'i phyogs la gnod pa spang pa'o* |:.
- 1.2.2. | *ma yin pa la gnod pa sgrub pa la gñis ste* | **1.2.2.1.** *rnam pa rnams shes pa cig gi rang bzhin yin pa la gnod pa dang* | **1.2.2.2.** *du ma'i rang bzhin yin pa la gnod pa'o* |
- 1.2.2.1. | *dang po* [corr. : *dang pa*] *ni rnam pa bzhis rig par bya ste* | **1.2.2.1.1.** *yan lag can bzhin du shes pa yang cha du mas cig pa 'gal ba dang* | **1.2.2.1.2.** *kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur* ⁴ *ba yang shes pa'i rags pa la myi ldog pa dang* | *cha <tha> dad pa tsam gyis cig dgag par myi nus na kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur bas kyang myi nus pa dang* | **1.2.2.1.3.** *des cig dgag par nus kyang cha tha dad pas myi nus na yan lag can dgag par myi nus pa'o* | **1.2.2.1.4.** *tha ma ni gal te cha tha dad par snang pa 'gog byed ma yin na de'i tshe kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba'i gnas skabs su* ⁵ *cig ma yin mod* | *gzhan gyi tshe skad cig gzhan kyi mtshan ñid go ci ste cig ma yin te* | *des na yan lag can 'thad do zhes bya ba'o* | |
- 1.2.2.2. | | *du ma'i phyogs la gnod pa la rnam pa lngas shes par bya ste* | **1.2.2.2.1.** *rdul phra rab kyi spyad pa shes pa'i snang pa phra rab la yang 'dra ba dang* | *snang pa thams cad bden par yod na rags pa snang ba 'gal (ba)*

- dang | **1.2.2.2.2.** rags pa snang ba myi bden na rdul phra₆ rab du snang pa brtag par myi nus shing brtags pa don myed pa dang | **1.2.2.2.3.** rags par snang pa rnam rtog yin na gsal bar snang pa 'gal ba dang | **1.2.2.2.4.** rang gi rnam pa mthar thug pa gñis kyis rnam par rtog pa ñid la rags par snang pa myi 'thad pa dang | de la rags pa snang pa khas blangs kyang myed pa gsal bar 'grub pa'o | **1.2.2.2.5.** | tha ma ni gal te rnam par rtog pa don myed pa la don du zhen pas de ltar₇ snang pa myi 'gal lo zhes brjod na | don myed par rang gsal ba 'gal ba dang | gzhan gyis gsal na rnam par shes pa'i myed pa gsal ba'i nus pa grub pa dang | ma rig pas [corr. : rang rig pas] gsal na de myed par 'gal ba dang | yod na shes pa'i myed pa gsal ba'i nus pa 'grub pa dang | myed pa gsal ba'i nus pa khas myi len na 'khrul pa myed par thal-lo | dam bca'i don to |
- 2.** | gtan₈ tshigs kyis skyon spang pa ni **2.1.** ma grub pa dang | **2.2.** 'gal ba dang | **2.3.** thun mong gi ma nges pa dang | **2.4.** ldog pa la the tshom za ba'i ñes pa ste bzhi spang pa'o |
- 2.1.** | dang po ni **gzhan** na re | 'di ni ma grub ste | 'di ltar lhan cig dmyigs pa nges pa'i gtan tshigs kyis don ni shes pa ma dmyigs par shes bya dmyigs pa myed pas shes bya dmyigs pa shes pa dmyigs pas khyab pa'i don [46a] yin la de yang khyab byed 'gal ba dmyigs par 'dod pa yin na | zla ba dang gyad la lta ba ni shes pa ma dmyigs kyang shes bya 'ba' zhig dmyigs pas | lhan cig dmyigs pa ñid ma grub bo |
- 2.2.** | yang na 'gal ba yin te | lhan cig gi sgra ni tha dad par brjod pa yin no | des na tha dad pa'i khyad par can du dmyigs pa'i phyir tha dad pa yin no zhes bya bar 'gyur na de ni zlog pas₂ khyab pas 'gal ba'i phyir ro |
- 2.3.** | yang na thun mong gi ma nges pa yin te | sangs rgyas kyis thugs dang de'i shes bya dag lhan cig dmyigs kyang shes bya rgyud gzhan ni shes pa dang tha myi dad pa ma yin pas sam | sems dang sems las byung ba dag lhan cig du mtshungs par dmyigs kyang tha dad pa myed pa ma yin pas so | | yang na snang pa dang gzugs kyis ma nges so |
- 2.4.** | gal te thun mong gi₃ ma nges pa ma yin du chug kyang ldog pa la the tshom za ba ni bzlog par myi nus ste | tha dad pa la lhan cig dmyigs pa myed pas khyab pa 'am | lhan cig dmyigs pa dang 'gal ba grub pa myed pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba ni rtsod pa rnam pa bzhi'o |
- 2.1.a.** | 'di la lan ni ma grub pa ni ma yin te | zla ba dang gyad la lta ba na yang shes pa'i khyad par tha dad pas de ma dmyigs kyang de'i shes bya dmyigs₄ mod kyis | 'on kyang shes pa tsam myed pa ma dmyigs-so | de lta na ni shes pa'i khyad par dang don tha myi dad pa ni myi sgrub kyis 'on kyang spyi dang yin no | | gang las tha myi dad myed par sgrub par bya ba'i spyi de la ltos te ni lhan cig dmyigs pa yod pa yin te | shes pa tsam dang bral ba'i zla ba dang gyad ni mthong pa myed pa'i phyir ro | | des na ma grub pa ma yin no |
- [**2.2.a.**] [The refutation of this *pūrvapakṣa* is lacking]

2.3.a. | *tham*₄ *mkhyen pa'i shes bya yang de'i mkhyen* ₅ *pa ma dmyigs kyang rgyud gzhan la rang rig pas dmyigs pa'i phyir ro* | *rnal 'byor pa can gyis rgyud gzhan de ma bzung par thams cad mkhyen pa ni thugs 'ba' zhig 'dzin pa'i phyir ro* |

| *sems dang sems las byung pa ni lhan cig dmyigs pa tsam yang myed na nges pa la ga la yod* |

gzugs dang snang pa ni 'og nas spong ngo | *des na thun mong gi ma nges pa ma yin no* |

2.4.a. | *ldog* ₆ *pa la the tshom za ba ni khyab pa sgrub pa'i tshad ma ston pas 'gog par 'gyur ro* | |

Translation³⁹

The reason “**being necessarily perceived together**” (*sahopalambhaniyama*) is to be understood through **1.** [an examination of] the subject of the thesis (*pratijñārtha*), and **2.** through the exclusion of the faults of the reason (*hetudoṣa*).

1. From among these [the examination of] the subject of the thesis also consists of two examinations: **1.1.** that of the nature of the locus of properties (*dharmin*), and **1.2.** that of the property to be proved (*sādhya*).

1.1. From among these here [in this proof] the locus of properties is only the objective aspect (*grāhyākāra*) consisting of blue etc., but it is not the subjective one (*grāhaka*), for [this] is the section (*skabs, prastāva*) in which the difference of the subjective (aspect) from the objective one is affirmed (*sgrub pa, vidhi*). As [the subjective/objective aspect?] consists of the exclusion (*ldog pa, vyāvṛtti*) of that which is different, it is reasonable that it is different from that which is not an objective (aspect) (*gzung pa myed pa, agrāhya*).⁴⁰ Thus the negation of difference is an activity towards the objective aspect, but not towards the subjective one.

1.2. The property to be proved here is of the nature of a non-implicative negation (*myed par dgag pa, prasajyapraṭiṣedha*), but not an implicative negation (*ma yin par dgag pa, paryudāsapraṭiṣedha*). And this is to be ascertained through **1.2.1.** the exclusion of [a valid cognition] that invalidates (*bādhaka*) the non-implicative negation, and through **1.2.2.** the proof of [a valid cognition] that invalidates the implicative (negation).

1.2.1. Objection:⁴¹ If the objective aspect is not experienced as being illuminated (*gsal ba, pra√kāś*), the subjective one is also not established to be existent (*sat*). Thus, it would follow that all (aspects) are abandoned. And if a non-implicative negation [of being something] different which is not of

³⁹In the following notes I quote passages of Dharmottara’s PVINṬ on which rNgog lotsāba’s explanations are based. However, as these passages are often quite long and space here is limited, I shall translate only the shorter ones and of the longer ones only those parts which are necessary for understanding rNgog lotsāba’s enigmatic formulations. Passages which are translated in IWATA I, II and MATSUMOTO 1980 are not translated, but are referred to in the footnotes. Finally, Sanskrit equivalents of several Tibetan terms have been supplied for the sake of convenience and easier understanding.

⁴⁰Or: As the difference consists of an exclusion (*ldog pa, vyāvṛtti*), it is reasonable that [the subjective/objective aspect?] is different from that which is not an objective (aspect)Ž. The meaning of this argument is not clear!

⁴¹The idea of the following objection is to be found in PVIN I 96,8f: *viśayasya jñānahetutayopanidheḥ prāg upalambhaḥ paścāt saṃvedanam iti cet*. Much parallel material is collected in IWATA II 155¹¹. In this discussion an opponent wants to establish that cognition of the object is different from the cognition of that cognition, because it is the condition for the latter. Thus the reason “*sahopalambhaniyama*” would not be established.

the nature of cognition is illuminated, it follows that an external object or something else that is cognized is illuminated as being different as well.⁴² Thus, it follows that the objective [as well as] the subjective (aspect) are established. In this way it follows that the subjective (aspect) which is not established [as long as the objective one is not experienced] and the objective (aspect) which is different [from it] are real.

Answer: As the subjective (aspect) is experienced and reliable (*avisamvādin*), it is said to be existent (*sat*). However, the objective (aspect) is, although it is experienced as being illuminated, not reliable, for it is invalidated by a valid cognition (*pramāṇabādhita*). Therefore, although [the two] are not different, insofar as [both of them] are experienced as being illuminated, that one whose reliability is established to be without an invalidating [cognition] is real (*satya*), while the (other one) without [such a reliability] is false (*brdzun pa*, *alīka*).⁴³ Thus the difference is established. Moreover, it does not follow either that the objective (aspect) is illuminated as being real, for – being connected with the real [subjective aspect] – it is not reasonable. [This is so] because the two [kinds of] connection [i.e. *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti*] contradict [their] having the same time (*ekakāla*) and not being of one and the same nature (*anekarūpa*), and because another kind [of connection] is not possible.⁴⁴ This was the exclusion of [a valid cognition] that invalidates the assumption of a non-implicative negation.

1.2.2. In [the subsection of] the proof of [a valid cognition] that invalidates the implicative (negation) there are two [proofs]:⁴⁵ **1.2.2.1.** [one that

⁴²This argument is not clear to me!

⁴³rNgog lotsāba's answer is based on the following passage of Dharmottara: *ñams su myong ba nges pa'i rang bzhin mi slu ba ni spang bar nus pa ma yin te | de ni khas blang bar bya ba yin pa'i phyir ro | | yang gang ñams su myong yang gnod par byed pa mthong pa'i phyir slu ba de ni spang bar bya ba yin te | dper na zla ba gñis kyi rang bzhin lta bu'o | | gnod par byed pa med pa'i phyir 'khrul pa mi 'grub po zhes¹⁾ gang 'chad par 'gyur ro | | de bzhin du rnam 'grel las kyang | gnod byed rig pa dam pa ni | med na ñams myong spang bya min²⁾*

zhes so | | dga' ba la sogs pa'i rang bzhin yang dag pa'i rig pa ni spang bar bya ba ma yin te | gnod par byed pa med pa'i phyir ro | | des na gcig ma yin no zhes bya bar gnas so | | PVINṬ P 185a2-5 (D 159a2-4); the passage is translated in IWATA I 180.

¹⁾ = PVIN II 45,19f: *gnod par byed pa med pas 'khrul pa mi grub pa'i phyir ro | |* (= *bādhakābhāvād bhrāntyasiddheḥ* PVSV 16,4f)

²⁾ not identified.

⁴⁴Cf. *mi bden pa'i rang bzhin ñid ma rig pa'i dbang gis ston par byed kyi bden pa ni ma yin te | bden pa dang lhan cig 'brel pa nges pa med pa'i phyir ro | |* PVINṬ P 185a2 (D 159a1f) = By force of ignorance (*avidyā*) [cognition] shows something of an unreal nature, but not something real. For [two] connected (things), that are real and together [at the same time] (*saha*) are not ascertained. A more detailed refutation of the two kinds of connection is to be found in Kamalaśīla's TSP 694,23-695,12.

⁴⁵In the following refutation rNgog lotsāba makes use of the arguments applied by Dharmakīrti in PVIN I 84,12-86,10 in order to prove that cognition does not resemble its

establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates [the fact] that (manifold) forms are the nature of a unitary (*eka*) cognition, and **1.2.2.2.** [one that establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates [the fact] that they are the nature of a manifold cognition.

1.2.2.1.⁴⁶ The first one is to be known through four alternatives: **1.2.2.1.1.**

object.

⁴⁶This paragraph has its equivalent in PVINT P 183a2-183b3 (D 157a6-157b5): <¹ *ci'i phyir tha dad pa dgag pa tsam bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi | gcig ñid du ni bsgrub pa ma yin no zhes smra | gcig tu ni (ni D: om. P) 'thad pa yin (yin D: ma yin P) te | gang gi phyir gal te gzung ba'i rnam pa gsal ba yang mi bden na | rig pa yang bden pa ñid du gang gis rtogs (P: rtog D) par byed* |^{1>} *yang gal te rnam par shes pa mi bden pa gsal bar byed na bden par yang gsal bar byed de | bden pas ni ñes ba cung zad kyang bya pa med pa'i phyir ro |*

[§1.2.2.1.1.] *gal te de ltar gzung ba'i rnam pa de gal te gcig gi ngo bo yin na ni phyogs chas byas pa'i 'gal ba'i chos dang ldan pa mi 'thad do | | phyogs cha tha dad pa de yang gcig ñid yin na ni yan lag can gyi rdzas gcig ci'i phyir mi 'dod de khyad par ci yod |*

[§1.2.2.1.2.] *yan lag can gyi rdzas la ni kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba yod pa'i phyir 'gal gyi | blo la ni ma yin pa'i phyir 'di ñid khyad par yin no zhe na | shes pa ma yin pa'i rags pa gcig ma shes pa yang rung ste khyad par ci yod de | blo'i rang bzhin ñid ni rags pa'i ñes pa ñams pa ma yin no | |*

[§1.2.2.1.3.] *gghan yang kha bsgyur ba dang ma bsgyur ba la sogs pa dang ldan pa kho na ni 'gal ba ma yin gyi | 'on kyang phyogs cha tha dad pa yang yin no zhes mang du bshad zin to | | de'i phyogs cha tha dad pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis kyang 'gal ba na | gal te rnam par shes pa gcig yin na ni yan lag can yang gcig ñid yin la | 'di du ma ñid yin na ni khyad par med pa'i phyir shes pa'i rags pa yang du ma ñid do | |*

[§1.2.2.1.4.] *gghan yang rgyu can ces bya ba ni don dam par yod pa ma yin no | | skad cig ma'i rdzas la ni gang du kha bsgyur ba dang | g.yo ba dang bsgribs pa yod pa dang med pas byas pa'i tha dad pa ma mthong ba de ñid rdzas gcig tu 'gyur ro | | g.yo ba la sogs pas byas pa'i tha dad pa'i gnas skabs su tha dad pa mthong bas gghan du yang rjes su 'jug par byas pa ni ma yin pas tshad ma , 'ga' zhig yod pa yin no | | de'i phyir rags pa thams cad la phyogs gghan dang 'brel pas cha shas yongs su bcad pa las gyur pa'i 'gal ba'i chos 'du bar mthong bas tha dad pa med pa spang bar bya ba yin no zhes rigs pa yin no ||*

<¹> This passage is translated in IWATA I 181 (text: II 128¹⁷¹) and MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 18. Both of them understand it in such a way that the *pūrvapakṣa* ends with *zhes smra* and that the following sentence already is part of the answer. Consequently, they prefer the reading of Peking (*gcig tu ni 'thad pa ma yin te*). To my understanding, however, this part still belongs to the *pūrvapakṣa* which ends with *med pa'i phyir ro*. My translation: [Objection:] Why do you say that (the property) to be proved is the mere negation of difference but that (they) are not to be proved to be identical? For (*ni = hi*) it is reasonable that (they) are identical. Because, if the objective aspect is not real although it is illuminated, how could consciousness in turn be known to be real? Further, if cognition illuminates something unreal (*asatya*), it illuminates [the objective aspect] when it is real as well, because by something real not the slightest fault is undertaken. [Answer:] If that objective aspect – given that it might be so (*gal te de ltar = yady evam*) – were a unitary thing, it would not be reasonable to be endowed with contradictory properties that are due to its parts. And if those different parts are a unit, why do you not assume a substance that is a composite whole? What is the difference

like a composite whole (*avayavin*) cognition too would contradict (its) unity through (its) many parts;⁴⁷ **1.2.2.1.2.** coloured (*rakta*) as well as uncoloured [parts] are not excluded in case of the gross (form) (*sthūla*) in cognition;⁴⁸ if the [cognition's] unity cannot be negated by the different parts alone, it cannot [be negated] by the coloured and uncoloured ones either; **1.2.2.1.3.** if, although the unity can be negated by these [coloured and uncoloured parts], it cannot [be negated] by the different parts [alone], a composite whole cannot be negated. **1.2.2.1.4.** Finally, [if one asks:] [The gross form] may not be an unity in the state of being coloured and uncoloured at the time when it is not denied that it manifests as having different parts, [then] however, due to which circumstances (*go ci ste*) should [the gross form] at another time being characterized by another phase (*kṣaṇa*) not be an unity? [If this were the case] then a composite whole [too] would be reasonable.

1.2.2.2.⁴⁹ [The proof that establishes a valid cognition] that invalidates the as-

(between them)? ... Ṽ

⁴⁷Cf. *yan lag can 'gog pa'i ñes pa de ñid ni du ma'i thun mong gcig gi rang bzhin gyi ñes par yang blta bar bya'o* || PVINṬ P 166b8 (D 143b2) = The very same fault that negates a composite whole is also to be seen as the fault of a unitary nature that is common to a manifold (object). Ṽ

⁴⁸It is possible that the text *shes pa'i rags pa la* should be corrected to *shes pa'i rags pa las*.

⁴⁹This paragraph corresponds to PVINṬ 183b3-185a2 (D 158a6-159a2): *gal te de lta na gzung ba'i rnam pa'i rang bzhin du ma yin no zhe na* |

[§1.2.2.2.1.] *'di la yang ji ltar rdul phra rab rnams drug gis* (P: *gi* D) *cig car sbyar bas dngos po med pa de bzhin du shes pa'i rdul phra rab rnams la yang thal bar 'gyur ro* || *lus can ñid la skyon 'dir 'gyur gyi lus can ma yin pa la ni ma yin pa ma yin nam | lus can zhes bya ba rua zed de ba ni med kyi | 'on kyang tshad chung* (D: *tshung* P) *ngu mang po rnams phan tshun gyi rang bzhin gyi yul yongs su spangs nas skyes* (D: *skyed* P) *pa'i phyir yul rgyas pa dang ldan par gyur pa* (P: *'gyur* ba D) *ni lus can yin la | de ni rnam par shes pa la yang bye brag med pa'i phyir kun rdzob tu yod par mtshungs par thal bas de ni du mar yang rigs pa ma yin no | | gzhan yang rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab ñams su myong bar gyur pa rnams la | rags pa'i rnam pa ñams su myong ba ni bzlog par nus pa ma yin no | | rnam par shes pa'i bdag ñid gcig la ni rags pa yod pa ma yin zhing | rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab mang po rnams kyang so sor rags pa'i rang bzhin ma yin no | | ji ltar phyi rol gyi rdul phra rab shes pa gcig la snang ba rnams kyi so sor snang ba'i chos rags pa yin pa de bzhin du | 'dir yang shes pa gcig la snang ba'i phyir rags pa ñid du snang bar 'gyur ba yang ma yin te | du ma rnams gzhan 'ga' zhig gis kyang ma bzung ba'i phyir ro | | de'i phyir ñams su myong ba'i rjes su 'brangs pa na rags pa gsal bar snang bar ñams su myong bar mi 'gyur ba zhig na ñams su myong ste | de'i phyir gang dang ldan pas yod pa ma yin pas rags pa'i bdag ñid la ston par byed pa shes pa'i med pa gsal bar byed nus pa yang yod pa ñid do | |*

[§1.2.2.2.2.] *rags pa'i rnam pa med na rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab gzhan ci zhig lus la | de brtag pas kyang ci zhig bya ste | gang gi phyir rags pa'i rnam pa 'di ñid de kho na ñid ma yin par mi 'gyur ba dang | rnam par shes pa yang med pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa dang ldan par mi 'gyur bar bya ba'i phyir gzung ba'i rnam pa rnam par shes pa'i*

sumption that [the manifold forms are of the nature] of a manifold [cognition] is to be understood through five alternatives:

1.2.2.2.1. If the mode of existence (*spyad pa, caraṇa*)⁵⁰ of the [external] atoms

bdag ñid du brtags pa yin na gzung ba'i rnam pa mi bden pa dang rnam par shes pa yang med pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa dang ldan par khas blangs na | rnam par shes pa'i rdul phra rab rtog pa ni don dam pa yin no | |

[§1.2.2.2.3.] *rags par snang ba rnam par rtog pas sprul pa yang rigs pa ma yin te | gsal bar snang ba'i phyir dang | rnam par rtog pa rnams ni gsal bar snang ba ma yin pa'i phyir ro | |*

[§1.2.2.2.4.] *ji ltar smig rgyu dag la chur rnam par rtog pa gsal bar snang bzhin du rags par rnam par rtog pa yang yin no zhes ni brjod (D: rjod P) par mi nus te | gang gi phyir smig rgyu'i rang gi mtshan ñid 'dzin pa'i rnam par shes pa dang dus gcig tu 'jug pa'i chu'i rnam par rtog pa snang ba dang rnam par rtog pa dag gcig tu byed pa'i phyir gsal bar snang bar nges par 'gyur na | 'dir ni gang zhig dang (dang D: om. P) lhan cig rgyu ba las rags pa'i rnam par rtog pa gsal bar snang bar rtog (P: rtogs D) par 'gyur ba rags pa ñams su myong ba gsal bar snang ba ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no | | gzhan yang rnam par rtog pa'i rnam par shes pa yang bdag ñid kyi rang bzhin gang yin pa de kho na ñams su myong bar 'gyur ba yin na | de la ni rags pa yod pa ma yin te | de'i phyir snang bar mi 'gyur ro | |*

[§1.2.2.2.5.] *rnam par rtog pa'i rnam par shes pa ni rang gi bdag ñid don med pa la don du lhag par zhen nas 'jug pa yin no zhe na | don med pa ston pa ni nges par brtags pa na med pa gsal bar byed pa ñid du gnas pa yin te | gang gi phyir don med pa gsal ba na bdag ñid gsal bar byed pa 'am | gzhan gsal bar byed par 'gyur te | rnam pa gzhan ni mi srid pa'i phyir ro | | re zhig (D: shig P) bdag ñid ni gsal bar byed pa ma yin te | rnam par shes pa ñid gsal ba'i rang bzhin yin pa'i phyir dang | don med pa ni dngos po ma yin pa'i yang phyir ro | | gzhan gyis gsal bar byed na yang de gsal bar byed pa ni shes pa'i bdag ñid de ñid mi bden pa gsal bar byed par skyes pa yin no | |*

'di sñam du ma rig pa'i dbang gis de ltar gsal ba yin no sñam na | gal te ma rig pa de dngos po med pa yin na dngos po med pas dngos po med pa gsal bar byed do zhes bya ba'i tshig gi tshul 'di cir yang mi rung ngo | | ci ste dngos po yin pa de lta na yang de ni rnam par shes pa'i rang bzhin ñid yin na de las kyang dngos po med pa ji ltar gsal te | dngos po dang dngos po med pa dag la ni 'brel pa 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no | | <1> de'i phyir ma rig pa'i nus pa dang ldan pa'i shes pa mi bden pa'i rang bzhin gsal ba'i byed pa yin pa'i phyir ma rig pa'i dbang gis gsal ba yin no zhes brjod pa la ni kha na ma tho ba yod pa ma yin no | | <1> de'i phyir de ltar don med par 'dzin pa'i shes pa thams cad mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i ma rig pa'i bdag ñid du blta bar bya'o | | <2> thams cad du gal te snang ba gang yin pa de thams cad yod pa yin na tshangs pas kyang shes pa 'ga' (P: 'ba' D) zhig kyang 'khrul par brtag par mi nus so | | ci ste mi bden pa yang yod na ni brgya byin gyis kyang shes pa mi bden pa gsal bar byed pa'i nus pa bsñon par mi nus so | | 'dod du zin kyang ñams su myong ba thams cad bden pa yin par ni sus kyang gzhas par nus pa ma yin pa'i phyir shes pa'i mi bden pa gsal ba'i nus pa las 'da' bar bya ba ma yin no | | <2> mi bden pa'i rang bzhin ñid ma rig pa'i dbang gis ston par byed kyi (P: pa'i D) bden pa ni ma yin te | bden pa dang lhan cig 'brel pa nges pa med pa'i phyir ro | | [The text of the immediately following passage PVINṬ 185a2-5 is quoted in n. 43.]

<1> quoted in *Syādvādaratnākara* 170,17-19; cf. above fn. 24.

<2> This passage is translated in IWATA I 174.

⁵⁰It is also possible that *spyad pa* should be corrected to *dpyad pa* (*vicāra*): If the

(*paramāṇu*) is the same also in case of the subtle (*sūkṣma*) manifestation of cognition, and if everything that manifests is really existent, [then] the gross (form) (*sthūla*) that manifests [in cognition] is contradictory.⁵¹

1.2.2.2.2. If [under the previous conditions] the gross (form) that manifests is not real, [it follows that] that which is conceptualized (*kalpita*) is not the object (*anartha*), insofar as that which manifests in form of the atoms (*paramāṇutvena*) cannot be conceptualized.

1.2.2.2.3. If the manifestation in a gross (form) is conception (*vikalpa*), the manifestation in a clear (form) would be contradictory.⁵²

1.2.2.2.4. It is not reasonable that [the conceptual cognition's] own form manifests in a gross (form) just in conceptual cognition due to the two ends [i.e. the two kinds of cognition it relies on] (*mthar thug pa gñis kyis*).⁵³ And even in the case that one assumes that a gross (form) manifests in that (conceptual cognition), it is established that [cognition] illuminates something non-existent.

1.2.2.2.5. Finally, if one says that the manifestation in such a way [i.e. in a gross form] is not contradictory because it is [only] conceptual cognition (*vikalpa*) that ascertains [its own nature which is] not the object (*anartha*)

analysis of the atoms also in case of the subtle manifestation of cognition is the same [as in case of the external atoms], and if . . . Ž

⁵¹Cf. *dbang po'i* (D: *po P*) *rnam par shes pa la gnas pa'i rnam pa gang yin pa de ni cha shas dang bcas pa dang | rdul phra rab gcig la ni cha shas yod pa ma yin pa des na rdul phra rab kyī rang bzhin dang | shes pa la gnas pa'i snang ba 'di 'gal ba'i phyir rnam pa 'di de'i yin no zhes brjod par nus pa ma yin no | |* PVINṬ P 165b7-166a1 (D 142b3f). = That form which is situated in sense-cognition is endowed with parts, and in a single atom parts do not exist. Therefore the nature of an atom and this manifestation which is situated in cognition are contradictory. Thus one cannot say that this form [in cognition is the form] of that (atom). Ž

⁵²This is the case because the gross form manifests clearly and conceptions are by their nature unclear; cf. n. 49 [§1.2.2.2.3].

⁵³This enigmatic formulation becomes clearer with the help of the passage of PVINṬ it relies on, cf. n. 49 [§1.2.2.2.4.], which says: One cannot say: “Like the conceptual cognition [which ascertains] sun rays to be water manifests itself in a clear way, also the conceptual cognition [which ascertains atoms to be gross] manifests itself in a gross way.” [This is] because [of the following:] [The conceptual cognition which ascertains sun rays to be water] is determined to manifest clearly due to the fact that the cognition which grasps the individual (*svalakṣaṇa*) of the sun rays, the conceptual cognition of water which occurs at the same time (and) which manifests, and the two conceptual cognitions [of them] are unified [i.e. identified with each other]. However, in the case under consideration there is no conceptual cognition of a gross (form) at all which, due to the co-occurrence (*sahacāritvāt*) with any [other cognition], could be conceptualized to manifest clearly, which experiences a gross (form), and which manifests clearly. Moreover, as the cognition of the conceptual cognition experiences only that which is of its own nature, there does not exist a gross (form). Therefore it would not manifest. Ž

as [being the] object,⁵⁴ it follows that it would be contradictory that [conceptual cognition], not being the object, illuminates itself; if it is illuminated by something else [i.e. cognition], the cognition's capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; if it is illuminated by ignorance (*avidyā*)⁵⁵, this (ignorance) being non-existent is contradictory, and if [this ignorance] is existent, the cognition's capability of illuminating something non-existent is established; and [finally] if we do not assume the capability of illuminating something non-existent, there would not exist any erroneous cognition (*bhrānti*) (at all). [This was the examination of] the subject of the thesis (*pratijñārtha*).

2. The exclusion of the faults of the reason (*hetuḍoṣa*) consists of the exclusions of four (faults): **2.1.** [the reason] is not established (*asiddha*); **2.2.** it is contradictory (*viruddha*); **2.3.** it is inconclusive for being too general (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*); **2.4.** it has the fault that its being absent [from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*)] is doubtful (*vyatirekasamśaya*).

- 2.1.** Regarding the first, **some others** say: This (reason) is not established, for if the reason “being necessarily perceived together” means that perception (*upalabdhi*) of the object of cognition (*jñeya*) is pervaded (*vyāpta*) by perception of cognition, because there is no perception of the object of cognition without perception of cognition, and if this (reason) moreover is assumed to consist of a perception of that which contradicts the pervading (property) (*vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*),⁵⁶ then, in case that [many people] watch the moon or wrestlers (*gyad, malla*), the object of cognition alone is perceived, although the cognitions [of the other persons] are not perceived. Thus, the (reason) “being necessarily perceived together” is not established.⁵⁷

⁵⁴This idea is based on PVIN II 2,8f: *rang gi snang ba don med pa la don du mngon par zhen nas 'jug pa'i phyir ... svapratibhāse 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravartanāt ...*

⁵⁵Without correcting *rang rig pa* (*svasamvedana*) to *ma rig pa* (*avidyā*) the text does not make sense. The correction is based on the equivalent discussion found in the PVINṬ passage quoted above (n. 49 [§1.2.2.2.5.]), which is introduced by the following *pūrvapakṣa*: *'di sñam du ma rig pa'i dbang gis de ltar gsal ba yin no sñam na |*

⁵⁶*gang zhig gang dang lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa de ni de las tha dad pa ma yin te | dper na zla ba gcig las gñis pa bzhin no | | sngon po la sogs pa'i gzung ba'i rnam pa yang shes pa dang lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin no | | tha dad pa ni lhan cig dmigs pa ma nges pas khyab pa yin te | 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro | | de dang 'gal ba ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin te | des na khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pas tha dad pa bkag pa yin no | | PVINṬ P 189b7-190a1 (D 163a1-3) = yad yena niyatasahopalambham, tat tato na vyatiricyate, yathāikasmāc candramaso dvitīyaḥ. niyatasahopalambhaś ca jñānena saha grāhyākāro nīlādir ity ... bhedaḥ sahopalambhāniyamena vyāptaḥ, pratibandhābhāvāt. tasya viruddhaḥ sahopalambhaniyamaḥ, tena vyāpakaviruddhena bhedo nirākriyate. JAMBŪVIJAYA 1981 p. 137 (P. 110); translated in IWATA I 181f.*

⁵⁷This objection reflects the opinion of Śubhagupta as formulated in his *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*. The following objections as well, namely that the reason is contradictory (*viruddha*), inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) and doubtful (*sandigdha*), are based on BASK.

- 2.2.** Moreover, [the reason] is contradictory, because it is contradictory due to the fact that it is pervaded by [the property that is] the opposite (*zlog pa, viparyaya*) [of the property to be proved]. [This is the case] under the presupposition that (*zhes bya bar 'gyur na*) they are different, because the word “together” denotes their being different (and) therefore they are perceived to possess the characteristic (*viśeṣaṇa*) of difference.⁵⁸
- 2.3.** Moreover, [the reason] is inconclusive for being too general, because it is the case that, although the cognition (*thugs*) of Buddha and its object (*jñeya*) are perceived together, another (person's) [mind-]continuum (*santānāntara*), which serves as object of [Buddha's] cognition, is [by its nature] cognition [of the person] and is (nevertheless) not non-different [from Buddha's cognition]. Or [it is inconclusive] because the mind (*citta*) and the mental factors (*caitta*) are not non-different, although they are perceived together as if they were the same (*mtshungs par*).⁵⁹ Moreover, [the reason] is inconclusive because of light (*snang pa, āloka*) and colour-form (*rūpa*).⁶⁰

- 2.4.** Even if [the reason] may be one that is not inconclusive for being too general, [it is inconclusive because] doubt regarding (its) absence (*vyatireka*) [from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*)] cannot be eliminated.⁶¹ [This is the

This *pūrvapakṣa* corresponds to BASK vv. 72-74 (text and transl. in MATSUMOTO 1980 pp.3, 5), whereas rNgog lotsāba has reformulated the first part in accordance with the passages of the PVINṬ quoted in n. 56 & n. 62 and shortened the second part. More detailed it is available in TSP 692,11-16: *punaḥ sa [= Śubhagupta] evāha – yadi sahaśabda ekārthaḥ, tadā hetur asiddhaḥ. tathā hi naṭacandramallaprekṣāsu na hy ekenaivopalambho nīlādeḥ. nāpi nīlatadupalambhayor ekenaivopalambhaḥ. tathā hi nīlopalambhe 'pi tadupalambhānām anyasantānagatānām anupalambhāt. yadā ca sarvaprāṇabhṛtām sarve cittakṣaṇāḥ sarvajñenāvasīyante, tadā katham ekenaivopalambhaḥ siddhaḥ syāt. kiñca anyopalambhaniṣedhe saty ekopalambhaniyamāḥ sidhyati. na cānyopalambhapratishedhasambhavaḥ, svabhāvaviprakṣṭasya vidhīpratiśedhāyogāt.* The passage is summarized in IWATA I 88; cf. also his notes in II 78⁷⁰⁻⁷².

⁵⁸This corresponds to BASK v. 71: *tatra bhadantaśubhaguptas tv āha - sahaśabdaś ca loke 'smīn naivānyena vinā kvacit | viruddho 'yaṃ tato hetur yady asti saḥavedanam |* quoted in TSP 692,2-3; text and transl. in MATSUMOTO 1980 pp. 3, 5; summarized in IWATA I 88; cf. also II 167⁴⁵.

⁵⁹This opinion corresponds to BASK v. 68 and to a probable commentary on it by Śubhagupta which is not available and which seems to be the source of the following quotation by Kamalaśīla: *atha sahaśabda ekakālavivakṣayā, tadā buddhavijñeyacittena cittacaittaiś ca sarvathā | anaikāntikatā hetor ekakālavivakṣayā |* (BASK 68) *yathā kila bhuddhasya bhagavato yad vijñeyaṃ santānāntaracittam, tasya buddhajñānasya ca sahopalambhaniyamāḥ 'py asty eva ca nānātvam, tathā cittacaittānām saty api sahopalambhe naikatvam ity ato 'naikāntiko hetur iti* TSP 692,17-21; the verse is translated in MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 4f; summarized in IWATA I 88; cf. also the references in II 79⁶².

⁶⁰The reason is therefore assumed to be inconclusive, because light and colour are perceived together but are obviously different. The case of *āloka* and *rūpa* is already discussed by Dharmakīrti (PVIN I 94,25ff).

⁶¹This objection summarizes the opinion expressed in BASK vv. 65-67 and 81 which

case] because neither the being pervaded of the difference by not being perceived together nor something that contradicts the being perceived together is established. These are the four kinds of objections.

2.1.a. The answer to this [is as follows]: [The reason] is not unestablished. For, even in the case that [many persons] watch the moon or wrestlers, it may be that the object of their cognition is perceived, although the particular cognitions (*jñānaviśeṣa*) [of the other persons] are not perceived due to their difference [from one's own cognition]. However, the absence of cognition as such (*mātra*) is not perceived. Although it is not established in this way that the particular cognition and the object which is not different [are perceived together], it is [established that cognition] in general (*[jñāna]sāmānya*) and [the object are perceived together]. With regard to that [cognition] in general from which [the object] is to be proved not to be different there exists [the property of] being perceived together, because a moon or wrestlers being without cognition as such are not observed. Therefore [the reason] is not unestablished.⁶²

[2.2.a.] [The refutation of this *pūrvapakṣa* is lacking]

2.3.a. [The reason is not inconclusive for being too general either.]⁶³ Because the object of the cognition of the all-knowing (Buddha) too [i.e. the other

is also to be found in TSP 694,9-20. Cf. the section (b) inconclusiveness II (kk 65-67, 81)Ž in MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 7 and p. 27f¹⁵.

The formulation of this *pūrvapakṣa* by rNgog lotsāva shows a great similarity to the passage of Dharmottara already quoted above (n. 56): *tha dad pa ni lhan cig dmigs pa ma nges pas khyab pa yin te | 'brel pa med pa'i phyir ro | | de dang 'gal ba ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yin te* = *bhedah sahopalambhāniyamena vyāptah, pratibandhābhāvāt. tasya viruddhah sahopalambhāniyamah*. In the objection, however, *khyab pa* has to be understood in the sense of *vyāpti*, for otherwise it cannot be construed with *tha dad pa la*.

⁶²The answer is similar to those of Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla: *gar dang gyad la lta ba la sogs pa rnams la gang shes bya dmigs par mi 'gyur ba'i shes pa ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no | | de bas na* (D: *ni* P) *shes bya mi dmigs par shes pa (dmigs par shes pa* P: om. D) *dmigs pa 'am | shes pa mi dmigs par shes bya dmigs pa ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no zhes rnam pa gzhan ñid 'gog pa yin gyi | dmigs pa thams cad la tha dad pa ñid 'gog pa ni ma yin no | |* PVIṆṬ P 185b3-5 (D 159b1f); *na ca naṭacandramallaprekṣāsu kaścij jñānopalambho 'sti yo na jñeyopalambhah, jñeyopalambho vā na jñānopalambhaka iti kuto 'siddhatā*. TSP 693,1-3; cf. MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 21.

⁶³One is forced to add such an introductory statement, for otherwise the following formulation of the reason cannot be construed. As the immediately preceding part, the refutation of §2.2., is also missing, one might think of a scribal error. However, rNgog lotsāba adds another proof for the reason's not being inconclusive which also lacks the predicate to be proved and which is not connected with the first formulation by a conjunctive or disjunctive particle such as *dang* or *'am*. Therefore and also because the remaining part of the refutation is quite short, it is also possible that rNgog lotsāba for some reason wanted to finish this section very quickly and just noted the most important points without formulating full sentences.

person's mind-continuum], although his cognition is not perceived [by the other person], is perceived in the other (person's) [mind-]continuum through self-consciousness.⁶⁴

[It is also not inconclusive] because the all-knowing (Buddha) grasps only mind insofar as one abiding in Yoga (*yogavāhin*) does not grasp another (person's) continuum.⁶⁵

As it is not the case that the mind and the mental factors are only perceived together, which [arguments] could there be for a necessity (*niyama*) [of being perceived together]?⁶⁶

[The objection] regarding light and colour-form will be refuted later [by Dharmakīrti himself].⁶⁷

Therefore [the reason] is not inconclusive for being too general.

2.4.a. Doubt regarding [the reason's] absence (*vyatireka*) [from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*)] is eliminated by showing a valid cognition that establishes the pervasion (*vyāpti*).

Abbreviations

BASK

Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā

⁶⁴Similar Dharmottara's refutation which is preserved in Sanskrit in Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā: *gang yang bcom ldan 'das kyi* (P: *kyis* D) *shes bya dang thugs* (D: *thug* P) *la lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa yod kyang | tha dad pa med pa ni ma yin no zhes smras pa de ni mi rigs te | gang gi phyir de la ni lhan cig dmigs pa nges pa ñid med de | tha dad pa ñid du rgyud gzhan gyis rang gi sems dmigs pa'i phyir ro | | de ñid kyi phyir sems dang sems las byung bas kyang 'khrul par 'gyur ba ma yin te | de dag rnams kyang so sor bdag ñid yang dag par rig pa'i phyir ro | |* PVINṬ 185b5-7 (D 159b2-4); [*nāpi buddhavijñeyacittēnānaikāntiko hetuḥ*], *na hi tatraikopāmbhāniyamo 'sti, pṛthak pṛthak sarvair eva cittasya saṃvedanāt. ata eva na*¹⁾ *cittacaitair vyabhicārah, teṣām api pratyekam ātmana eva saṃvedanāt.* TSP 693,19-21; cf. MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 21.

¹⁾ cf. TSP_{tib} [Peking, vol. 139, No. 5765] 160b8 ... *'khrul pa ma yin te |*

⁶⁵This means that the Buddha, being without defilements, is free of the dichotomy of *grāhya* and *grāhaka*. This idea is expressed in a more detailed fashion in TSP 693,6-13. The first part (693,6-8) is translated in MATSUMOTO 1980 p. 13; cf. also his note p.31³⁸.

⁶⁶As for Dharmottara's and Kamalaśīla's explanations, cf. n.64.

⁶⁷That is PVIN I 94,25-96,7; cf. PVINṬ P 186b1f (D 160a5f): *gzugs dang snang ba dag gis 'khrul par dogs pa la | bshad pa | gzugs dang snang ba dag la ni de'i shes pa skyed par rung ba gang yin pa de thob pa'i mtshan ñid dam* (=PVIN I 94,25f) *ste | ngo bo gang yin pa'o | |*. Kamalaśīla's refutation: *ata eva na rūpālokair vyabhicārah, ¹⁾ kevalasyāpy ālokadarśanāt. rūpasyāpy ālokarahitasya kaiścit prāṇiviśeṣair upalambhāt.*¹⁾ *tasmād vipakṣe bhāvāsambhavān nānaikāntiko hetuḥ.* TSP 694,6-8.

¹⁾ = PVIN I 96,2-4: *snang ba 'ba' zhig kyang mthong ba'i phyir dang | snang ba med pa'i gzugs kyang srog chags kyi bye brag 'ga' zhig gis mthong ba yin pa'i phyir ...* (no Skt. equivalent for *dang*).

- IWATA I, II TAKASHI IWATA, *Sahopalambhanyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, daß Erkenntnis und Gegenstand ausschließlich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nichtverschiedenheit*. Teil I – Studie; Teil II – Anmerkungen. Stuttgart 1991.
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- MATSUMOTO 1980 SHIRŌ MATSUMOTO, *Sahopalambhanyama. Sotōshū Kenkyūin Kenkyūsei Kenkyū Kiyō 12*, 1980, pp. 1-34 (=298-265).
- PVBH *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* or *Vārttikālaṃkāra* of Prajñākaragupta, edited by R. SĀṆKṚTYĀYANA. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 1. Patna, 1953. Tib. P 5719.
- PVIN I TILMANN VETTER, *Dharmakīrti's Pramānaviniścayaḥ, 1.Kapitel: Pratyakṣam. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung*. Wien 1966.
- PVINṬ Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā (Dharmottara): P 5727 (*Dse*), D 4229.
- TSP *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*. Ed. Dvarikadas Shastri [2 vols.]. Varanasi 1981/82.
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Discovering Buddhist Art of Kinnaur

Per Kværne
(Oslo)

In October 1993 I had the good fortune to be able to travel for two weeks in the district of Kinnaur, Himachal Pradesh, situated along the upper course of the River Sutlej and its tributaries. The lower part of Kinnaur had been opened to foreign tourists two years earlier, but the area in which I travelled was still classified as 'restricted' at the time.

My companions were the two art historians, Dr. Ajay Kumar Singh, Senior Lecturer at Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, and Professor Manjula Chaturvedi, Kashi Vidyapith, Varanasi. Both had spent much time during the last years registering Buddhist art, particularly bronzes, in Kinnaur.

Kinnaur has, at least since the eleventh century, received strong cultural and religious influence from Tibet, especially in the form of Buddhism. The greater part of the population is Buddhist, and there are numerous private chapels and small temples in which Buddhist art, originating from Tibet, Nepal, and even Kashmir, is preserved. This art has been virtually unknown to scholars, and has remained unregistered until the present day. Consequently, with the opening of Kinnaur to general tourism, it is now in danger of attracting the attention of international art dealers, which in turn is likely to lead to widespread thefts, as has been the case in Ladakh and Nepal. It is, however, hoped that proper registration and documentation will make the selling of art from Kinnaur more difficult and hence render thefts less tempting. With this end in view, the Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, Oslo, has for the last few years financed the registration work carried out by Dr. Singh and Professor Chaturvedi. Dr. Singh is now completing work on a major publication presenting several hundred Buddhist bronzes from Kinnaur.

Apart from Rāhul Sāṃkrtyāyan's book *Kinnaur deś mē* ("In the Land of Kinnaur", in Hindi), first published in 1948, there is a remarkable lack of literature on Kinnaur, including its language (Tibeto-Burman, with clear affinities, at least as to vocabulary, to the Zhangzhung language of the Bon religion) and its autochthonous (non-Buddhist) religious beliefs, focussing, it seems, on the cult of mountain deities. Together with its rich artistic heritage and architecture (characterized by remarkable wood-carving), Kinnaur is not only an unexplored, but promises to be also an extraordinarily fertile and important field of research for linguists, art historians, anthropologists, and historians of religion.

Bhavya on *Mīmāṃsā*

Christian Lindtner
(Copenhagen)

Should one wish to know—and there are certainly good reasons for wanting to do so—what the Buddhists in the sixth century A.D. had to say about the contemporary *darśanas*, one should primarily turn one’s attention to Bhavya’s *Madhyamakahr̥daya* (MH), or *Tarkajvālā* (TJ), chapters VI, VII, VIII and IX of which deal with Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā, respectively.

While the chapters on Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika still call for an editor and translator, the chapter on Vedānta was edited and translated (with extracts from the commentary “TJ”) by Olle QVARNSTRÖM in his *Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective*, Lund 1989, whereas the chapter on Mīmāṃsā has been the special object of several studies by Shinjō Nobusada KAWASAKI, whose recent book *Issai-chi shisō no kenkyū*, (i.e. *Studies in the Idea of Omniscience*) Tokyo 1992, contains, *inter alia*, an edition of the extant Sanskrit verses of MH, i.e. MHK (in all 148 verses) along with the Tibetan translation (167 & 67 “extra” verses) as well as a Japanese translation. (The Sanskrit text of MHK V was edited by myself in *The Adyar Library Bulletin* 59 (1995), pp. 37-65, as *Yogācāratattvaviniścayaḥ*. A complete edition and translation of all the chapters of MHK, Sanskrit and Tibetan, will be published as the *The Heart of Madhyamaka*. For further references the reader is referred to these works.)

Since there is no complete translation of MHK IX in a Western language, and since Kawasaki’s edition of the Sanskrit verses still is open to critique and emendations, I do not have to offer any apology for presenting the interested readers of Sanskrit philosophical literature with a new edition and translation of that important work, MHK IX.

In preparing the English translation, I have, of course, carefully compared and consulted the commentary (TJ) which—since there can, in my opinion, be no doubt about its authenticity—must naturally remain the final authority in all matters of doubt concerning the understanding of the meaning and (with some obvious provisos) also of the wording of the basic verse-text (i.e. MHK).

In attempting to establish the Sanskrit recension of the text I have not only compared Kawasaki’s edition (KAWASAKI, pp. 407-467) with the only available Sanskrit Ms (cf. QVARNSTRÖM, p. 23)—of which a very clear copy is in my possession—but also, of course, with the Tibetan version of MHK (as edited by KAWASAKI) and TJ (Peking and sDe-dge editions). Some critical remarks on a

few verses by Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN, *The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism*, Tokyo 1991, have also been taken into consideration.

In general, it goes without saying, the Tib. version of MHK is indispensable for checking and supporting the words of the Sanskrit verses. Nevertheless, it should be used with some circumspection. Occasionally it leaves out (e.g. 145b) or inserts words (e.g. 31d, 144c), or even paraphrases the Sanskrit (e.g. 87d) in an attempt to render the syntax or argument more clear. The stern demands of Sanskrit metre, style and syntax must, in such and similar cases, make us refrain from submitting ourselves to the temptation of “correcting” the Sanskrit in the light of the Tibetan. Occasionally a reading in the Tib. (e.g. 34d) and Sanskrit (e.g. 92b) version of MHK has been influenced by a reading in TJ. Obvious misunderstandings of the Sanskrit occur (e.g. 94c) but are very rare. In a few cases Tib. reflects bad readings in the Sanskrit Ms(s) used by the translators (e.g. 121a). As a rule, the Tib. faces insurmountable incumbrances in catching the rhetoric and irony incidental to the author’s arguments. Several allusions (e.g. 73 to *Gītā* 2.2 and 15.18) can only be duly appreciated by a *rasika* familiar, like Bhavya, with Sanskrit literature. Nor would the desolate Tibetan *mkhas pa*—even with the assistance of the tacit TJ—have had any chance of clearly recognizing the implications of the significant historical allusions to Bhartṛhari (14), Kumārila (15), or the *Mahābhārata* (12, etc.)—not to speak of the tangy list of 363 doctrines (*ad* 19). The connotations of rare and curious technical entries such as *lokapakti* (15d), *magasāstra* (31d), *saṃsāramocaka* (35b), *siddhiyoga* (62a), and *dharmagupti* (68d, etc.), must also have escaped the Tibetan reader. Much the same applies to rare Sanskrit compound formations such as *saṃcintyābhrāntimāraṇa* (38, cf. also 39 and Wackernagel *Altind. Gr.*, II,1, p. 69), and *maṇḍalakārikā* etc. (in 141), where *-kārikā* is used, *i.f.c.*, to designate a particular zoological or botanical species.

As opposed to Kawasaki I have no hesitations in normalizing the often inconsistent “orthography” of our unique Sanskrit Ms. In doing so I am of course assuming that Bhavya consistently wrote a correct Sanskrit, grammatically and orthographically.

There is, as pointed out and discussed by KAWASAKI (in his 1989/1992 paper “Discrepancies in the Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts of Bhavya’s *Madhyama-ka-hṛdaya-Tarkajvālā*”, pp. 13) a large number of Tibetan verses that have no correspondents in the extant Sanskrit Ms. Likewise, there are a couple of Sanskrit verses that have no correspondents in the Tib. of MHK. They are, however, embedded in the prose of TJ. It is clear (from the other chapters of MH/TJ also) that our work was originally conceived as a **unit** of verse and prose. At some point in the line(s) of transmission it was decided to extract the verses from the prose. Since then one could, at least for practical purposes, speak of the verses as MHK, and the prose of TJ. Bhavya himself, it seems, used both titles (MH and TJ) indiscriminately. Understandably, the unknown readers/translators responsible for extracting the verses from the prose ran into the difficulty of having to separate Bhavya’s “own” verses from those that, for various reasons, they did not consider “original”. The difficulty of making the correct distinction is reflected in

the fact that there is, especially in Chapters VIII (see 78-84) and IX a handsome discountenance between the Tibetan and Sanskrit recensions of MHK. On the whole, however, Kawasaki seems to have solved these difficulties in a satisfactory manner, though a few uncertainties still remain.

In the sequel my only concern is to provide a reliable translation and to establish a Sanskrit text that, with the support of all available materials (with the exception of the Mongolian versions of MH/TJ, and the paper Ms of MHK allegedly available in Lhasa) comes as close as possible to what Bhavya actually wrote in the sixth century A.D. Since Bhavya's archetype is, for all we know, irrevocably lost, we shall have to remain satisfied, not with absolute certainty, but with a reasonable degree of plausibility.

The argument: First the *pūrvapakṣa* (1-17). According to Mīmāṃsā *apavarga*, or *mokṣa* (1,10) is to be obtained not by *dhyāna* and *jñāna* (as e.g. in Vedānta, cf. 8.51), but by the performance of various rituals alone (*kriyāmātra*). These rituals are prescribed by the authority of *āgama*, the three Vedas. This *āgama* derives its authority from the fact that it consists of words that are permanent, i.e. not created by a fallible human author. As *āgama* it is reliable because it has been handed down without interruption. As a *pramāṇa āgama* informs us of our ritual duties (*apūrva = dharma*), and as such it is quite different from *anumāna*. The Bhagavat of the Buddhists (and Jains) is not omniscient and his words are therefore unreliable.

Bhavya's replies, the *uttarapakṣa* (18-167): If a tradition is to be considered *āgama* it must be true and logical. The highest goal, *mukti* (= *apavarga*, *mokṣa*) can only be achieved by *jñāna*, not by *kriyā*. Sometimes the words of human beings **are** reliable (18-23). The three Vedas **do**, in fact, have a human author, even an evil one (24-31). This is because they prescribe *hiṃsā* etc., which is the cause of *duḥkha*. It is impossible to protect oneself and others against the *duḥkha* of *hiṃsā* by incantations (*mantra*) and such things. Even if done for some holy purpose or in some sacred place *hiṃsā* is to be rejected. The same goes for *madyapāna* (32-42).

The reasons for claiming that the words of the Vedas (the Word) are permanent, and thus authoritative, are not valid. Thus the Word cannot have a permanent *saṃbandha* to any *artha*. On the contrary, *pratipatti* (an important word!) is based on *saṃketa* (43-49).

As a *pramāṇa āgama* is not essentially different from *anumāna* (here as elsewhere Bhavya follows Dignāga etc.), which also has a manifold (abstract) object. Both are, in the end, based on perception (50-54).

Since *apūrva* and *kriyā* are impermanent their results must also be impermanent. So the Vedas are obviously wrong in saying that they lead to immortality, i.e. *apavarga* etc. (55-58).

Since the main teachers of the three Vedas, i.e. Brahma, Viṣṇu (Kṛṣṇa) and Śiva—as seen by many examples in the *Mahābhārata* etc.—lack *jñāna* and are full of *kleśas*, they should not serve as authorities. Their immoral behavior cannot be justified by referring to the necessity of *dharmagupti*. Moreover, they lack compassion, and are full of hatred, desire etc. (59-73).

Also, the idea that Viṣṇu has **two** bodies is absurd, and has only been introduced for the purpose (not of *dharmagupti* but) of *vyasanagupti* (74-83). So there is no point in meditating, in terms of yoga, on the body of Hari (83-86).

Since the gods are ignorant of causality (in the Buddhist sense) and full of passions etc. they cannot serve the cause of *dharmagupti*, be it by teaching or by their personal *pratipatti*. So, again, the three Vedas should be rejected (87-94).

God, as the creator of the world, has already been refuted in Chapter III. If it is now asked **what** he, hypothetically, has created, some possibilities are examined—and excluded (95-103). Nor can God be considered *eka*, *nitya* etc. (104-106). In fact, God seems to be cruel and unjust, so it is safer to say that *karma*, not God, is responsible for the *śṛṣṭi* of the world (107-113). Again, meditation on God will not bring an end to suffering (114-119).

Moreover, the Vedas are wrong when claiming that bad *karma* can be removed by means of water, for *karma* is bound to *citta* with which water obviously cannot get in touch (120-126). There are other silly doctrines in the Vedas, e.g. that it is good to throw oneself into fire, and to abstain from food and drinking (127-131). It is, under certain circumstances, alright to eat meat, it mostly depends on one's motive (132-138). The Vedas are also mistaken in claiming that trees are sentient beings endowed with a soul (136-146). Again, it is *karma* that is responsible for "life" (147).

Finally, one cannot argue that the Vedas must be authoritative because they are endorsed by various "authorities," for these authorities are obviously not always reliable. Some of their statements are true, others are false. As said, *āgama* should only be followed to the extent that it satisfies the demands of logic and *anumāna*. The Buddha, on the other hand, is reliable and omniscient in the sense that he knows, and preaches (cf. 88) the *mārga* to *svarga* and *apavarga*. It is quite true that the Jains also refute the three Vedas, but of course this does not mean that the Buddhists are also Jains (148-167).

So, to sum up, the three Vedas are full of silly ideas and proposals (*durvihita*), and should therefore be rejected by sensible people. Also, the reasons for attributing the status of *pramāṇa* to the *āgama* of the three Vedas, are all wrong or inconclusive. What is good in the Vedas must have been borrowed from other sources. Thus, like Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Vedānta, the *darśana* of Mīmāṃsā must also be rejected as *ayuktiyukta* etc.

MĪMĀṂSĀTATTVANIRṆAYĀVATĀRAḤ

(*pūrvapakṣa* 1-17; *uttarapakṣa* 18-167)

1. *eke 'pavargasanmārgadhyānāñānāpavādīnaḥ |
kriyāmātreṇa tatprāptiṃ pratipadyānapatrapāḥ ||*

Without any sense of shame some [adherents of Vedānta, viz. the Mīmāṃsakas] deny that meditation and insight [constitute] the true way to deliverance. They insist that it can only be achieved by rituals.

2. *śāstroktaṅvṛhiṅpaśvājyapatnīsaṃbandhakarmaṇaḥ |*
nānyo mārgo 'pavargāya yukta ity āhur āgamāt ||

They say that according to tradition there is no other correct way to deliverance that the rituals prescribed in the sacred texts, i.e. [rituals that involve] rice, cattle, butter and intercourse with one's spouse.

3. *rāgādidoṣaduṣṭatvāt puruṣasya vaco mṛṣā |*
vedo 'puruṣakartṛtvāt pramāṇa[m iti g]ṛhyate ||

[The Buddha cannot serve as *pramāṇa*.] The word of a human being is false, for he is [always] defiled by desire and other [passions]. Since it does not have a human being as its author the [self-originated] Veda must be accepted as the [only true] authority.

4. *kartur asmaraṇāc ceṣṭo vedo 'puruṣakartṛkaḥ |*
saṃpradāyānupacchedād āgamo 'sau tadatyaye ||

Also, because no author can be recollected, the Veda does not have a human being as its author. Since it has been transmitted without interruption it [the Veda] is our *āgama*.—Without it...

5. *atyantākṣaparokṣe hi pratipattiḥ kathaṃ bhavet |*
adṛṣṭaliṅgasambandhe svargāpūrvādivastuni ||

How could one in fact have any knowledge of invisible things far beyond the senses, such as heaven, *apūrva* [= *dharma*] etc., which have no connection with a visible mark?

6. *nityaḥ śabdo dhvanivyāṅgyaḥ saṃbandho 'rthena nityataḥ |*
pratipattur yato 'rtheṣu pratipattiḥ prajāyate ||

The Word that is expressed in sounds is permanent. It is associated with meaning (*artha*) from eternity. It is due to the [Word] that one understands the meaning of things when one has understanding.

7. *advipravṛtter abhyāsāt pratyabhijñānatas tathā |*
śabdavac chrāvaṇatvād dhi nityaḥ śabdo 'vasīyate ||

The Word is understood to be permanent, because it never is used twice, because it can be repeated, because it allows recognition, and because it is audible, just like a sound.

8. *anumānāt pṛthak cāsau pramāṇatvāt tadanyavat |*
ekānekārthaviṣayapratipattir athāpi vā ||

Moreover, it [viz. *āgama*] is different from *anumāna*, because it is a *pramāṇa*, just like the one different from that [i.e. *pratyakṣa*]. It is also an understanding that has an object that is one or many [like *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, respectively].

9. *adr̥ṣṭalīṅgasambandhapadārthamatihetaḥ |
bhinnagocaradhījanmakāraṇatvād athāpi vā ||*

Also [*āgama* is different from *anumāna*,] because it gives rise to an understanding of something [such as heaven etc.] that has no visible connection to a mark, or because it gives rise to an understanding of a manifold object.

10. *apūrvo 'pi kriyāvyaṅgyaḥ kriyā mokṣe 'pi sādhanam |
somapānādīkā vidvān nirj[ayed a]ntakaṃ yayā ||*

Moreover, duty (*apūrva* = *dharma*) is expressed in [ritual] action, and ritual actions such as drinking soma etc. bring about liberation (*mokṣa* = *apavarga*). By means of such [ritual actions] a knowing person may overcome Death.

11. *devarsijūṣṭasīṣṭeṣṭaṃ purāṇaṃ vartma śobhanam |
vedārthabāhyaiḥ strīśūdrair yuktaṃ yat tyajyate trayī ||*

The pristine glorious path [of the Three Vedas] is frequented and taught by the gods and the sages. That the three Vedas are rejected by women and slaves who have nothing to do with the Veda is, of course, quite logical.

12. *yad ihāsti tad anyatra yan nehāsti na tat kvacit |
catuṣṭaye 'pi dharmādaḥ tad evānyatra dṛśyate ||*

What exists here [in the Vedas,] that [also exists] elsewhere. What does not exist here, exists nowhere. With regard to the four [aims of man's life, viz.] *dharma*, [*kāma*, *artha* and *mokṣa*]—is such a thing actually seen elsewhere?

13. *dūṣayitvā trayīmārgaṃ hetubhir hetuvādināḥ |
anumānapradhānatvāt svanayaṃ dyotayanti ye ||*

[Another point:] Finding faults with the three Vedas with the help of arguments, certain logicians, by putting too much emphasis on *anumāna*, celebrate their personal interpretations;

14. *pādasparśād iv[āndhānāṃ] viṣame pathi dhāvatām |
anumānapradhānānāṃ pātaḥ teṣāṃ na durlabhaḥ ||*

But, as in the case of blind people running on an uneven path with only the contact of their feet, such people are prone to fall when they regard *anumāna* as the most important *pramāṇa*.

15. *na cāsti kaścit sarvajño nedānīṃ dṛśyate yataḥ |
sarvajñatā hi buddhasya kalpitā lokapaktaye ||*

Moreover, there exists no omniscient person at all, for such a [human being] is not seen nowadays. The [doctrine of the] omniscience of the Buddha has in fact been invented [by his followers] in order to impress people.

16. *apramāṇaṃ vaco bauddhaṃ kṛtakatvāt tadanyavat |
asarvajñāś ca sambuddhaḥ puruṣatvāt tadanyavat ||*

The word of the Buddha is no *pramāṇa*, because it is created, just like [the words] of other such [human beings]. Moreover, the Buddha is not omniscient, for he is a human being, just like others.

17. *apramāṇam vaco buddham trayīdarśanadūṣaṇāt |
yat yathoktam [tathoktam tad yat]hā nagnāṭadarśanam ||*

The word of the Buddha is no *pramāṇa*, for it criticizes the theory of the three Vedas. Any [theory] that does so is said to be [no *pramāṇa*], as, for instance, the theory of the Jains.

Reply to the opponents objections:

18. *tad atrāpi parīkṣante yathābhūtagaveśiṇaḥ |
pakṣapātaviṣaṃ hitvā śabdārthanyāyyakovidāḥ ||*

Those seekers of truth who are clever in figuring out the proper meaning of words abandon the poison of partiality and also investigate this in the following way:

19. *saṃpradāyānupacchedād āgamasyāgamatvataḥ |
sarvasyāgamatāsiddheḥ kiṃ tattvam iti dhāryatām ||*

If *āgama* has status of *āgama* simply because it has been handed down without interruption [cf. 4], then it is established that all [the 363 doctrines] are *āgama*! [But this is absurd!] One should hold on to what is true!

20. *yat parīkṣākṣamaṃ yuktyā vacanaṃ cet tad āgamaḥ |
tad eva tāvan mīmāṃsyaṃ paścāt tenoditam hi yat ||*

If a statement is logically capable of critique then it is *āgama*. First one must find that which is [true], and then one must, of course, [figure out,] what it means.

21. *tatra tatpra[tipakṣatvā] jñānān muktir itīṣyatām |
āmayapratīpakṣatvād auśadhād vyādhimuktivat ||*

We maintain that liberation is due to insight, because it, in this case, is an antidote [to ignorance]. It is like being free from a disease by means of medicine, because it is an antidote to sickness.

22. *kriyātvān na kriyābhiṣṭā kṛṣivan muktyavāptaye |
adhīve sati vācyatvān mitakālatvato 'pi vā ||*

We do not accept that a ritual [cf. 2] can lead to liberation, because it is just an activity, like ploughing. Also because it, having no understanding, can be expressed in words, or because it only lasts for a limited time.

23. *nṛvāk ced doṣaduṣṭatvād apramāṇam itīṣyate |
sauvarṇikādivākyena hetuḥ syād vyabhicāravān ||*

If you maintain that the statement of a human being cannot serve as authority, because it is defiled by [various] faults [cf. 3], then this “reason” is not

compatible with [the fact that] the words of a goldsmith and other [experts may be quite reliable].

24. *prāmāṇyam atha vedasya sādhyate 'kartṛkatvataḥ |
asā[dhāraṇa]tā hetoḥ syād asiddhārthatāpi ca ||*

If, alternatively, you want to prove that the Veda has status of *pramāṇa*, because it does not have a creator, then this “reason” is either too narrow [as no other example can be given,] or else it fails to make any sense [to other people].

25. *anuvādād akartṛtve bauddham apy asty akartṛkam |
pūrvabuddhābhisambuddhaṃ yato buddhair anūdyate ||*

If [the Vedic Word] has no creator because it is [permanent] repetition, well, then the word of the Buddha may also be without a creator. This is because the Buddhas just repeat what former Buddhas have understood.

26. *kṛtakatvānumānāc ca pakṣabādhānumānataḥ |
kartur asmaraṇāsiddher hetoś ca syād asiddhatā ||*

Still, the reason [“because it has no creator”] will be unestablished, because one can infer that it does have a creator, and because it cannot be proved that there is no recollection of a creator.

27. *samantrasyaiva sambhūto mantrakartuḥ purā yadi |
śāstraṃ vaḥ samabhipretaṃ tatkartṛkam akartṛkam ||*

Opponent: If we say that [the Veda] at first came into the possession of the creator of the mantra, i.e. one who had the mantra, will it then be acceptable to you that a sacred text with such a “creator” [really] does not have a creator?

28. *sakartṛkatvaṃ śāstrasya kim evaṃ na pratīyate |
tatsahotpannakartṛtvāj jātismarakṛtir yathā ||*

Reply: But, if so, why do you not acknowledge that your sacred text **does** have a creator? This is because he becomes a creator at the same time [that the mantra] occurs, just like an activity [takes place the very moment] one recollects [an earlier] incarnation.

29. *pratipattyanugūnyena varṇāmnāyād athāpi vā |
gṛhyate vedavākyānāṃ na kiṃ puruṣakartṛtā ||*

Or why not accept that the words of the Vedas actually are created by a human being, either because they are consistent with [human] understanding, or because of the tradition of language [or words]?

30. *itaś ca vedavākyānāṃ matā puruṣakartṛtā |
vivakṣitārthadhījanmakāraṇatvād yatheṅgitam ||*

We also think that the words of the Vedas must have a human author, because they give rise to ideas about meanings that one wants to express in words. It is just like a sign.

31. *anumeyaś ca vedo 'yam asatpuruṣakartṛkaḥ |
bhūtahimśāsurasurāpānakriyokter magaśāstravat ||*

Moreover, one can even infer that this Veda must have an **evil** human being as its author [or creator]! This is because [the Vedas] recommend [abhorrent] rituals [such as] slaughter of animals and drinking of alcohol, just like the sacred texts of the [Persian] Maga.

32. *viṣopayuktivad dhimśā yadi mantraparigrahāt |
nābhīṣṭāniṣṭaphaladā śāstrookter vāpi dānavat ||*

Perhaps you maintain that violence (*himśā*) does not give an undesirable result, either because one is protected by a mantra, as in the case of consuming poison, or because it is prescribed in the holy texts, just as generosity is?

33. *mantrakarṣaṇacūrṇādyair agamyāgamaṇaḥ hi yat |
tenānekāntikaḥ pūrvo madyapānena cottaraḥ ||*

[But this is wrong:] The first [argument] is not to the point, for then one could obviously [justify] illicit intercourse by means of mantras, seduction, magic powder etc. The second argument [in 32] is also not to the point [for generosity may be associated] with consumption of alcohol.

34. *āyucchedaprayogavād iṣṭo mantraparigrahaḥ |
aniṣṭaphaladaḥ kartur viśaśastraprayogavat ||*

If one wants to protect oneself with a mantra in order to commit a murder, it will have undesirable results for the person responsible. It is as [dangerous as] to employ poison and weapons!

35. *svaśāstra eva ced ukte siddhaḥ saṃsāramocakaḥ |
sāmānyena ca hetūktau syād anyatarasiddhatā ||*

Opponent: But what if it says so in our [own] sacred text?—

Reply: Then it is also perfectly alright to [murder people in order to] liberate them from samsara!—But if the reason is stated in a general sense, would it then be established for any one of us? [No! So it proves nothing!]

36. *yajñe paśūnāṃ himśā cen nāniṣṭaphaladāyini |
tādarthiyād brāhmaṇārthā hi yatheṣṭā pacanakriyā ||*

If [the opponent thinks] that it does not give an undesirable result to slaughter cattle during a sacrifice, because one does it for the same purpose that one does something for the sake of a priest. It is, for instance, alright to cook food for him...

37. *bhoktrarthāḥ paśavo 'bhīṣṭā bhogyatvāt tad yathāṅganā |
tasmād yajñārthatāsiddheḥ paśūnām hetvasiddhatā ||*

Reply: This must mean that animals are created for the sake of those who eat them, for they have to be enjoyed, just like a woman. Therefore it has not been established that animals [have been created] for the purpose of sacrifice. So the reason [for the creation of animals, viz. sacrifice] remains unestablished.

38. *antarvedyām ca hiṃseyam saṃcintyābhrāntimāraṇāt |
aniṣṭapha[la]dā kartur āyatyām tad yathetarā ||*

Even in a [sacred place such as] Antarvedī this kind of violence (*hiṃsā* = *yajña*) gives an undesirable result in the future for the person responsible. This is because it is deliberate cold-blooded murder, just as other kinds [of violence]!

39. *itaś cāniṣṭaphaladā hiṃsā yajña itīṣyate |
saṃcintyayajñvitocchediduhkhādhānād yathetarā ||*

Another reason why we think that violence during a sacrifice has an undesirable result, is that deliberate murder inflicts suffering [upon its victims,] just like other kinds [of violence or slaughter].

40. *yādṛk phalam adhiṣṭhāne dṛṣṭe hi kurute kriyā |
kartus tādṛg adṛṣṭe 'pi hiṃsād vā tad yathetarā ||*

So, surely, whether the authority is seen or not seen, a ritual action brings about a result that corresponds to [the evil action] of one who commits it. This is because it is motivated by violence, just like other [ritual actions].

41. *vyākhyātaṃ madyapānādi pratyākhyānād yathoditāt |
madyam na madahetutvāt sevyaṃ dhustūrakādivat ||*

Consumption of alcohol etc. is explained by a prohibition which has the same purpose as [above, viz. to prevent undesirable results:] One should not consume alcohol, because it causes madness, just as a poisonous apple etc. does.

42. *[na madya]pānaṃ nirdoṣaṃ yajñe mantrapariḡrahāt |
madyatvāt tad yathānyatra dṛṣṭo mantrapariḡrahāt ||*

One cannot render consumption of alcohol harmless by protecting oneself with a mantra during the sacrifice, for [alcohol may still] make one mad. Thus, for instance, in other cases one is seen to [be mad] **because** one assumes the protection of a mantra!

43. *dṛṣṭam na liṅgam astīti yadi svargādyanīścayaḥ |
liṅgād anumī[ta]tvāc ca niścetur niścīter na kim ||*

If [the opponent thinks, cf. 5] that one cannot be certain of heaven and [apūrva = *dharma*], since [without the *āgama* of the Vedas] there is no visible

sign, can one who is certain not have a certain understanding by inferring [these things] from a sign? [In other words, the validity of *āgama* must be ascertained by means of *anumāna*.]

44. *advipravṛtter ity atra dīpe 'py advipravṛttitah |
vyabhicāritayā hetoḥ śabdanityatvam apy asat ||*

To say that the Word is permanent because it never occurs twice [cf. 7], is also wrong, because the reason is uncertain, since [for instance, the same] lamp also never occurs twice. [Still it is not, on that account, permanent.]

45. *sattvād anityaḥ śabdo 'yaṃ kriyāvat kiṃ na gṛhyate |
atha [vā de]haceṣṭāvād dhīhetutvād vināśy ayam ||*

Why do you not accept that the Word is impermanent, because it exists, just like a ritual action? Or that it is impermanent, because it gives rise to ideas, just as the movements of the body?

46. *abhyāsapratyabhijñānahetvor anvayahīnatā |
nābhyāsapratyabhijñāne 'nitye 'drṣṭe kvacid yathā ||*

The two other reasons [given above in 7, viz. that the Word is permanent because] it can be repeated [or studied] and recognized, are not appropriate, for repetition [or study] and recognition are always experienced to be impermanent!

47. *śabdatvanityatāsiddheḥ śabdatvaṃ na nidarśanam |
abhivyaktiniṣedhāc ca dhvanivyaṅgyo na cāpy ayam ||*

Since it has not been established that the Word is permanent, “to be [like] a word” [cf. 7] cannot be used as an example. Moreover, the Word cannot be “expressed in sounds,” because “expression” [or manifestation in general] has been refuted [already as being quite impossible].

48. *śrāvaṇo yadi śabdā te dhvanivyaṅgyaḥ kathaṃ mataḥ |
pratipattis tu saṃketād asau śabdāḥ prasaṅgyate ||*

If you think that the Word is audible [cf. 7], why do you also maintain that it must be expressed in sounds [cf. 6]? [This is unnecessary and absurd.] The understanding of [the meaning of a word] depends, in our opinion, on convention. It follows as a word.

49. *saṃketāsaṃbhavād ādau pratipattir na yujyate |
saṃsāravād anāditvāt saṃketasyānuvādataḥ ||*

If there is no convention to begin with then understanding is not possible at all. [Understanding arises] from a repetition of a convention, since this, like *saṃsāra*, is without beginning.

50. *anumāne pramāṇatvaṃ bhinnaṃ ca na tadātmanaḥ |
ato 'naikāntiko hetuḥ pramāṇatvād itīritah ||*

Moreover, what gives *anumāna* the status of *pramāṇa* is [a kind of cognition] that is not different from the one [of *āgama*] that has the same nature. Therefore, the argument mentioned [in 8] “because it is a *pramāṇa*,” is uncertain.

51. *bhinnagocaratāsiddher hetoś ca syād asiddhatā |
bhinnagocaradhījanmakāraṇatvasya netaraḥ ||*

Moreover, the [other] reason [for saying that *āgama* is different from *anumāna*], viz. that it, because it has a different object, gives rise to ideas of manifold objects [cf. 9], is also not valid. [You may think so] but others [such as the Buddhists] do not!

52. *anekārthavinābhāvād anumānam apīśyate |
naikārthapratipaddhetur asmāc chābdān na bhidyate ||*

Since it is impossible without a plurality we also maintain that *anumāna* gives rise to an understanding of a manifold object. Therefore [we do] **not** differentiate it [viz. *anumāna*] from language (*śabda* = *āgama*) [which is, in fact, contained in *anumāna*].

53. *adr̥ṣṭaliṅgasambandhe parārthād anumānataḥ |
pratipattir yato boddhye tasmād arthāntaram na saḥ ||*

Since one can understand an understandable object with no visible connection to a mark by inferring it from something else [that **is** visible], therefore it [viz. *āgama*] is **not** absolutely different from [*anumāna*]!

54. *nānumānāt pṛthak chābdaḥ parokṣamatihetaḥ |
sambandhasmṛtyapekṣatvād anumānaṃ yathā svataḥ ||*

Moreover, since it is the cause of an understanding of something beyond perception, language (*śabda* = *āgama*) is **not** different from *anumāna*. This is because it, like *anumāna* itself, depends on recollection of a connection between [a mark and that which may be inferred from that mark, based on previous experience].

55. *nāpūrvo 'pi kriyāvyaṅgyaḥ śabdavyaktiniṣedhavat |
ghaṭavad vāpy abhivyakter apūrvo 'nitya iṣyatām ||*

Moreover, *apūrva* [= *dharma*] is not to be expressed in ritual action [cf. 10], [for this can be refuted] just like the manifestation of the word is refuted. Also, we think that *apūrva* is impermanent because, like a jar, it is something manifest.

56. *anityaṃ somapānādikri[yā]phalam itīśyate |
kriyāpha[la]tvāt tad yathā kāmanaimittikaṃ phalam ||*

[Moreover,] we maintain that the result of ritual actions such as drinking *soma* is impermanent. This is because it is the outcome of an action, as for instance the result of [an activity] motivated by desire.

57. *na mokṣaprāpikā yuktā somapānādīkī kriyā |
kriyātvāt tad yathā neṣṭā kāmanaimittikī kriyā ||*

A ritual action such as drinking of *soma* cannot possibly make one obtain freedom. This is because it is an action. Likewise, an action motivated by desire is not acceptable.

58. *na jayaty antakaṃ tasmād enaṃ panthānam āśritaḥ |
parapraṇeyair juṣṭo 'yaṃ vicārākṣamabuddhibhiḥ ||*

Therefore, by following this path [of the three Vedas, cf. 10 & 11] one cannot overcome Death. It is only accepted by [people] seduced by others, [people] with minds unable to analyse [things correctly].

59. *trayīmārgapraṇetṛṇām brahmakṣavaśūlinām |
dṛṣṭvā kleśātmikāṃ caryām yuktāṃ yat tyajyate trayī ||*

It is quite logical to reject the three Vedas [cf. 11] when one notices the thoroughly vicious behaviour of the prophets of the path of the three Vedas, i.e. Brahma, Viṣṇu (Kṛṣṇa) and Śiva.

60. *jñānena jñāninaḥ pāpaṃ dahaty agnir ivendhanam |
atas tejovīṣeṣāc ca na teṣāṃ pratyapāyitā ||*

As fire burns fuel, thus men of insight [burn] evil karma with their insight. So it must be due to a special power that they do not face an evil destiny.

61. *yat kleśadahanāyālaṃ taj jñānaṃ jñānino viduḥ |
nātaḥ prakurute pāpaṃ jñānī taddhetvasambhavāt ||*

The kind of insight that men of insight acknowledge is one that is capable of burning away the vices (*kleśa*). Therefore a man of insight does not commit any evil. This is because the cause [of evil, viz. ignorance] cannot possibly arise [in him].

62. *siddhiyogo na lipyeta karmaṇā pātakena vā |
iti bruvāṇaiḥ sanmārgān naṣṭair anye 'pi nāśitāḥ ||*

Others have been corrupted by those who have deviated from the right way claiming that the yoga of perfection (*siddhiyoga*) is not sullied even by a criminal action [such as the murder of a priest].

63. *tattvārthadarśanī buddhiḥ brahmādīnām na ceṣyate |
tilottamāyām saṃraktāu kathāṃ brahmatriśūlinau ||*

Nor do we believe that the mind of Brahma etc. sees things as they actually are: How in the world could Brahma and Śiva be [so stupid as to] fall in love with Tilottamā!

64. *pūrvaṃ krodhāgninādagdho dadāha tripuraṃ katham |
pūṣṇaḥ śaśāsa dantāmś ca bhagasyāpi ca locane ||*

How could [Śiva] burn Tripura without first having been influenced by the fire of anger? Or how could he knock out the teeth of Pūṣan, or the two eyes of Bhaga?

65. *brahmahā madyapaḥ kāmī dṛṣṭatattvo yadiśvaraḥ |
kā kathādrṣṭatattvānām tatpaddhatyanugāminām ||*

If God can kill a priest, drink alcohol and be in love, and still [be considered] to have seen the truth, what can one say of those who, following in his path, have **not** seen the truth!

66. *katham ca keśavaḥ keśicāṇūranārakādikān |
vyayojayad akāruṇyād asubhir vasubhiś ca tān ||*

And how could Viṣṇu [or Kṛṣṇa] without mercy deprive Keśi, Cāṇūra and others in hell of their lives and their possessions!

67. *parāṅganādhanādāyī madyapaḥ prāṅghātakāḥ |
dṛṣṭatattvo yadi harir jitaḥ śavarataskariḥ ||*

If Hari [Viṣṇu-Kṛṣṇa] is [considered] to have seen the truth when he takes other men's women and goods, when he drinks alcohol and kills living beings, then he cannot compete with bandits and robbers!

68. *prajāpālanadakṣatvād asurān surakaṅṭakān |
nāto doṣo ghnato 'py asti tasya ced dharmaguptaye ||*

Opponent: If he is good at protecting people, then it is not a sin for him to kill godless [creatures] who are a thorn in the eyes of gods—as long as it is his [intention] to protect *dharmā* (*dharmagupti*)!

69. *parastrīdraviṇādānamāyāsāṅghyapavṛttayaḥ |
kiṃ na tyaktā vā vāñchāsti tasya ced dharmaguptaye ||*

Reply: But if it is his desire to protect *dharmā* why not abandon actions such as adultery, theft, deceit and dishonesty?

70. *adharmas cendriyo nāsya katham tatsṛṣṭikāritā |
adrṣṭadoṣair ajñatvāt tatsṛṣṭir atha vā kṛtā ||*

But if *adharmā* is not his domain, why is he responsible for its creation? Or has it [viz. *adharmā*] been created by [gods] who failed to recognize their own faults because they were ignorant?

71. *trṣṇayā pāti lokaḥ vā trṣṇādāsaḥ katham kṛtī |
kāruṇyāc cet katham lokaḥ māyayā samamūmahat ||*

If it is out of desire that [God] protects the world, how can he, being a slave of desire, be an accomplished [and perfect being as a god should be]? If, on the other hand, he [does so] out of compassion, why did he always confuse the world with all his tricks?

72. *kiṃ nāsureṣu kārūṇyaṃ mṛtyujātyādīduḥkhiṣu |
sarvatra samadarśitvān nārisaṃjñāsya yujyate ||*

Why does he not have compassion for all the living beings who suffer from death, rebirth etc.? Since he [is supposed] to regard everything with equanimity it ought not be possible for him to have any notion of an enemy!

73. *rāgadveṣādīśavalaṃ kim īdṛk caritaṃ hareḥ |
anāryacaritaś caivaṃ kathaṃ sa puruṣottamaḥ ||*

How can such a behaviour that is so filled with desire, hatred and [ignorance] be ascribed to Hari! And how can he be a superman when he behaves in a manner so unworthy of Aryans [cf. *Gītā* 2.2 & 15.18]!

74. *anyaivāsau harer mūrtiḥ śivā yadi vikalpyate |
dṛṣṭvā hi yatayo yāṃ na punar yānti punarbhavam ||*

If [our opponents, cf. *Gītā* 9.11 etc.] imagine that Hari has an entirely different body that is blissful—it is, of course, the one that ascetics see and are no more reborn—

75. *na satī nāsati cāsau nāsau sadasatī matā |
tasmāt sattvād asattvāc ca sadasattvāc ca sā parā ||*

It is considered not to exist, not not to exist, not to exist and not to exist, and so it is beyond being, non-being, and being and non-being...

76. *matsyādīmūrtaiḥ sānyā ced anyatvād acyutā na sā |
ananyatvād ananyāpi sāpy aśāntā yathetarā ||*

Then, if it is [considered] to be different from the material forms such as fish etc. it cannot, because it **is** different, be permanent. But if it is the same, because it is not different, then, like the other form, it is also not blissful!

77. *athāpy aśāntā tasyaikā śāntānyaikātmanaḥ sataḥ |
bandhakī nāma sādhvī syāc charīrārdhena saṃyatā ||*

If one, on the other hand, [assumes] that this real soul [has **two** bodies,] one that is not blissful and one that is blissful, then his “chaste wife” is actually unchaste, because she is only devoted to **one** half of his body!

78. *sadādiśabdāvācyatvāt parā ceti na yujyate |
sato hi paratā yuktā yuktā kāraṇatāpi ca ||*

Also, if one cannot say that it exists etc. [cf. 75], it is not logical to speak of a “higher” [form of Hari]. Of course, for something to be “higher” it must exist, and for something to be a cause [of creation, it must] also [exist].

79. *kāraṇatvapratikṣepād anyatvasya ca pūrvavat |
na kāraṇaṃ na cānyāsau nācyutaś cāpy ajātitāḥ ||*

Since we have already refuted that [God] is the creator of the world, [the refutation of his] being different [from the world] is also like before [as in

Chapter 3 etc.]. He is not the cause [of the world] and [his “higher” form] is not different [from his “material form”]. Moreover, he is not immortal, for he is not even born!

80. *acyuto yadi bhāvaḥ syāt sa naṣṭaḥ syād rasādivat |
acyuto yady abhāvaḥ syād asaṃś cāsau khapuṣpavat ||*

If “immortal” is something real [that, as such, always changes,] then it is destroyed like taste etc. If “immortal” is something unreal, then it is as unreal as a flower in the sky.

81. *sadasattā na yuktaivaṃ yathāgner uṣṇasītate |
athāpy anabhilāpyaḥ syād yukto 'sau katham acyutaḥ ||*

It is not possible for him to exist and not to exist, just as it is [not possible] for fire to be hot **and** cold. Again, how can he possibly be [spoken of as] immortal [if he is also said] to be unspeakable!

82. *na cāsyānabhilāpyatvam ātmavat tanniṣedhataḥ |
acyuter nācyutaḥ kaścīd asti cen nācyuto 'cyutaḥ ||*

Nor can he be unspeakable, for this can be refuted, just as the self [was refuted in Chapter 8].—But can he not somehow, due to immortality, remain immortal?—If so, as immortal will he not [always remain] immortal? [There is no example of this, so it is impossible.]

83. *mūrtir anyā ca yā tasya kṛptā vyasanaguptaye |
katham ālambamānās tāṃ mucyante nirmumukṣavaḥ ||*

[So there is no immortal form of Hari:] So how can [yogis] longing for liberation become liberated by taking as object [of meditation] this other [material] form of his which has only been introduced to cover up a calamity [in your system]!

84. *indri[yāñīndri]yārthebhyaḥ kūrmo 'ṅgānīva saṃharan |
oṃkāraṃ vyāharan smṛtyā tadbhaktō mucyate yadi ||*

If [the opponent] thinks that a devotee of him [i.e. of Hari] is liberated by withdrawing his senses from the objects of the senses—as a tortoise [withdraws] its limbs—and by mindfully uttering the syllable OM [then he is mistaken]:

85. *muktir na haribhaktānāṃ yujyate haridarśanāt |
vikalpasmṛtīyogatvāt tad yathā haridarśanāt ||*

The devotees of Hari are not liberated by visualizing Hari, for they are still bound by ideas and recollections, for instance because they visualize Hari.

86. *nirvikalpāpi dhīr neṣṭā yogayuktasya muktaye |
nīmittagrahaṇān mithyā kiṃ punaḥ parikalpitā ||*

Nor do we accept that the mind of a yogi will become free even if it is non-conceptual. This is because it falsely still holds on to signs. So much the more a mind that is full of images!

87. *rāgādisamudācārād brahmādīnām ki[rā]tavat |
tattvacintām nirākarṣyaḥ saṃdeho na hi kāraṇe ||*

Since they are deeply steeped in desire and other [passions], like primitive tribesmen, Brahma and the other gods do not, of course, have that curiosity about causality which ought to draw it towards scientific studies!

88. *tathyadharmopadeśena pratipattyāpi vā svayam |
dharmaguptir bhavanti syāt sā dvidhāpy eṣu duḥsthītā ||*

Real protection of *dharma* (*dharmagupti*) would consist either in teaching the true *dharma* [to others] or in realizing it personally. But with regard to the gods, it is, in both cases, in a bad state!

89. *sarve ca sṛṣṭīhetutvaṃ bruvate svātmanaḥ pṛthak |
kasyātra vacanaṃ bhūtam abhūtaṃ vā vikalpyatām ||*

Each one of **all** of them claims that **he** is the only cause of creation. So here one must consider whose word is true, and whose is not true!

90. *tadekatvād adoṣaś ced brahmāpi brahmahā katham |
ekatvapratīṣedhāc ca tadekatvam ayuktimat ||*

If one says that there is no problem since they are all one [and the same god], how can it be that only Brahma is [said to be] a killer of priests? If one denies that they are one [as done in Chapter 3 etc.], then their unity is illogical.

91. *ātmabhede 'pi cāyogāt tritayaṃ ceśanaṃ katham |
duḥkhaḥetau vimūḍhānāṃ tacchāntyuktau kathāstu kā ||*

But assuming that there is no **essential** difference [between the three gods], how can a divinity be a trinity?—When they do not know the cause of suffering, how in the world can they tell us how to make it cease!

92. *vedayogopadeśādītukter vikalatvataḥ |
na tāvat tathyadharmoktyā śaktās te dharmaguptaye ||*

Since the teachings etc. about *yoga* in the Vedas are deficient when they are talking about this [viz. suffering etc.], it cannot, first of all [cf. 88] be by teaching the true *dharma* that they are [considered] able to protect the *dharma*.

93. *pratipadvikalatvāc ca nālaṃ netuṃ parāñ chamam |
yathā netā svamārgaṇa prapātapatitaḥ parān ||*

Moreover, since their personal understanding is deficient, they are not able to lead others to peace [and freedom from suffering]. It would be as if a guide who has fallen into a precipice were to lead others along his own path!

94. *trayyāṃ hetuviparyastaiḥ kalpanājālakalpitaiḥ |
ayuktiyuktaṃ mīmāṃsyaṃ yuktaṃ yat tyajyate trayī ||*

One must scrutinize the mass of bad logic in the three Vedas put together by mistaken arguments that have been arranged by the web of conceptual constructions! [If one does so] it is logical that the three Vedas are rejected!

95. *neśādikāraṇaṃ viśvaṃ yuktaṃ ity uditam purā |
saty apīśādikarṭtve kiṃ hi tatkr̥takaṃ bhavet ||*

I have already stated earlier [in Chapter 3] that the universe does not have God etc. as its cause. Even if one assumes that God etc. is its cause, what, exactly, has he created?—

96. *ātma tāvad ajanyatvān na tatkr̥taka iṣyate |
dharmādharmau na tasyeṣṭau tadguṇatvād yathādhunā ||*

First of all, it cannot be maintained that the soul has been created by him. This is because it cannot be created at all. Nor can it be maintained that he is responsible for *dharmā* and *adharmā*, for they [have always been] his attributes, just as they are so today.

97. *deho 'pi tābhyāṃ nirvṛttaḥ sukhaduḥkhopalabdhye |
deho 'pi dehināṃ tasmād yukto neśādikarṭṛ[kah] ||*

Moreover, the body [necessary] for perceiving pleasure and pain is produced by those two [viz. *dharmā* and *adharmā*]. Therefore the body that living beings are in possession of, cannot possibly have been created by one of the gods.

98. *kalpātau dehināṃ dehaḥ prākkr̥tādr̥ṣṭahetutaḥ |
sukhādyutpattihetutvāt tad yathādyatanī tanuḥ ||*

The body that incarnated beings possess at the beginning of a kalpa must be caused by invisible [*dharmā* and *adharmā*] done previously. This is because [it is the body] that is the cause of the arising of pleasure and [pain], just as the present body.

99. *īśvarasya yad aiśvaryaṃ tac cet puṇyakṛtaṃ bhavet |
tatpuṇyaparatantratvād īśvaraḥ syād anīśvaraḥ ||*

If the almighty status of the almighty god is supposed to be created by good karma, then the almighty is, *eo ipso*, not almighty, since he must depend on that good karma!

100. *īśvara[sya yad aiśvarya]m akasmāc cet tad iṣyate |
tasyānyair api sāmānyād īśvaraḥ syād anīśvaraḥ ||*

If the almighty status of the almighty God is supposed to be entirely accidental, then he must have this in common with others also. Therefore the almighty God is not almighty!

101. *īśvaro jñasvabhāvaś cet tena tatkarṭṛkaṃ jagat |
kāraṇānuwidhāyivāt sarvaṃ te cetanaṃ jagat ||*

If you say that God consists in spirit, then the world created by him must also, according to you, consist entirely in spirit. This is because [an effect] must be in conformance with its cause.

102. *īśvaro yadi hetuḥ syāj jagat syād aṇimādivat |
īśvaro vā na hetuḥ syāj jagac cen nāṇimādivat ||*

If God is its cause the world would have had to possess subtlety and [the seven other attributes of God, cf. 8.8]. In other words, if the world does not possess subtlety etc., God could not be its cause.

103. *īśvaraḥ karmakartā cet pacyeta na[rakeṣv api |
tadanyeṣāṃ hi] pāke vā kṛtanāśākṛtāgamau ||*

If God were responsible for doing karma he would also have to boil in the hells. If one assumes that it is others than himself that have to boil [in the hells], then actions done are lost, and actions not done come back! [This is obviously against the law of karma.]

104. *duḥkhaheṭoś ca nityatvāt tadduḥkhopaśamaḥ kutaḥ |
noṣṇavyupaśamo dṛṣṭo jvalaty eva vibhāvasau ||*

Moreover, assuming that the cause of suffering is permanent, how then can such suffering be extinguished? Clearly, as long as a fire is burning its heat is **not** extinguished!

105. *ekasya vāvicitrasya kathaṃ kāryavicitratā |
nāpi ceccādivaicitryā yuktaikasya vicitratā ||*

Moreover, if God is one and not manifold, how can he be responsible for a manifold effect? Nor can the manifoldness he, as one, is [considered responsible for] possibly be due to his manifold desires etc.

106. *nityo 'navayavaḥ sūkṣmaḥ kāraṇaṃ jagataḥ kila |
ekaḥ sarvagataś ceti kim āścarya[ṇ tato 'param] ||*

If the cause of the world, as claimed, is a god that is permanent, without parts and subtle, what can be more odd than to say that he is also one and omnipresent?

107. *[krīḍārthaṃ tan]nimittaṃ cet tasyāḥ prītiphalaṃ kila |
prītau svaparatantratvād īśvaraḥ syād anīśvaraḥ ||*

If his motive for this allegedly is to play, then the result of such [a play] must be pleasure. Since pleasure only depends on itself [for motivation], the almighty god cannot be almighty [since, as said, he is **subject** to pleasure].

108. *anyonyabhakṣaṇād bhūtais tiryagbhīr durlabhotsavaiḥ |
niṣpeṣacchedadāhādīduḥkhārtair nārakair api ||*

109. *nṛbhir janmajarārogabhayaśokaklamārditaiḥ |*
prīyate yo namas tasmai rudrāyānvarthasaṃjñīne ||

Homage to the [terrible god] Rudra whose name corresponds to what he actually is: He delights in the hapless animals that are afraid of being devoured by one another, and also in the inhabitants of hell who are tormented by clashings, cuttings, burnings etc., [and he also delights in] human beings haunted by rebirth, old age, disease, fear, sorrow and exhaustion.

110. *kṛpṇā dhanino yad vā parānnādās ca s[āttvikāḥ |*
svarge cādharmaṇaḥ] kecid vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitam ||

It is obviously the whim of God that some miserable men are rich, that some good men live as parasites, and that some immoral people [are reborn] in heaven!

111. *alpāyuso guṇadhanā durvṛttās ca cirāyusaḥ |*
dātāras cālpavibhavā vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitam ||

It is obviously the whim [“will”] of God that men rich in virtues have a short life, that rogues have a long life, and that generous people have little power!

112. *bauddhā hi sukhinaḥ kecid [tad]bhaktā duḥkhinaś ca kim |*
īśvarājñāvidhānāc ca puṇyabhāk kiṃ na pāpakṛt ||

Some Buddhists are, naturally, happy, but why are [some of] their devotees suffering? Why do some good people, following the commandments of God, not commit evil?—

113. *vaicitryakarmaṇo ’jñasya taddhetutvena vācyatā |*
etena sṛṣṭikartṛtvaṃ pratyuktam brahmakṛṣṇayoḥ ||

The answer to one who does not understand manifoldness and karma is that it [viz. karma] is its cause.—Hereby I have refuted that Brahma and Kṛṣṇa are responsible for the creation [of the world etc., cf. 95].

114. *[saṃyamitamativā]raḥ sthāpayitvā śive manaḥ |*
tathomkāram abhidhyāyan dhārayan dhāraṇām hṛdi ||

115. *kṣityādīdhāraṇābhyāsāt prāksamāhitamānasah |*
īśe prasanne duḥkhāntaṃ gacchatīty etad apy asat ||

It is also wrong to think as follows [in the *Śivatantra*.] Having closed the door of the mind, [the yogi] places his mind in Śiva. Then he meditates on the syllable OM while fixing his concentration in his heart. When one has thus first concentrated one’s mind by trying hard to keep it concentrated on earth etc., one becomes free from suffering, when the lord [Śiva] is propitious.

116. *manoḥjñānodayo yāvat tāvan muktir na yujyate |*
manoḥjñānodayāt pūrvaṃ yathā muktir na yujyate ||

[It is wrong, for] as long as a mental cognition arises there cannot possibly be liberation. Likewise there cannot possibly be liberation **before** mental cognition arises.

117. *muktir neśvarabhaktānāṃ yujyate sthāṇudarśanāt |
upalambhavihāritvāt tad yathā sthāṇudarśanāt ||*

It is not possible for the devotees of God to become liberated by seeing [an image of] Śiva, because [their mind] is fixed on an object, just as when they see an image.

118. *duḥkhe hetur yadīśaḥ syān nityatvāt so 'pratikriyaḥ |
ato duḥkhāntagamanam neśvarād asti kasyacit ||*

Moreover, if God were the cause of suffering, then it cannot be counteracted, because it is permanent. Therefore it is not [possible] for any [devotee of God] to reach the end of suffering by [seeing] God.

119. *etena śeṣāḥ pratyuktā brahmaviṣṇvātmaśāntināḥ |
prītiś caivam ayuktatvān neśadāu dhīyate dhīyaḥ ||*

Hereby the remaining adherents of Brahma, Viṣṇu and the Soul have been refuted. Thus one should not take any pleasure of mind in God etc., for that would be illogical.

120. *pāpaprakṣālanam cādbhīḥ śubhādikrayavikrayam |
dṛṣṭvā durvhitam trayyāṃ yuktam yat tyajyate trayī ||*

Moreover, when one sees that it is recommended in the three Vedas that one washes away one's sins with water as a sort of trade in good and [bad karma], it is logical that the three Vedas are rejected.

121. *pāpam prakṣālyate nādbhīr asprṣṭer anidarśanāt |
akledād vāsanādhānāt smṛtijnānaśubhādivat ||*

Sins [or bad karma] cannot be washed away with water. This is because it cannot be touched, it cannot be seen, it cannot be moistened, and because it is determined by impregnations—just like memory and pure karma etc.

122. *na pāpam pātayaty ambhaḥ pauṣkaram jāhnavādi vā |
sprṣyatvāt kledanāc cāpi gṛhasyandikapūyavat ||*

Lotus water or water from the Ganges etc. cannot remove one's sins. This is because it can be touched and because it can moisten, just like the drainage inside a house.

123. *avagāhādīnā kṣaye prākṛtāpuṇyakarmaṇām |
kṛtatīrthābhīṣekānām duḥkham na syād ahetukam ||*

If one could get rid of one's original bad karma by bathing [in a river etc.], would this not create unfounded suffering for [other quite innocent people] who had made an ablution [at the same] bathing-place!

124. *na ca [kar]makṣaye cāpi na kaścit pātakī bhavet |
saṃśucyaty antarātmādbhīr ity uktiś cet tad apy asat ||*

Opponent: But assuming that karma cannot be destroyed, then nobody can get rid of his sins! It is the inner soul that is affected by the “water” [of ablution].—Reply: If you say so, this is also wrong:

125. *sant[ānāntarasamkramaṃ] na pāpam iti gṛhyate |
amūrtatvād yathā rāga dveṣamohādyasamkramaḥ ||*

It is inconceivable that a sin is transferred from the soul of one person to that of another. This is because [sin, as bad karma] is not something material. Likewise, desire, hatred and delusion etc. cannot be transferred [from one soul to another].

126. *na dānagrahaṇaṃ yuktaṃ puṇyāder iti niścayaḥ |
cittena saṃprayogitvāt tad yathā sukhaduḥkhaḥ ||*

One can be sure that it is not possible to give and receive good and [bad karma]. This is because [karma] is bound up with the mind. The same goes for pleasure and pain.

127. *brahmalokādīgamaṇaṃ jvalanādīprapātataḥ |
dṛṣṭvā durvīhitaṃ trayyāṃ yuktaṃ yat tyajyate trayī ||*

Seeing, in the three Vedas, the bad rule that one can go to the world of Brahma etc. by hurling oneself into flames etc., it is logical that the three Vedas are rejected.

128. *hetur nāgnīprapātādi brahmalokādyavāptaye |
[prāṇabādhakāraṇatvā]c chalabhādīprapātavat ||*

Throwing oneself into a fire etc. is **not** the cause of obtaining the world of Brahma etc. This is because one only brings harm upon oneself, just as when a night-moth throws [itself into a fire].

129. *nānnapānāparityāgaḥ svargaprāpaka iṣyate |
kṣutsamṭāpādīhetutvād anicchānaśanādivat ||*

Nor do we accept that abstention from food and drinking can bring one to heaven. This is because it only brings about hunger, pain etc., just as in the case of anorexia etc.

130. *abhojanādau puṇyaṃ ca tyāgāt pāpanivṛttivat |
satyatyāgādībhīr hetoḥ syād evaṃ vyabhīcārītā ||*

Opponent: But it is good karma not to eat etc., for it is a kind of renunciation, just as when one abandons evil.—Reply: If so, your argument is rendered inconclusive by the fact that one can renounce truth etc. [— which is a bad thing].

131. *bhuktityāgo na puṇyāya yat kriyeyam apātakā |
yac chubhamanas[kārasya tyaktamanasikāravat] ||*
Abstention from food does not [in itself] lead to good karma, for [in itself] such an action [as eating food] is not sinful. It would be like a man of good intentions having abstained from his intentions!
132. *trikoṭīśuddhaṃ yan māṃsaṃ na tad bhakṣitam enase |
rasādīpariṇāmitvād bhaikṣānnaṃ na yathainase ||*
It is not to be considered a sin to eat meat if only it is pure from the three points of view. This is because [meat is only] a transformation of juice etc. Likewise it is not a sin to eat begged food.
133. *na māṃsabhakṣaṇaṃ bhoktuṃ bhujyate 'pāpakāraṇāt |
kṣutpratīkārahetutvād yadṛcchāgatabhaktavat ||*
It is not from an evil motive that one is inclined to eat meat, because it is in order to counteract hunger, as in the case of a meal obtained unexpectedly.
134. *aśucitvād abhakṣyaṃ cen māṃsaṃ kāyo 'pi cintyatām |
bījasthānād upastambhād aśucir viṭkrmir yathā ||*
If you think that meat is not to be eaten because it is impure, then also think of your own body! It is caused and supported by seeds—just as an impure worm feeding on ordure!
135. *śukrādisambhav[ād eva matsyamāṃsaṃ vigarhitam] |
tad ghṛtakṣīrādyair hetoḥ syād evaṃ vyabhicāritā ||*
If you find it reprehensible to eat the meat of fish because it is born from *semen virile* etc., then this reason is not compatible with the [fact that] butter, milk etc. [also have the same origin]!
136. *māṃsādaḥ prāṇighātī cet tannimittatvato mataḥ |
ajinādīdharair hetoḥ syād evaṃ vyabhicāritā ||*
If you think that a carnivorous person kills an animal because [killing] must be his inner motive, then [the fact that some people] wear leather renders this argument quite uncertain.
137. *na māṃsabhakṣaṇaṃ duṣṭaṃ tadānīm prāṇyaduḥkhanāt |
muktābarhikalāpāditaṇḍulāmbūpayogavat ||*
It is not a sin to eat meat, for while doing so one does not make the living animal suffer. It is just [as harmless] as making use of pearls, a peacock's tail etc., and grain of rice and water.
138. *saṃkalpajatvād rāgasya na hetur māṃsabhakṣaṇam |
[tad]vināpi tadutpatter gavām iva tṛṇāśinām ||*
Eating meat is **not** the cause of desire, for [desire] arises from the will. This is [clear] from [the fact] that it also arises without this [i.e. without meat], as in the case of cattle eating grass.

139. *acetaneṣu caitanyaṃ sthāvareṣu prakalpitam |
dṛṣṭvā durvhitam trayyāṃ yuktaṃ yat tyajyate trayī ||*

Seeing in the three Vedas the bad doctrine that an imagined soul exists in things that have no soul, it is logical that the three Vedas are rejected.

140. *sacittakā hi taravo na caturyoniyasaṃgrahāt |
madhyacchede 'pi vāspandāj jaḍatve sati loṣṭavat ||*

Of course trees do not have a soul for they are not included in the four [groups of living beings arising from a] womb. Moreover, they do not move even when cut right through, it being a fact that they are inanimate like a clod.

141. *sparśato yadi saṃkocād yathā maṇḍalakārikā |
sacittake tathābhīṣṭe sa[maṅgāṇ]jalikārike ||*

If you still are convinced that various kinds of mimosa have a soul, because of their contraction when touched, just like a millepede...

142. *vahnisaṃsprṣṭakeśādyaiḥ syād dhetor vyabhicāritā |
cūrṇapāratasaṃsprṣṭakeśair vāpi viśeṣataḥ ||*

Then the reason [given by you] is rendered uncertain by [the fact that] hair etc. touched by fire [also are contracted without, therefore, being alive], and, in particular, by [the contraction of] hair that has been treated with pulverised quicksilver!

143. *cikitsyatvān na taravo yujyante hi sacittakāḥ |
vinaṣṭasyāpi madyādeḥ pratyāpatteś ca saṃśayaḥ ||*

Of course it is not possible [to claim] that trees have a soul just because they can be healed. [This “reason” would be] inconclusive because wine etc. that has lost [its “spirit”] can have it restored. [This does **not** imply that it has a soul.]

144. *samānaprasavād vṛddher dohadāc ca sacittakāḥ |
rtujatvāt tathā svāpān nāpīṣṭās turagādivat ||*

Opponent: But can trees not be maintained to have a soul because their procreation is similar, because they grow [as they do], because they are malevolent, because they are born in season, and because they can sleep, just like a horse etc.?

145. *dadru[vidruma]vaidūryakeśahemāṅkurādibhiḥ |
vyabhicārāt tu taravo na sidhyanti sacittakāḥ ||*

Reply: Trees cannot be proved to have a soul, for this is at variance with [the fact that] ulcers, corals, cat's eyes, hair, golden nuggets and the like [can grow etc., cf. 144, without having a soul].

146. *acittakatvād evaiṣāṃ dohadādyaprasiddhataḥ |
hetavaḥ syur asiddhārthā gadaiś ca vyabhicāriṇaḥ ||*

Since all these are absolutely without soul, the [five arguments given, viz.] malevolence etc. are **not** established. Therefore the arguments [viz. *dohadāt* and *svāpāt*] are either meaningless, or [in case of the remaining three] rendered inconclusive by [the fact that] diseases [such as leprosy occur without being animate etc.].

147. *sattvakarmādhipatyena kālajāḥ pādapādayaḥ |
narake svargaloke ca śāstraratnadrumā yathā ||*

It is due to the overwhelming power of the karma of creatures that trees etc. gradually grow. The same goes for the [trees with the] swords in hell and the jewel-trees in the world of heaven.

148. *yathārtho hi trayīmārgo brahmokter vaidyakādivat |
a[*tītā*]nāgatajñair vā tadukteś cet prasādhyate ||*

What if [the opponent] tries to prove that the way of the three Vedas is true either because it has been preached by Brahma, or because it has been preached by [sages] who know the past and the future, as in the case of [something said] by a learned doctor for instance?

[149-167 only available in Tibetan:]

149. Reply: The argument that [the way of the three Vedas] “has been preached by Brahma” is given by those who make him the creator [of the world etc.]. I have already proved that this is a wrong idea. Therefore you cannot be sure of this [argument].
150. In some cases he sees things as they are, but [his words] are not **always** true. Likewise the words of cowherds and madmen are not always true.
151. Even animals and so on may have knowledge of the past and the future [cf. 148]. But it is not everything [the sages] have said [that they have understood]. Therefore [their words] must be analysed for arguments.
152. [In 12 the opponent said] that the dharma etc. found here [in the three Vedas] is also to be found elsewhere. But actually in some cases [the words of the Vedas] are like the “syllables” of a worm [carved in wood], in other cases they just happen to be nicely spoken.
153. For example, some [jeweller] may spot a jewel in a pile of waste. He recognizes it as he is aware of its power and origin.
154. It would be like [a Buddhist] discovering some nice remark in the three Vedas! A jewel does not [originally] belong to a heap of waste in an alley!

155. If one does not investigate what is logical and what is not logical by means of *anumāna* free from faults, then one's understanding will be formed by other [traditions], and therefore one will be in doubt about other traditions (*āgama*).
156. It is like a man wanting to cross a large river who gets hold of a boat. Likewise one must first hold on to *anumāna*, even if one has to abandon it [later on].
157. Following mere words (*śabdāmātra*), and going along with the past like blind men here in this circuit fools revolve in samsara.
158. Just as blind men without anything to hold on to must follow a dreadful path, thus it is all too easy to fall for those who put too much emphasis on the mere words [of *āgama*] (*śabdāmātrapradhāna*, [cf. 14]).
159. The epithet "omniscient" [in 15, can correctly be applied to the Buddha] in certain cases. The word "lion" is also true [to life] in some cases [when speaking of real lions], but occasionally it is used in a figurative sense [e.g. when speaking of brave men etc.].
160. In our opinion the *dharma*- and *nirmāṇakāya* do not belong to a human being. Nor can Tathāgata be proved to be [a human being, as assumed in 16]. Therefore [the example in 16 is also] not conclusive.
161. Opponent: If **you** are entitled to opine that Bhagavat is not omniscient, am I not likewise [entitled to opine] that Śaṅkara [Śiva], Viṣṇu etc. know [everything]?
162. Reply: If it were true that their kind of knowledge were omniscient, then they still seem to see [things] with the cataract [of ignorance, *avidyāpaṭala*]; they do not seem to see [things] with a clear eye!
163. If, on the other hand, you think that they are omniscient in the sense that they know **enough**, this argument is not valid, for lepers etc. [also know "enough", without being truly omniscient].
164. Opponent: But [the Buddha only] knows certain things, he does not know everything!—Reply: What is it that the Muni does not know? Is it the way to *svarga* and *apavarga*? [No!] For he teaches [the way] based on this teaching!
165. Opponent: Even though he teaches [this way] it may be wrong!—Reply: If you have this [silly] idea, it must be due to ignorance; the reply to this has already been given [in 163].
166. Moreover, the standpoint that [our] sacred texts, ideas and words [are not valid, because they are created, cf. 16] should be answered in the same way: [The mind] that analyses is uncertain, since it is created; therefore [the argument is] fallacious.

167. Just because I think that the three Vedas can be criticized in the same way that the Jains do, this does not mean that I follow their religion (*sādhya*). Therefore the comparison [in 17] is no good!

Apparatus criticus

Sigla:

- M** Unique Sanskrit Ms of MHK, cf. QVARNSTRÖM, 1989, p. 23.
K KAWASAKI's ed. of MHK, 1992; for the basis of which see p. 471.
S Emendations to K proposed by SCHMITHAUSEN, 1991, cf. p. 118.
 [] Lacuna in **M**, filled in by **K**, mostly following a conjecture by V.V. GOKHALE or R. SĀMĀKṚTYĀYANA (not specified here), and by myself (with some exceptions: 114a, 128c and 131d).

- 1d** *-trapāḥ* K : *-trapā* M
2d *yukta* : *ukta* M : *bhukta* K
3c *-tvāt* K : *tvā-* M
6c *'rtheṣu* K : *'rtheṣuḥ* M
7b *-jñānatas* K : *-jñānas* M
7c *śabdavac* K : *śabdavic* M
8b *-tvāt* K : *-tvā* M
8d *athāpi* M : *yathāpi* K
10a *-vyaṅgyaḥ* K : *-vyaṅgaḥ* M
10c *vidvān* K : *vidvā* M
12d *evān-* M : *naivān-* K
13d *sva-* K : *sa-* M
17b *-darśanadūṣaṇāt* : *-dūṣaṇadarśanāt* MK
18b *-nyāyakovidaḥ* : *-nyāyakovidā* K : *-āyatakovidā* M
20a *-kṣamaṇ* K : *-kṣasaṇ* M
21d *auśadhād vyādhimuktivat* K : *oṣavādyadhimuktivat* M
22a *kriyātvān na* K : *kriyatvānu* M
23b *itīṣyate* K : *itīkṣate* M
23d *-cāravān* : *-cārivan* K : *-cāraṇa* M
24b *'kartṛkatvataḥ* : *kṛtṛmatvataḥ* M : *'kartṛmatvataḥ* K
25b *akarṭṛkam* K : *atkarṭṛkam* M

- 26a *-tvānumānāc ca* K : *-ānumānatvāc ca* M
- 27d *tatkarṭṭkam* : *tat karṭṭkam* K
- 29b *varṇāmnāyād* : *varṇānāyād* K
- 30d *yatheṅgitam* : *yathegitam* M : *yathehitam* K
- 31b *asat-* K : *asa-* M
- 31d *kriyokter* : *kryokter* M : *mithyokter* K
- 32a *-vad dhiṃsā* K : *rthasiddhīsā* M
- 33a *mantra-* K : *manu-* M
- 34b *mantra-* K : *manu-* M
- 35a *-śāstra* K : *-śāstre* M; *-mocakaḥ* K : *-mocakāḥ* M
- 35d *anyatara-* : *anyataraḥ* M : *anyatarā-* K
- 36a *yajñe* K : *yajño* M
- 36c *hi* M : *ni* K
- 37a *bhoktrarthāḥ...* 'bhīṣṭā K : *bhoktrrthāḥ...* bhīṣṭāḥ M
- 38b *saṃcintya-* : *saṃcintya* K : *saṃcitya* M
- 38d *āyatyāṃ* : *āyatyām* K : *āvyatyāṃ* M
- 39c *saṃcintya-* : *saṃcintya* K
- 40b *kriyā* K : *kṛpā* M
- 41a *vyākhyātāṃ* M : *vyākhyānāṃ* K
- 41d *dhustūra-* : *dhuntūra-* MK
- 43a *drṣṭaṃ* K : *iṣṭaṃ* M
- 43c *ca* K : *catri* M
- 44a *atra* K : *ad* M
- 44b *dīpe 'py advipravṛttitaḥ* : *dīpe 'py advipravṛttinā* K : *dvīyēnodvipravṛttinā* M
- 46d 'drṣṭe K : 'iṣṭe M
- 48b *-vyaṅgyaḥ* K : *-vyaṅgaḥ* M (cf. 10a)
- 49a *saṃketāsaṃbhavād ādau* K : *saṃketasaṃbhavādau* M
- 50c *hetuḥ* K : *hetu-* M
- 52d *asmāc chābdān* : *asmāc chabdān* K : *asmābdān* M
- 54a *chābdaḥ* : *chabdaḥ* K
- 55a *kriyā-* K : *kryā-* M
- 55d 'nitya iṣyatām K : nityadrṣyatām M
- 56a *-pānādi-* : *-pānādi* K

- 56c *tad yathā* : *varttante* MK
57b *kriyā* K : *kṛyā* M (cf. 55a)
57c *-tvāt* K : *-tvā* M
58d *vicārākṣama-* K : *vicārākṣama-* M
60a *pāpaṃ* K : *māyaṃ* M
60d *pratyapāyitā* : *pratyapāyinā* K
62d *nāśītāḥ* K : *nāśritā* M
63b *na ceṣyate* : *niṣedhyate* K : *te* M
64b *tri-* K *tr-* M
64c *śasāda* K : *śasānta* M
66b *-nārakādikān* : *-narakādikān* K
66d *tān* K : *tā* M
67d *jitaṃ* K : *jitaḥ* melius?
69c *tyaktā vā* : *tyaktādi-* K
70a *adharmāś* K : *athadharmāś* M
70b *-kāritā* : *-kārite* K
71a *trṣṇayā* K : *kṛṣṇayā* M
71d *samamūmuhat* K : *samubhūbhuham* M
72b *mṛtyu-* K : *mṛtyur* M
73b *īdr̥k caritaṃ* : *īdr̥k-caritaṃ* K
74a *mūrtiḥ* : *mūrtti* M
74b *yadi* K : *yayad* M
74c *yāṃ na* : *yānti* MK
74d *punar* M : *na ye* K
75d *sā parā* : *sāparā* melius?
76b *acyutā* K : *acyuto* M
78a *-śabdāvācya-* : *-śābdavācya-* MK
80b *sa naṣṭaḥ* : *saṃnasau* M : *saṃnaṣṭaḥ* K
80d *asaṃś cāsau* (sive *asadātmā*) : *saṃtmaka-* M : *asaṃś cātma-* K
82d *nācyuto 'cyutaḥ* M : *nācyutaś cyutaḥ* K
83b *kl̥ptā* K : *kuptā* M
87d *saṃdeho* : *sandahyo* M : *sandehyo* K
90d *ayuktimat* K : *ayuktima* M
92a *-yogopadeśādi-* : *-yogopadeśādi* K : *-yogapadeśādi* M

- 92b *vikalatvataḥ* : *vitathatvataḥ* MK
- 93b *parāñ* : *parāṃc* K; *netā* K : *naitā* M
- 94b *kalpanājālakalpitaiḥ* K : *svakalpādaujanmakatam* M
- 99b *punyakṛtaṃ* : *punyaṃ kṛtaṃ* MK
- 100b *akasmāc cet* M : *ākasmikaṃ* K
- 101a *jñā-* K : *jñāḥ* M
- 102d *jagac* K : *jaga* M
- 104c *dr̥ṣṭo* K : *duṣṭo* M
- 105c *-vaicitryā* : *-vaicitryād* melius?
- 106c *sarvagataś* : *sarvataś* MK
- 109b *-klamārditaiḥ* : *klamāttaraiḥ* M : *klamāntaraiḥ* K
- 110a *yad vā* : *yat vā* K
- 111b *cirāyuṣaḥ* : *cirāyuṣāḥ* MK
- 112d *kiṃ* : *kan* M : *ko* K; *pāpakṛt* K : *pānakṛt* M
- 113a *vaicitrya-* : *vaicitryat* M : *vaicitryāt* K
- 114a [*saṃyamita-...*] : [*saṃyamaka-...*] K
- 114d *dhāraṇāṃ* : *dhāraṇaṃ* K
- 115c *duḥkhāntaṃ* : *duḥkhārttaṃ* MK
- 115d *asat* : *asan* MK
- 118a *hetur yadīśaḥ* K : *hetu yadīśa* M
- 120b *-krayavikrayam* K : *kriyavikriyam* M
- 121c *vāsanādhānāt* K : *vāsanādhānā*
- 121d *-jñāna-* K : *-jñānāt* M
- 122c *-tvāt* K : *-tvā* M
- 122d *-kapūyavat* : *kamāpnuvat* M : *kaphāpavat* K
- 123a *kṣaye* K : *kṣaṇa* M
- 123b *prākṛta-* K : *prākṣitā* M
- 124d *asat* : *asan* K
- 128b *-lokādyavāptaye* K : *-lokādyathāptaye* M
- 128c [*prāṇabādhakāraṇatvā*]c : [*prāṇāpakāratvā*]c K
- 130a *ca tyāgāt* K : *cetyāśāt* M
- 131a *bhukti-* : *bhuji* M : *bhuñji-* K
- 131b *yat kriyeyam apāpakā* : *yatkriyāyām apāpakāt* K :
yatkriyāyām apātakāt M

- 131d [... *tyaktamanasikāravat*] : [... *manasikāratyāgavat*] K
 132a *māṃsaṃ* K : *māsaṃ* M
 132d *yathainase* K : *yathenase* M
 134d *aśucir* : *aśuci-* MK
 135c *-kṣīrādyaiḥ* : *-kṣīrādir* MK (*-kṣīrādi-* melius?)
 136c *-dharair* K : *-dharai* M
 137c *-kalāpādi-* : *-kalāpādi* K
 138c [*tad*] : [*tad-*] K
 139c *dr̥ṣṭvā...* *trayyāṃ* S : *dr̥ṣṭyā...* *trayyā* K
 140d *jadatve* S : *jātve* M : *jādyatve* K
 141d *-jali-* K : *-jāla-* M
 142a *-keśādyaiḥ* S : *-keśādau* K
 144c *ṛtujatvāt* S : *ritujanāt* M : *ṛtujanāt* K
 144d *nāpīṣṭās* K : *cāpīṣṭās* S
 145c *tu taravo* : *rūpāṇān* M : *rūpānāṃ* K : *tarūṇāṃ* (& *te* aut *tair*?) S
 145d *na sidhyanti sacittakāḥ* K : *na sidhyati sacittatā* S
 146b *-siddhataḥ* MK : *-siddhatā* S
 146d *gadaiś* K : *gaṇḍaiś* S (male, ut etiam *vyabhicāritā* etc.)
 148b *brahmokter* K : *brahmoktai* M

A Note on Buddhist Studies in Poland

Marek Mejer
(Warszawa)

In its past Poland did not have many contacts with Asia, and the travellers of those days were mostly the Christian missionaries.¹ Here it suffices to mention two names.

About the middle of the 13th century the Franciscan Father **Benedictus Polonus** accompanied a special papal legate, Giovanni da Pian del Carpine in his mission to the Mongol Khan.² Father Benedictus left an important account of his journey, which was the first journey from the Western Europe to the Central Asia.

In the 17th century the Jesuit Father **Michał Boym** (1612–1659)³ was sent to China. He travelled also to India, Burma, Siam, and Vietnam. Boym is famous for his numerous works on geography, botany, medicine, and linguistics of China. A manuscript copy of his *Atlas of China* is kept in the Vatican Library. His main work is *Flora sinensis* (1656).

Unfortunately, these and other contacts with Asia and specifically with India, remarkable as they were then, did not result in gathering collections of original texts or objects of art, which could serve a basis for scholarly research, as it later happened in other countries, like for example in England, France, Germany, Denmark or Russia.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century some interest in Sanskrit and comparative studies was inspired by the works of Franz Bopp: here one should mention the pioneer, but unscientific, works by **Walenty Skorochód-Majewski** (1764–1835), and among them the first Sanskrit grammar in Polish (1828). Premature death of **Jan Hanusz** (1858–1887)⁴ had delayed establishment of the first chair

¹Cf. E. SŁUSZKIEWICZ, “India as seen by Polish travellers upto the 19th century,” *Indo-Asian Culture* 9, April 1961, pp. 385–403; ditto, “India as seen by Polish travellers of the XIX century,” *Indo-Asian Culture* 10, January 1962, p. 336–339.

²*The Mission to Asia. Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries.* Ed. by Christopher DAWSON. Sheed & Ward, London 1980, pp. 78–84.

³C. SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*, 11 vols., Paris 1890–1932; vol. II, pp. 69–73; P. PELLIOT, “Michel Boym,” *T'oung Pao* 31, 1935, pp. 95–151; B. SZCZEŚNIAK, “The writings of Michael Boym,” *Monumenta serica* 14, 1949–55, pp. 481–538.

⁴Studied in Leipzig (Windisch) and Berlin (Weber, Oldenberg); he obtained his Ha-

of Sanskrit, which was later created for **Leon Mańkowski** (1858–1909)⁵ in 1893 (or 1904) at the Jagiellonian University, Cracow.

It is only with **Andrzej Gawroński** (1885–1927) that the Sanskrit and Indological studies were firmly established in Poland, and reached immediately the highest level.⁶ Gawroński received his doctor's degree in Leipzig (1907), where he was a student of prof. E. Windisch (*Sprachliche Untersuchungen über das Mṛcchakaṭika und das Daśakumāracarita*, Leipzig 1907). In 1911 he obtained his Habilitation (*Am Rande des Mṛcchakaṭika*, Kuhn Zeitschr. 1911), in 1916 he was appointed Professor in Jagiellonian University, Cracow, and from 1917 he was Professor of Indology at the University of Lwów. Gawroński was also a founder and editor of the *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, a journal of Oriental studies which is still published. His main works include a series of studies on the Buddhist Sanskrit literature: "Gleanings from Aśvaghōṣa's Buddhacarita," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* I:1, 1914–1915, pp. 1–41; *Studies about the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature*, Prace Kom. Orient. PAU, Nr 2, Cracow 1919, pp. 80; *Notes on the Saundarananda, critical and explanatory* (Second series), Prace Kom. Orient. PAU, Nr 6, Cracow 1922, pp. 38; "Notes on the Saundarananda, critical and explanatory (Third series)," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* IV, 1926, pp. 219–229. His Polish translation of selected fragments from Aśvaghōṣa appeared shortly before his death (2nd. ed. 1966). Gawroński was also an author of the first Polish academic handbook on Sanskrit grammar (1932), still in use in our indological curriculum.

Gawroński's interests were extremely wide and manifold. The inspiration with Buddhist studies in Poland comes actually from him, as the author of a well-known series of studies on the Buddhist Sanskrit literature.⁷ It was at Gawroński's instigation that Schayer left Munich and came to Poland to continue successfully his academic career.

Thus, it is remarkable that in the thirties (1932–1939) a group of scholars supervised by Prof. S. Schayer at the Oriental Institute of the Warsaw University pursued Buddhist studies.

Stanisław Schayer (1899–1941),⁸ Professor of Indology at the Warsaw University (from 1931), a founder of the Oriental Institute at the same University

bilitation under G. Bühler in 1884 in Vienna ("Über das allmälige Umsichgreifen der -n-Deklination im Altindischen," *Sitzber. hist.-phil. cl. Ak. d. Wiss.* CX, Wien 1885, pp. 42–83).

⁵Studied in Wrocław (Breslau) (Stenzler, Hillebrandt) and Vienna (Bühler, Müller, Kirste); obtained his Habilitation in 1892 in Vienna ("Der Auszug aus dem Pañcatantra im Kshemendra's Brihatkathāmañjarī," Leipzig 1892).

⁶Cf. E. ŚLUSZKIEWICZ, "Indian studies in Poland," in: *Indian Studies Abroad*. Indian Council for Cultural Relations. Asia Publishing House, London 1964, pp. 65–72.

⁷Cf. E.H. JOHNSTON, "Andrzej Gawroński and Sanskrit Textual Criticism," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* XII, 1936, pp. 209–215.

⁸S. SCHAYER, *O filozofowaniu Hindusów. Artykuły wybrane*. [On Philosophizing of the Hindus. Selected Articles.] Ed. by M. MEJOR. Warsaw 1988. Contains full bibliography on pp. xxvii–xxxii. Cf. *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, "Mémorial St. Schayer", vol. XXI, Warsaw 1957.

(1932), an editor of the *Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies* (1937–39), was one of the most eminent Polish Indologists. Soon, under his direction, the Indology Department at the Oriental Institute of the Warsaw University became a well-known centre of advanced studies on Buddhism.

Schayer's research was focused on Indian (especially Buddhist) philosophy, religiology, and logic. In his paper on Professor Schayer and the Indian studies in Poland A. Kunst characterized the work of his Teacher in the following words:⁹

“While mainly engaged in philosophic and soteriological problems of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, and more particularly in the Madhyamika exegesis of [the] Buddha's doctrines, he contributed [also] (...) to the knowledge of Hinduism by articles on the structure of the magic conception according to the Atharva-Veda and the Brahmanas, on the meaning of the word “Upanishad,” [on] Indian Philosophy as the Problem of the Present Times, [on] the Transience of Existence (*anityatā*), on Indian Logic and the methods of the Nyāya analysis. (...) His contribution to Indian logic, though scarce in volume is of quite particular interest, as he has for the first time attempted to formulate formalistically the Nyāya and the Buddhist types of syllogism.”

In Schayer's own words, Indian philosophy may be an interesting and instructive field of historical and comparative research for a scholar, but the essential value of this philosophy is more than that; in this philosophy we are faced with new problems and new ways of solving them, and therefore our own understanding of the world becomes enriched with the new perspectives and new dimensions of spiritual life. It is the Indian philosophy that can be acknowledged as a true partner of the Western tradition.

Schayer started his scholarly career in 1921 with the publication of his doctoral dissertation *Mahāyāna Doctrines of Salvation*.¹⁰ He offered in it an analysis of soteriology of the Mahāyāna Buddhism with special reference to the problem of discrepancy between the ancient Indian concept of self-salvation and the later mediaeval ideals of theistic soteriology. Moreover, on the authority of a large number of texts he could offer an adequate explanation of such important Buddhist terms as *nāma-rūpa*, *viññāna*, *māyā*, etc.

In 1931 Schayer published his main work, an annotated translation of the six chapters from Candrakīrti's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.¹¹ This work of Schayer's is still regarded as a valuable compendium of Buddhist

⁹A. KUNST, “Indian studies in Poland: Stanisław Schayer,” in: *Indian Studies Abroad*. Indian Council for Cultural Relations. Asia Publishing House, London 1964, pp. 73–89; quot. from pp. 81, 85.

¹⁰Translated from the original German “Vorarbeiten zur Geschichte der mahāyānistischen Erlösungslehren” (*Zeitschrift für Buddhismus* III, 1921) by R.T. KNIGHT. Probsthain, London 1923.

¹¹*Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā, V, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI*, Kraków 1931. The 10th chapter was published separately under the title “Feuer und Brennstoff,” *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* VII, 1929 (= *On Philosophizing of the Hindus*, pp. 383–409).

(Mahāyāna) philosophy, thanks to his lucid translation of the Sanskrit text, which is accompanied with a lengthy introduction and detailed notes.

His last major work was devoted to the problem of time in Indian (Buddhist) philosophy (*Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian Philosophy*, Kraków 1938). The introductory essay, in which is explained the Buddhist theory of “three times” (*traikālyā*) in comparison with the notion of Time-substance as developed by the schools of the *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Mīmāṃsakas*, is followed by an English translation of the *kāla-parīkṣa* chapter from Śāntarakṣita’s *Tattvasaṅgraha*.

Among Schayer’s students and collaborators were: **Constantin Regamey**, the author of two studies on Mahāyāna Buddhism; **Arnold Kunst**, who wrote his dissertation on Buddhist logic; **Jan Jaworski**, the author of a series of studies on the Buddhist Vinaya in Chinese; **Ludwik Skurzak**, the author of a study on the beginnings of Indian ascetism; **Maryla Falk**, the author of a large study of two ancient Indian concepts of *nāma-rūpa* and *dharmā-rūpa*, which was prepared for publication in Warsaw.

Constantin Regamey (1907–1982), studied simultaneously classical philology (M.A. 1931) and Indology (under S. Schayer; M.A. 1931) at the Warsaw University; he continued his studies in Paris under prof. J. Przyluski and prof. M. Lalou; in 1935/36 obtained his doctorate (*Three Chapters from the Samādhiraṅgāsūtra*, Warsaw 1938); from 1938 Dozent at the Warsaw University (Habilitation: *The Bhadrāmāyākāravāyākaraṇa, Introduction, Tibetan Text, Translation and Notes*. Warsaw 1938); in 1944 (after the Warsaw uprising) together with his wife went to Switzerland, where he was appointed professor at the Universities of Lausanne and Fribourg.¹² Among his papers published before he left Poland one should mention: a series of essays on Buddhism (published in a bimonthly journal ZET, IV 1935/36, nos. 8,10, 12, 13, 14; V 1936/37, nos. 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17; VI 1937, nos. 2, 3-4, 5); “Bibliographie analytique des travaux relatifs aux éléments aryens dans la civilisation et les langues de l’Inde”, BEFEO XXXIV, 1935, pp. 429-566; “Le problème des langues ‘austroasiatiques’ et finno-ougriennes dans l’Inde”, *Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies* II, 1938, pp. 13-40; reviews in the *Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies* II, 1938: Walther Wüst, *Vergleichendes und etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindiarischen (Altindischen)*, Heidelberg 1935, Lief. 1-3 (pp. 111-119), *Portuguese Vocables in Asiatic Languages*, transl. into English by Anthony Xavier Soares, Baroda 1936 (pp. 136-138), Alan S.C. Ross, *The ‘Numeral-Signs’ of the Mohenjo-Daro Script*, Delhi 1938 (pp. 138-143). He also contributed a paper on Oriental studies in Poland to a volume *Pologne 1919-1939. T. 3: Vie intellectuelle et artistique*, Éditions de la Bacconière, Neuchatel 1947, pp. 374-386 (“Les études orientales”).

Arnold Kunst (1903–1981), studied Indology under prof. S. Stasiak in Lwów (M.A. 1933/34), continued in Warsaw under S. Schayer and in Vienna under E. Frauwallner; after his doctorate (*Probleme der buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṅgraha*, Kraków 1939) went in August 1939 to London; after the

¹²Cf. J. MAY, *Liminaire*, Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques XXXV:2 (1981), Numéro spécial offert en Hommage à Constantin Regamey.

war he was a lecturer at the SOAS, London.¹³

Jan Jaworski (1903–1945), sinologist and japanologist, studied in Paris under prof. J. Przyluski, specialized in the Buddhist Vinaya texts in Chinese translations.¹⁴

Ludwik Skurzak (1900–1979), studied under prof. S. Stasiak in Lwów, later continued his studies in Paris; he obtained his doctorate on the study of ancient Indian asceticism (*Etudes sur origines de l'ascetisme indien*, Wrocław 1948); after the war he was a lecturer at the Wrocław University.

Maryla Falk (1906–1979 ?), not much is known about her career; she seems to have been influenced by comparative religious studies of J. Przyluski (1885–1944), Collège de France, Paris, a French Buddhologist of Polish origin; she worked in Rome, visited Warsaw several times before the war, then lived in India (Calcutta); she took part in the International Congress of Orientalists in Paris in 1948: “Arrière-plans védiques: dissimilation et catharsis de la conquête de l'accroissement vital,” *Actes du XXIe Congrès des Orientalistes, Paris 23–31 Juillet 1948*, Paris 1949, pp. 214–215; “L’histoire du mythe de la Perle,” *ibid.*, pp. 371–373.¹⁵

With the outbreak of Second World War and the complete destruction of the

¹³“The two-membered syllogism,” *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* XV (1939–1949), Kraków 1949, pp. 72–83; “The Concept of the Principle of Excluded Middle in Buddhism,” *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* XXI, 1957, pp. 141–147; ed. (with E.H. JOHNSTON) “Nāgārjuna’s *Vigrahavyāvartanī*,” *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* 9, 1948–1951, pp. 99–152; ed. “Tibetan text of the *Tattvasaṅgraha: Anumānaparīkṣā*,” *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* 8, 1947, pp. 106–216. Cf. obituary “In Memoriam A.K.” by D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 11, 1983, pp. 3–5; “The Friend – A.K.,” *The Times*, Wednesday December 23 1981, p. 12 (Obituary).

¹⁴“La section des Remèdes dans le Vinaya des Mahīśāsaka et dans le Vinaya pali,” *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* V, 1926, pp. 92–101; “La Section de la Nourriture dans le Vinaya des Mahīśāsaka,” *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* VII, 1931, pp. 53–124; “La Section de l’Ordination dans le Vinaya des Mūlasarvāstivādin,” *Compte rendu des Séances de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Varsovie*, XXIII (1931), pp. 1–48; “L’Avalambana-Sūtra de la Terre Pure, Traduit et annoté,” *Monumenta Serica* I (1935–36), pp. 82–107; “Notes sur l’ancienne littérature populaire en Chine,” *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* XII, 1936, pp. 181–193. Cf. A. YUYAMA, *Vinaya-Texte, Systematische Übersicht über die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur I*. Wiesbaden 1979, Nos. 1.27.C.1.f.; 1.45–47.C.1.f.2; 1.45–47.C.1.f.3.

¹⁵Her main publications include: *I “misteri” di Novalis. Collezione di studi filosofici diretta da Carmelo Ottaviano*, Serie Storica, Monografie N. 17. Napoli 1937; “Origine dell’equazione ellenistica Logos-Anthropos,” *Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni*, XIII, 1937, pp. 166–214 (cf. rev. by J. Przyluski, “Logos-Anthropos,” *Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies* 2, 1939, pp. 7–12); “Indologie auf den Wegen und Abwegen vergleichender Religionsforschung,” *Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies* 1, 1937, pp. 18–37; “Upāsana et upaniṣad,” *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* XIII, 1938, pp. 129–158; “Il mito psicologico nell’India antica,” *Memorie delle Reale Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche*, Roma, ser. VI, vol. VIII, fasc. V (1939), pp. 289–738 [see review by D. SNELLGROVE, *BSOAS* 51, 1988, pp. 362–365.]; *Nāma-rūpa and Dharma-rūpa. Origin and Aspects of an Ancient Indian Conception*. Calcutta 1943.

Oriental Institute in September 1939, the Warsaw school of Buddhology terminated its activities. Professor Schayer passed away soon (1 December 1941), and the disciples and collaborators dispersed. After the War only a few scholars did some work in the field of Buddhist studies. One should mention here:

Stanisław Fr. Michalski (1881–1961) – studied in Vienna under prof. L. von Schroeder and prof. P. Kretschmer; in 1912 received his doctorate in Vienna (*Kṛṣṇa im Mahābhārata*); continued his studies in Göttingen (H. Oldenberg, J. Wackernagel). From 1945 Michalski was a lecturer at the University of Łódź. He translated into Polish a number of important texts: *Bhagavadgītā*, selected Upanishads, *Dhammapada* (1925, 2nd. ed. 1948), some fragments from the *Suttanipāta* (*Przegląd Orientalistyczny* 1, 1957; 4, 1958; 3, 1958), wrote a number of articles on Vedic philology, and prepared a grammar of Pāli language for students (Warsaw 1963). He was not connected with the Warsaw School of Buddhology.

Eugeniusz Słuszkiewicz (1901–1981), Professor of Indology and linguistics, a pupil of A. Gawroński, studied in Lwów and Paris. From 1953 until his retirement (1971) he was head of the Department of Indology at the University of Warsaw. E. Słuszkiewicz is best known for his studies on the language of Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* (*Rocznik Orientalistyczny* V, 1927, 108–164), and on the recensions of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (Kraków 1938).¹⁶ He was an author of a series of popular books and articles on the Buddha and Buddhism (*Budda i jego nauka*, Warsaw 1965; “Religie Indii,” “Buddyzm pierwotny” in: *Zarys dziejów religii*, 3rd ed. Warsaw 1976; “Budda” in: *Od Mojżesza do Mahometa*, Warsaw 1969; *Opowieści buddyjskie*, Warsaw 1982).

Artur Karp, a lecturer in the Indology Department at the Warsaw University, wrote a paper on phonology of the middle Indian dialects¹⁷ and translated a fragment from the *Mahāpariṇibbanasutta*.¹⁸

Janusz Chmielewski (b. 1916) *Professor emeritus* of Chinese, studied sinology in Warsaw 1934–38 (under prof. Jaworski and also under prof. Schayer), in 1947–48 studied in Paris under prof. P. Demiéville. J. Chmielewski specialized in Chinese logic and linguistics.¹⁹ He wrote a comparative study on the principle of *reductio ad absurdum* (“Zasada redukcji do absurdu na tle porównawczym,” *Studia Semiotyczne* 11, 1981, 21–106), which contains a large section devoted to the Buddhist aspects of the problem (pp. 40–75).

At present, the organizers of this symposium are doing research on the historical aspects of the Indian Buddhist doctrine (especially the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*) (M. Mejor), and on the history of Buddhism in Tibet and Mongolia (A. Bareja-Starzyńska).

Marek Mejor (b. 1950) published a popular book on Buddhism (Warsaw

¹⁶See *Festschrift E. Słuszkiewicz* (Księga Pamiątkowa ku czci E. S.), ed. by J. REYCHMAN, Warszawa 1974 (with bibliography).

¹⁷“*Nirukta* Jaski i jej znaczenie dla badań nad początkami średnioaryjskiego stadium językowego”, *Przegląd Orientalistyczny* 2(66), 1968, pp. 165–168

¹⁸“Ostatnie dni Buddy”, *Euhemer* 2(68), 1968, pp. 77–88.

¹⁹See “Anniversary Volume dedicated to J. Ch. on His Seventy-Fifth Birthday”, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* XLVII:2, 1991, pp. 7–14.

1980), a study on *Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and its commentaries preserved in the Tanjur* (Stuttgart 1991), a study of Kṣemendra's *Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā* (Tokyo 1992), an edition of collected papers by Schayer (Warsaw 1988); he wrote several papers on Vasubandhu ("The problem of two Vasubandhus reconsidered," *Indologica Taurinensia* XV–XVI, 1989–90, pp. 275–283) and his *Abhidharmakośa* ("Klong rdol bla ma's explanatory notes on the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu," in: *Tibetan Studies*. Ed. by H. UEBACH and Jampa L. PANGLUNG. München 1988, pp. 249–252), on the date of Tibetan translation of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (*Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition. Proc. of the 2nd Dharmakīrti Conference*, ed. E. STEINKELLNER, Vienna 1991, pp. 175–197), "Some Problems of the Sanskrit Lexicography (Review Article)," in: *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik*, Bd. 16/17, 1992, pp. 149–160, etc.

Agata Bareja-Starzyńska (b. 1964) wrote a series of papers on Mongolian historiography.²⁰ Now she is preparing for publication her doctoral dissertation, which contains an edition, analysis and Polish translation of the *Čiqula kereglegči*, a 16th century Mongolian manual of Buddhism.²¹

Several translations from the original Tibetan into Polish were done by **Ireneusz Kania**, an independent scholar from Kraków (*Tibetan Book of the Dead*, Kraków 1991; Sakya Pandita's *Legs par bshad pa rin po che'i gter*, Kraków 1991; Life of Milarepa (*Mi la ras pa'i rnam thar*), Kraków 1996).

Three volumes of a Polish journal of Indological research (*Studia Indologiczne*) have been published since 1994 at the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University (ed. by M. MEJOR, P. BALCEROWICZ, M. WIELIŃSKA). Under the supervision of M. Mejor a few M.A. theses on Buddhism were prepared: Polish translation of the *Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna* (*Divyāvadāna* XXXVII) (by P. Banaś), a study of basic doctrinal notions and Polish translation of the 2nd book of the *Milindapañha* (by N. Szczucka), a study of the early reception of the *Hṛdaya-sūtra* in Japan, with Polish translation of its three Chinese versions and excerpts from Kukai's commentary thereon (by A. Zalewska).

A lecturer of Tibetan, Mr. Thupten Kunga, came from Dharamsala and started his work in the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University, from 1994. He teaches spoken Tibetan at the Department of Mongolian Studies. Currently he works on an edition and English translation of a commentary on Tibetan grammar (Dngul chu Dharmabhadra's *Situ'i shal lung*).

At present an attempt was undertaken towards establishing a seminar on Buddhist studies at the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University.

²⁰"The History of Ancient Tibet According to the XVIIth Century Mongolian Chronicle *Erdeni-yin tobči* by Sagang Sečen," in: *Tibetan Studies*, ed. by SHŌREN IHARA and ZUICHŌ YAMAGUCHI, Narita 1992, pp. 341–351; "A Note on the Chapter on Tibetan History in *Čiqula kereglegči*", *Tibetan History and Language*, ed. E. STEINKELLNER, Vienna 1991, pp. 1–7.

²¹"A Preliminary Note on *Čiqula kereglegči* - a Mongolian Treatise on Buddhism," *Proc. of the 33rd Meeting of the PIAC*, Budapest 1992, pp. 19–23; "Additional Notes on the Manuscripts of the *Čiqula kereglegči*," *Acta Orientalia Belgica* 6, 1991, pp. 387–393.

**On the Formulation of the *Pratītyasamutpāda*:
Some Observations from Vasubandhu's
*Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā***

**Marek Mejer
(Warsaw)**

§1. In almost every Buddhist text one can find a mention of the notion of dependent origination, and many texts devote a considerable space to its exposition and/or discussion. It is no wonder that due to its obvious importance as well as lack of clarity, in the course of time, the doctrine of dependent origination became one of the most debated Buddhist tenets and, naturally, over the years it underwent many modifications. Among the most prominent expositors of this doctrine stands Vasubandhu with his treatise entitled *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā*.

§2. It goes without saying that the *pratītyasamutpāda* has been a subject of various interpretations also among modern scholars and many opinions were offered on its origin, meaning and role. An excellent exposition of the problems connected with the issue of *pratītyasamutpāda* was offered by E. Frauwallner in the first volume of his history of Indian philosophy,¹ and in his book on the Buddhist philosophy² from which I have culled some important statements.

Frauwallner observed that according to the Sermon from Benares, i.e. the first sermon delivered by the Enlightened One (*Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra*), desire (*trṣṇā*) is the cause of all suffering (*duḥkha*). In course of development of the notion of desire another notion was added in order to explain the revolving of the wheel of transmigration, viz. the notion of ignorance (*avidyā*).

Thus, ignorance and desire were put together as the cause(s) of entanglement in the wheel of existence. Through connection of the two notions originated a chain of causes and effects which was meant to explain the arising of suffering and, in consequence, the entanglement in worldly existence and new rebirths.

In such a manner originated the most significant Buddhist theory, theory of “dependent (co-)arising” (or “dependent (co-)origination”), *pratītyasamutpāda*.

The Buddha's legend put the discovery of the formula of dependent origination in the time when Śākyamuni attained the Enlightenment (*bodhi*), and after a

¹FRAUWALLNER 1953, p. 197ff.

²FRAUWALLNER 1956, esp. pp. 27f., 29f., 39, 43, 48f.

prolonged effort came to the understanding of the *pratītyasamutpāda* (cf. Vinaya, *Mahāvagga* I.1,1-3).

In this place, however, we should make a remark that it has been shown by E. Lamotte (LAMOTTE 1980) that the Buddhist tradition is uncertain as to the exact moment of discernment of the law of dependent origination. Lamotte systematically arranged the texts which put this event either:

- (a) during the Enlightenment (e.g. *Mahāvastu* II, p. 285; *Lalitavistara* pp. 346-8; *Buddhacarita* XIV.49-86), or
- (b) after the Enlightenment (e.g. *Udāna* pp. 1-2; *Vinaya* pp. 1-2; *Catuspariṣatsūtra* pp. 100-104, 439-440; *Saṅghabhedavastu* p. 127), or
- (c) before the Enlightenment – *Nagaropamasūtra* (*Saṃyutta Nikāya* II, pp. 104-107; *Saṃyuktāgama* T 99, pp. 80b24-81a8; *Nidānasamṃyukta*, pp. 94-106).

§3. The twelve-membered formula is not clear at many places. First, it is to be observed that two causes of rebirth: ignorance and desire, were put together in a quite superficial way, starting two parallel series of elements (1-7, i.e. ignorance to feeling, and 8-12, i.e. desire to old-age-and-death). In consequence the compilation produced two different descriptions of how a worldly being comes into existence.

Frauwallner made an attempt towards a reconstruction of the possible evolution of the doctrine of dependent origination in the Buddha's teaching and advanced a hypothesis that the twelve-membered formula was compiled by the Buddha himself from two shorter formulae, viz. the one consisting of the links 1-7 (i.e. *avidyā* to *vedanā*) and the other consisting of the links 8-12 (i.e. *trṣṇā* to *jarāmaraṇa*). This hypothesis was later supported by F. Bernhard's philological argument (BERNHARD 1968-69).

The doctrine of dependent origination has always been regarded as dark and difficult. This, observed Frauwallner (*op. cit.*), together with the significant place it occupied in the Buddha's teaching, caused constant interest in it and led to repeated attempts towards its new interpretation.

We can observe this tendency already in the oldest parts of the Buddhist canon and it was extended over the dogmatic writings of later schools. In the course of time a much wider sense has been attributed to the theory of dependent origination and a fundamental philosophical meaning has been attached to it.

§4. There are many texts which give the formula in its standard twelve-membered formulation. However, there are also found canonical texts (e.g. *Mahānidānasuttanta*, DN XV,1-22) which give it in a shorter, e.g. ten-membered formulation, or combine the elements of the twelvefold chain with other elements or even doctrines. In his analysis of the older stratum of the Pāli *Nidānasamṃyutta* (*Saṃyutta Nikāya* II)] Pande³ gave the following classification of texts:

- (a) the bare formula of *paṭiccasamuppāda* (e.g. sutta no. 1: *Desanā*);

³PANDE 1957, p. 197f.

- (b) the formula of *paṭiccasamuppāda* enlarged by elucidation of its elements (e.g. sutta no. 2: *Vibhaṅga*);
- (c) the formula of *paṭiccasamuppāda* combined with other doctrines or formulae (e.g. suttas 11-12).

A good example of the first case is co-appearance of the two chains, shorter and longer, in the *Nagaropama-sūtra*⁴ where the tenfold chain occurs only in the sequence of origination (*samudaya*), whereas the full twelvefold formula is presented in the sequence of annihilation (*nirodha*), viz. *samudaya* = 12. *jarāmaraṇa* (...) → 3. *viññāna* (§§4.1-15.2); *nirodha* = 12. *jarāmaraṇa* (...) → 1. *avidyā* (§§16.1-27.2:), respectively.

As an illustration of the second case one can bring forward the *Mahātanihāsaṅkhasutta* (MN 38 = vol. I, pp. 256-271). There are mentioned four kinds of nourishment⁵ (*āhāra*) which are acting for the persistence of living beings and for “taking up” those beings which are seeking (re)birth. The four nourishments are, in their turn, conditioned by -, originating in -, descended from -, and produced from desire (*tanihā-nidānā*, *tanihā-samudayā*, *tanihā-jātikā*, *tanihā-pabhavā*). The whole causal sequence contains the members 8-1 of the twelvefold chain of *pratītyasamutpāda* and it runs as follows: *cattāro āhārā* → *tanihā* → *vedanā* → *phassa* → *saḷāyatana* → *nāma-rūpa* → *viññāna* → *saṅkhārā* → *avijjā*. Next follow the regular anuloma and pratiloma formulations of the twelvefold *pratītyasamutpāda*.

The third case can be illustrated with the same text too: in the following part the *Mahātanihāsaṅkhasutta* contains a juxtaposition of the theorem of dependent origination and another explication of entanglement in the painful world, viz. the theory of *gandhabba* (Skt. *gandharva*), an intermediate immaterial being, which presides over conception (MN I, p. 265f.).⁶ It describes the consecutive stages of conception, development of an embryo, birth, growing up, and sensual contact with the outer world, which result in origination of the whole mass of suffering.

The fusion of the theory of *antarābhava* and *gandharva* and the theory of

⁴Ed. MURAKAMI 1973. Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 1987, p. 214ff., nn. 1139-41. A similar occurrence of such two chains is also found in the *Buddhacarita* by Aśvaghōṣa (1st cent.) XIV.50-79 and XIV.80-83, respectively.

⁵The theory of four nourishments was explained in the *Abhidharmakośa* III.38d & ff. *cattāro 'me bhikkhave āhārā bhūtāna vā sattāna hitiyā sambhavesīna vā anuggahāya* (MN I, p. 261).

⁶Cf. SCHAYER 1988, p. 465: “At the moment of death, the individual loses his psycho-physical apparatus and becomes a so-called Gandharva, a separate being in the ‘intermediary state’, which sets forth into the world to look for the womb of its future mother. As soon as it finds its proper parents – ‘proper’ meaning that they belong to the class of beings in which it is to be born in accordance with its karmic destination – it ‘keeps ready’ (*pratyupasthita*) and, on the occasion of its parents’ coition enters its mother’s vulva.” Schayer long ago drew attention to the fact that “the popular Buddhist theory of reincarnation (...) should be distinguished from its philosophical exposition on the ground of the dharma-theory.” (ibid., n. 2).

the twelvefold dependent origination is also described in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*⁷ (AKBh ad III.15a-b; III.19) and in the *Caṇḍamahāroṣaṇatantra*,⁸ a Tantric text.

§5. The *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-nirdeśa-sūtra* is a specimen of the oldest Buddhist dogmatics. It has a form of the Buddha's sermon but here it is only a superficial addition. The lecture is divided into two parts:

- (a) the first part contains the so-called beginning (*ādi*),⁹ in which the twelve-membered formula is presented together with the so-called general formula (*asmin sati, idaṃ bhavati* etc.), and
- (b) the second part contains the so-called explanation (*vibhaṅga*), in which all the members are briefly explained. The explanation is short and dry, in the style of old scholastics.

However, the text has been highly esteemed among the Buddhists and became a basis of the exposition of the formula of dependent origination in the dogmatic writings of a classical period.

Vasubandhu's commentary on the above text, the *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā*, offers a good introduction into the exegetical literature of the classical period in general. First of all, it shows how the sacred texts have been comprehensively explained and how their inconsistencies were taken into consideration and attempted to solve.

§6. It was said that the *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra* is a canonical text—it means it was regarded as spoken by the Buddha himself (*buddha-vacana*). For Vasubandhu the problem of the authorship/authenticity of the *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra* is out of question: it is certainly a *buddha-vacana*. However, the actual question he poses is: “Which is **the** Sūtra?”

As it becomes soon clear from Vasubandhu's discussion in his PSVY, there are namely several texts regarded undoubtedly as a *buddha-vacana* which teach the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda*, yet to different doctrinal effects! The difficulty is clearly seen when Vasubandhu is discussing passages from different sūtras, above all from the *Ādi-viśeṣa-vibhaṅga* and the *Sahetusapratyayasānidāna-sūtra*, both of which represent the Sautrāntika doctrinal positions and explain *pratītyasamutpāda*

⁷Cf. SCHAYER 1988, p. 466: “In *Abhidharmakośa*, the celebrated treatise of Vasubandhu, we find an interesting passage describing the reincarnation process in the following way: The Gandharva seeing from a distance its father and mother united in the act of procreation, is overpowered by passion for its mother and hatred for its father, when it is a male Gandharva, or with passion for its father and hatred for its mother, if it is a female Gandharva. Under the influence of these conflicting sentiments, it loses his presence of mind and becomes affected by the illusion that it takes itself an active part in the act, mixes with the secretions, and penetrates its mother's womb as an embryo. It is clear, from this curious anticipation of Freudian theories, that the Gandharva is both a child spirit and a lover of its mother.”

⁸Cf. LVP, *Kośa*, III, p. 50 n. 4; LVP, *Théorie*, p. 125ff.

⁹Cf. NIDSA 16.1, p. 157.

in a special way. Thus, Vasubandhu is careful to precise which sūtra-text he is going to comment upon as the *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*: it is the *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga(-nirdeśa)-sūtra*, i.e. the text which consists of two parts—beginning (*ādi*) and explanation (*vibhaṅga*), and which opens with the Buddha’s words directed to his disciples: “I shall preach to you, monks, the beginning (*ādi*) of dependent origination and the explanation (*vibhaṅga*).”¹⁰

It seems that the title **Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*¹¹ should be taken as a conventional one only. The quotation from a *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra* in the *Prasannapadā* comes from the *Sahetusapratyayasanidāna-sūtra*, which belongs to a group of texts that explain the doctrine of dependent origination from a specific point of view, like *Śālistamba-sūtra* and *Ādi-viśeṣa-vibhaṅga* (T 716, 717). Moreover, there are also texts that are (almost) identical in form but either bear different titles (*Pratītyasamutpādādi-vibhaṅga-nirdeśa*, *Ādi-sūtra*,¹² *Pratītyasamutpāda-vibhaṅga*),¹³ or have no title at all (a brick inscription from Nālandā, a golden plate inscription from Djakarta, a Brāhmi stone inscription from Dunhuang), or are included into another larger text (*Arthaviniścaya-sūtra*, *Yogācārabhūmi (Vibhaṅga)*).

In his PSVY Vasubandhu speaks about texts which bear titles adequate to their contents, viz. *Paramārtha-sūnyatā-sūtra* and *Pratītyasamutpāda-(ādi-vibhaṅga)-sūtra*. Accordingly, a text which deals essentially with the exposition of the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* may be called a *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*.

The *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-nirdeśa-sūtra* is preserved in full (or partly cited) in the following sources :

(a) Skt. sources:

1. *Nidāna-saṃyukta*, Sūtra No. 16: *Ādi-sūtra*, Ms from Turfan, ed. Tripathi,
2. Nālandā bricks, ed. Chakravarti,
3. Djakarta Golden Plate inscription, ed. de Casparis,
4. Brāhmi stone inscription from Dunhuang, ed. V.V. Gokhale,
5. *Arthaviniścayasūtra*, ch. 5, ed. Samtani,
6. *Yogācārabhūmi*, (*Vibhaṅga*), Skt. ed. Bhattacharya, [cf. Tib. & Chin. transl.],
7. *Śrāvakahūmi* (quotations), ed. Shukla,

¹⁰Cf. NIDSA, p. 11 n. 1, 2.

¹¹NIDSA, Sūtra no. 16. Cf. WALDSCHMIDT 1967A, p. 295: “Sūtra 16 (Tsa-a-han-ching 298). Place: village in the land of the Kurus. In the summarizing word *ādinā* means *ādi* of the basic text of the formula of dependent origination which is in the opposite to the following in the Sūtra explanation (*vibhaṅga*). Pāli parallel: N[idāna] S[ammutta] Sutta 2 (*vibhaṅga*, Geiger: ‘Zergliederung’ [‘analysis’]); place: Sāvattī”.

¹²WALDSCHMIDT 1967A, p. 289 n. 4, refers to Ms S 474 from Turfan, fol. 13a1-2: *ayam ucyate pratītyasamutpādavibhaṅga*; WALDSCHMIDT 1967B, p. 360, refers to Ms S 472, fol. 1(25) v 5: || *pratītyasamutpādavibhaṅgasūtra samāpta* ||.

¹³See also DE JONG 1974.

8. *Arthaviniścayanibandhana* of Vīryaśrīdatta (contains extracts from Vasubandhu's PSVY and Guṇamati's PSVY-ṭīkā), ed. Samtani,
9. *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* of Yaśomitra (fragments collected in: MEJOR 1991, pp. 59-62).

(b) Tib. sources:

1. Kanjur (not all editions contain this text!),
2. Śamathadeva's *Upāyikā-nāma* comm. on the AKBH (in: MEJOR 1991, pp. 70-73),
3. Guṇamati's PSVY-ṭīkā,
4. *Arthaviniścaya-ṭīkā*.

(c) Chin. sources:

1. Guṇabhadra's transl. of the *Samyukta-Āgama*, T 99, no. 298,
2. Xuanzang, T 124,
3. Chinese votive stupas (analysed by H. Durt).

§7. Vasubandhu's attempt towards the identification of the *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra* is relevant from the historical point of view. As we have just seen, the problem of origin and historical development of *pratītyasamutpāda*-doctrine and its formulations is a very complex issue. In the following I shall try to show that the *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-nirdeśa-sūtra*, which is the subject of Vasubandhu's commentary, is a later compilation. Through the juxtaposition of the various formulations of the definition of *avidyā* the composite character of the *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra* will be demonstrated and it will be shown that the primitive Buddhist tradition concerning the *pratītyasamutpāda*-doctrine split early and compiled different texts of the *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*. With the Theravādins the text of the *Sūtra* has preserved its more primitive formulation, while with the Sarvāstivādins it has evolved and acquired its developed form in the *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-nirdeśa-sūtra*.

§8. As it was said, Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā* is a commentary on the *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-nirdeśa-sūtra*. The *sūtra* text has been preserved in several versions: Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese, and each of them shows some variants. These variants are particularly significant and numerous within the definition of ignorance (*avidyā*), the first link of the twelve-membered formula of dependent origination, and concern variant readings, the number and arrangement of the items.

§9. The *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-sūtra* definition of *avidyā* is as follows:¹⁴

¹⁴*Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra* = *Nidānasamyukta* 16: *Ādi-sūtra* [ed. Tripathi] (with comparative notes according to the Nālandā text, ed. Chakravarti):

avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ity avidyā katamā / yat tat pūrvānte 'jñānam,

“What is ignorance? Nescience as to the past, nescience as to the future, nescience as to the past and future, nescience as to the inward, nescience as to the outward, nescience as to the inward and outward, nescience as to the action, nescience as to the result, nescience as to the action and result, nescience as to the Buddha, nescience as to the Doctrine, nescience as to the Community, nescience as to the suffering, nescience as to the arising [of suffering], nescience as to the cessation [of suffering], nescience as to the path, nescience as to the cause, nescience as to the elements originated from the causes, nescience as to the virtuous and non-virtuous, faultless and sinful, to be cultivated and not to be cultivated, low and excellent, dark and white dependently originated elements, *together with their counterparts,¹⁵ or, [nescience] as to the *penetration into to the real state of things¹⁶ in the six bases of contact; *that which is in every case:¹⁷ nescience of the real state of things, not seeing, not comprehension, obscurity, complete delusion, and *darkness of ignorance¹⁸ —this is called ignorance.”

§10. In the Pāli canon we do not find a text which would fully agree with its Sanskrit counterpart. The nearest parallels are two short suttas from the Nidāna

*aparānte 'jñānam, pūrvāntāparānte 'jñānam, adhyātme 'jñānam, bahirdhā-jñānam, adhyātmabahirdhājñānam, karmaṇy ajñānam, vipāke 'jñānam, (Nālandā ad.: karmavipāke 'jñānam), buddhe 'jñānam, dharme 'jñānam, saṅghe 'jñānam, duḥkhe 'jñānam, samudaye (Nālandā ad.: 'jñānam), nirodhe (Nālandā ad.: 'jñānam), mārge 'jñānam, hetāv ajñānam, hetusamutpanneṣu dharmeṣv ajñānam, kuśalākuśaleṣu, sāvadyānavadyeṣu, sevītavayāsevitavyeṣu, *hīna-praṇīteṣu, *kṛṣṇa-śukleṣu *(sa)pratibhāga-pratītyasamutpanneṣu (Nālandā: *—* one compound) dharmeṣv ajñānam, ṣaṭsu vā punaḥ sparśāyataneṣu yathābhūta[ma]samprativedhe iti | (Nālandā: yat tatra) yatra tatra (Nālandā ad.: yathābhūtasya) ajñānam adarśanam anabhisamayasa tamaḥ saṃmoho 'vidyāndhakāram (Tripathi: avidyānu(śayaḥ)) | iyam (Tripathi: ayam) ucyate 'vidyā |.*

¹⁵(a) NIDSA §16.4; Brahmi inscr.: *pratibhāga-*. (b) PSVY [D 9b3; P 10a7], Nālandā [p. 198.8], DhSk 3r8 [DIETZ, p. 26], YBH [p. 205.8; Tib. *so so 'i cha yod pa*]: *sapratibhāga-*. (c) AVS om.!

¹⁶(a) NIDSA §16.4: *yathābhūtam asaṃprativedha iti*, cf. TRIPATHI's note, p. 159, n. 1: Pāli *appativedha* (read: *appaṭi-*); cf. PTSD *saṃprativedha* and BHSD *prativedha*: “penetration”; Kanjur: *khong du mi chud pa*; PSVY [P 10b1; D 9b4], Guṇamati [P 110a8]: *yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du khong du chud pa(r mi ses pa)*. (b) Nālandā: *yathābhūtasamprativedhe iti*; YBH [p. 205.9]: *yathābhūtasamprativedhe 'jñānam*; AVN [p. 110.1]: *yathābhūtam ajñānam ity aprativedhaḥ*. (c) AVS om. [!]: *yathābhūtam ajñānam adarśanam....*

¹⁷NIDSA §16.4: *yatra tatrājñānam...*; Nālandā [p. 198.8-9]: *yat tatra tatra yathābhūtasajñānam...*; Djakarta inscr. [A.11]: *yat tatra teṣu*; PSVY [P 10b7; D 10a2], Guṇamati [P 111b5]: *gang de dang der*; AVS om.

¹⁸NIDSA §16.4, p. 159: *avidyānu(śayaḥ |)*, and also SWTF s.v., against other Skt. sources: *avidyāndhakāra*. But Tib. reads regularly: *ma rig pa dang mun pa'i rnam pa* (**avidyāndhākāra*) [!].

Samyutta II: no. 1: *Desanā*, and no. 2: *Vibhaṅga*. The first sutta corresponds to the *ādi*-part, and the second one corresponds partially to the *vibhaṅga*-part of the *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-sūtra*.

The definition of ignorance (*avijjā*) from the Pāli *Vibhaṅga* (NS II.2 §15.) is as follows:

“And what is, monks, ignorance? The nescience about the suffering, the nescience about the arising of suffering, the nescience about the cessation of suffering, the nescience about the path leading to the cessation of suffering - this, monks, is called ignorance.”

As it is clearly seen from the above, here ignorance is defined simply as a nescience of the Four Noble Truths.

The extended definitions of ignorance are found in the old Pāli Abhidhamma work, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. The first is definition of delusion (*moha*) (DhS §390). (Here it should be noted that in the early sources, both Pāli and Sanskrit, the two notions *moha* and *avijjā/avidyā* are used interchangeably.) It is a simple enumeration of 25 various negative terms which characterize ignorance:

“What is delusion (*moha*)? Nescience, not seeing, non-comprehension, non-awakening, lack of enlightenment, non-intelligence, not collecting, not penetrating, not considering, inability to consider, not realizing, foolishness, stupidity, non-discrimination, delusion, deception, confusion, ignorance, the flood of ignorance, the bond of ignorance, the proclivity of ignorance, the overwhelming of ignorance, the bar of ignorance, delusion, which is the root evil - this is called delusion.”

The second definition (DHS §1061 = §1161 [here it is definition of ignorance as a hindrance]) consists of two parts: first part contains the elements of definition known to us from the Sanskrit **Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*, viz. such expressions as nescience about the Four Noble Truths, nescience as to the past, as to the future, as to the both, and nescience about the elements originated in dependance on this-conditioning. The second part is a mere repetition of the said enumeration of 25 negative terms.¹⁹

¹⁹*Dhammasaṅgaṇi* §1061 [PTS ed.]:

Tattha katamo moho?
Dukkhe aññāṇaṃ dukkhasamudaye aññāṇaṃ dukkhanirodhe aññāṇaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya aññāṇaṃ pubbante aññāṇaṃ aparante aññāṇaṃ pubbantāparante aññāṇaṃ idappaccayatā paṭiccasamuppannesu dhammesu aññāṇaṃ - yaṃ evarūpaṃ aññāṇaṃ adassanaṃ anabhisamayo ananubodho asambodho appaṭivedho asaṅgāhanā apariyogāhanā asamapekkhanā apaccavekkhanā apaccakkhakkammaṃ - dummejjhaṃ balyaṃ asampajaññaṃ moho pamoho sammoho avijjā avijjogho avijjāyogo avijjānusayo avijjāpariyutthānaṃ avijjālaṅgi moho akusalamūlaṃ - ayam vuccati moho.

It is clear then that the second definition in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* is but a mechanical conjunction of a few scriptural passages. The same definition is repeated also in another Pāli canonical Abhidhamma work, *Vibhaṅga*, and in other texts.

§11. The Sanskrit *Dharmaskandha*, most probably the oldest canonical treatise of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, contains a close parallel to the above given *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra* definition of *avidyā*; it is also found in the second oldest Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma treatise, in the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, but this time as a definition of *moha* (delusion). What is the most interesting here is the fact that the definition from the *Dharmaskandha* [ed. DIETZ, p. 24] and the *Saṅgītiparyāya* [ed. STACHE-ROSEN, III.3, p. 64] is wider than that of the *Pratītya-samutpāda-sūtra*. It contains in addition an enumeration of negative terms characterizing *avidyā*, similar to that which is known to us from the Pāli sources (but not identical). The composition of this extended definition also points out to a mechanical connection of several formulations. Unfortunately, a direct comparison of the terms with the list from the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* is not possible since that part of the Sanskrit text of the *Dharmaskandha* is lost and the full definition is preserved only in the Chinese translation [T 1537, p. 505c13-26]. Definition of *avidyā*:²⁰

“Now, again, in dependence on ignorance are formations (*avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārāḥ*). What is ignorance (*avidyā, wu-ming*)?”

Now, nescience (*ajñāna, wu-zhi*) as to the past, nescience as to the future, nescience as to the past and the future, nescience as to the inward, nescience as to the outward, nescience as to the inward and outward, nescience as to the action, nescience as to the result, nescience as to the action and the result, nescience as to the well-done action, nescience as to the wrongly done action, nescience as to the well done and wrongly done actions, nescience as to the cause, nescience as to the factors originated due to the causes, nescience as to the Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha, nescience as to the suffering, [its] origin, [its] annihilation, [and] the path [leading to its annihilation], nescience as to the virtuous and not virtuous factors, nescience as to the faultless and sinful factors, nescience as to the factors which are to be cultivated (*ying-xin*) and which are not to be cultivated, nescience as to the low (*xia-lie*) and excellent (*sheng-miao*) factors, nescience as to the dark and white factors, nescience as to the factors having (together with) their counterparts (*you-di-dui*), nescience as to the origination in dependence, nescience as to the six bases of contact according to the real state of things; further, it is nescience, not seeing, not intuitive comprehension (*abhisamaya, xian-guan*), obscurity (*hei-an*), complete delusion (*yu-chi*), darkness of ignorance (*wu-ming mang-ming*); [moreover,] [ignorance is like a fishing] net (*zhao-wang*), bonds (*chan-guo*), stupidity (*wan-ai*), turbidity (*hun-zhuo*), hindrance (*zhang-gai*) which issues blindness, ignorance, nescience, evil knowledge (*lie-hui*); [it is an]

²⁰Cf. DIETZ, DHSK p. 24f.; STACHE-ROSEN, *Saṅgīti*, p. 64.

obstacle for good qualities, [and] is not fit for nirvāṇa; [it is] evil influence of ignorance, flood of ignorance, bond of ignorance, poisonous root of ignorance, poisonous stem of ignorance, poisonous branch of ignorance, poisonous leaf of ignorance, poisonous flower of ignorance, poisonous fruit of ignorance, delusion (*chi*), complete delusion, utmost delusion, fierceness (v.l. *hen*), complete fierceness, utmost fierceness, a kind of delusion, originated from delusion—all this is called ignorance (*avidyā*, *wu-ming*).”

Another extended definition of *avidyā* is found in a later Sanskrit text, the *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra*.²¹

Its fifth chapter contains the full text of the *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-sūtra*.

§12. Apparently, the *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-sūtra* was not only an authority for the school of Sarvāstivādins but also it was accepted by the followers of the Yogācāra. The *Yogācārabhūmi* (ed. Bhattacharya, 204.1-206.9) offers explanations on *avidyā* which go beyond the definition of the Sūtra. This is reproduced by Vasubandhu in his PSVY. As an example let us quote a few passages from the YBH:

“What is nescience (*ajñāna*) as to the past? - It is nescience of one who is thinking incorrectly (*ayoniśas*) about the past formations (*saṃskāra*):

Did I exist in the past, or did I not exist in the past? Who was I? How did I exist?Ž”

“Which is nescience as to the future? - It is nescience of one who is thinking incorrectly about the future formations: Shall I exist in the future, or shall I not exist in the future? Who shall I be? How shall I be?Ž”

“Which is nescience as to the past and the future? - It is nescience of one who doubts incorrectly inward(ly): Who they are? Who will we be(come)? From where did come this sentient being? Where it will go after falling down from this [state of existence]?Ž”

Even more extended are the explanations in the *Arthaviniścaya-ṭīkā* (P 5852, Jo. 40bff.) which also include those of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

The YBH contains speculations on the order and arrangement of the characteristic forms (*ākāra*) of nescience (*ajñāna*).²² Further, it contains a discussion on

²¹The AVS exists also in Tibetan version (Peking Kanjur 983) and two Chinese translations: T 762 (= Nj 928) in 21 chapters, by Faxian from 982-1001 A.D.; T 763 (= Nj 1015) in 27 chapters, by Jinzuzhe from ca. 1113 A.D. It is interesting to observe that the definition of *avidyā* in the earlier Chinese version (T 762, vol. xvii, pp. 650a24-651a13) is further developed and shows close resemblance to the definition from the *Dharmaskandha* (the series of similes: ignorance as a flood, as a yoke, etc., ignorance as a poisonous part of a plant, etc.).

²²The nineteen forms are arranged according to the sevenfold nescience. Both the

the series of six (quasi-)synonyms (*paryāya*) of the word *avidyā* which are closing the Sūtra definition. The passage is as follows: *ajñānam adarśanam anabhisamayas tamaḥ saṃmoho 'vidyāndhakāram, iyaṃ ucyate 'vidyā (iti)* (“Nescience, not seeing, non-penetration, obscurity, delusion, darkness of ignorance - this is called ignorance.”).²³

§13. Summing up, the definition of *avidyā* – ignorance, one of the most important notions of the Buddhist doctrine, has been compiled from several scriptural passages ascribed to the Buddha. The Theravādins preserved its more primitive formulation fairly unchanged, while the Sarvāstivādins extended it in its own way and included it into the *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-sūtra*, a text which certainly is a compilation of the school. Moreover, the definition of *avidyā* may have its further source in the pre-Buddhistic speculations, which have been preserved in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga texts.

More primitive formulation of the definition of *avidyā* in the Pāli canon speaks for its greater antiquity. Consequently, the two short suttas from the *Nidāna-saṃyutta* (SN II.1-2), viz. the *Desanā* and the *Vibhaṅga* should be regarded as a prototype of the later *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-sūtra*. It seems that the *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-sūtra* which was commented upon by Vasubandhu may come from the time of the split of the Buddhist saṅgha, which took place after the second council, according to the Buddhist tradition. Judging from the later sources, its origin may be placed some time before the compilation of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* of the Theravādins and the *Dharmaskandha* of the Sarvāstivādins. This is, of course, rather rough and tentative estimation and only further scrutinizing of the sources may give us a more precise answer.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

AKBH	<i>Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya</i>
AN	<i>Aṅguttara Nikāya</i>
AVN	<i>Arthaviniścaya-nibandhana</i>
AVS	<i>Arthaviniścaya-sūtra</i>
DHS	<i>Dhammasaṅgaṇi</i>
DHsk	<i>Dharmaskandha</i>
DN	<i>Dīgha Nikāya</i>
N	<i>Nanjo</i>

Sanskrit and the Tibetan text have here a wrong number by mistake; it is only following an emendation after the Chinese text that the numerical arrangement agrees [T 1579, p. 322c16].

²³This series has its parallel in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* texts [*Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* ad I.8; comm. on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 47 and 48] which explain the fivefold delusion (ignorance): *tamo moho mahāmohas tāmiso 'ndhatāmiso iti* |.

SN	<i>Samyutta Nikāya</i>
PSVY	<i>Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā</i>
PSS	<i>Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra</i>
PSAVN	<i>Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-nirdeśa-sūtra</i>
YBH	<i>Yogācārabhūmi</i>
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On Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*¹

Marek Mejer
(Warsaw)

Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* [from hereon abbreviated: PSVY] is a commentary on the (so-called) *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*,² viz. *Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅga-nirdeśa-sūtra*, a canonical text which is an exposition of the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism.³

The *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā*⁴ is preserved in a few Sanskrit fragments from a single Nepalese manuscript which was discovered and published by Giuseppe Tucci in 1930.⁵ Several passages can also be traced in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*,

¹An earlier version of this paper was presented at the VIIIth World Sanskrit Conference, Vienna, August-September 1990.

²It seems that the title **Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra* should be taken as a conventional one. The quotation from the *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra* in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* can be shown to come from the *Sahetusapratyayasānidāna-sūtra*, which belongs to a group of texts which explain the doctrine of dependent origination from a specific point of view (*Śālistamba*, *Sahetusapratyayasānidāna*). Moreover, there exist texts which are almost identical but bear different titles (*Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśa*, [*Nidāna-samyukta*]: *Ādi-sūtra*, *Pratītyasamutpādavibhaṅga*), or have no title at all (Nālandā brick inscription, Brāhmi stone inscription from Dunhuang, Djakarta golden plates inscription), or are included into another larger text (*Arthaviniścaya-sūtra*).

³E. Frauwallner made an attempt towards a reconstruction of the possible evolution of the doctrine of dependent origination in the Buddha's teaching (FRAUWALLNER 1953, p. 211ff.) He put forth a hypothesis that the twelve-membered formula was compiled by the Buddha himself from two shorter formulae, viz. one consisting of the links 1-7 (i.e. *avidyā – vedanā*) and the other consisting of the links 8-12 (i.e. *trṣṇā to jarāmaraṇa*). This hypothesis was later supported by Bernhard (BERNHARD 1968-69). See also ARAMAKI 1985.

⁴So reads the Ms. (once: *vyākhyāna*). DE JONG 1974, p. 145 suggested **Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅga-vyākhyā* as a probable original title of the text. The Tibetan translation reads: *Pratītyasamutpādasyādivibhaṅgayor nirdeśaḥ*.

⁵TUCCI 1930 (in devanagari); reprinted (in Roman characters) in: TUCCI 1971. "The palm-leaf manuscript from which my copy has been taken belongs to His Holiness Śrī Hemarāja Śarmā, spiritual preceptor to His Highness the Mahārāja of Nepal. It is written in old Newari characters of the twelfth or thirteenth century and it is generally correct. It contains six lines per page." (TUCCI 1930, p. 612). The Skt. Ms. was available to me in colour photos thanks to the kind permission of Prof. A. Wezler (Hamburg): Ms.

in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, and in the *Arthaviniścaya-nibandhana*, a commentary by Vīryaśrīdatta on the *Artha-viniścaya-sūtra*. The entire text of the PSVY is extant in Tibetan translation;⁶ in the Tanjur it is followed by a large *ṭīkā* by Guṇamati.⁷ The text is divided into fourteen chapters: twelve chapters discuss successively the twelve links of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, and the last two chapters are devoted to some special questions. Guṇamati's *ṭīkā* provides us with further divisions within the chapters.⁸ The preserved Sanskrit fragments belong to the following chapters: (1) *avidyā-vibhaṅga*, (7) *vedanā-vibhaṅga*, (8) *tr̥ṣṇā-vibhaṅga* (complete), (9) *upādāna-vibhaṅga*, (10) *bhava-vibhaṅga*.

The eighth chapter, "On desire" (*tr̥ṣṇā-vibhaṅga*), was translated into German by Frauwallner.⁹ A new edition of the text of the *vedanā-vibhaṅga* and the *tr̥ṣṇā-vibhaṅga* was prepared by Muroji.¹⁰ Iida and Matsumoto analysed the so-called *ādi*-portion of the first chapter¹¹; this part has been critically edited by Muroji.¹² Recently Muroji¹³ published a critical edition and translation of two further chapters from Vasubandhu's PSVY: *saṃskāra*- and *viññāna-vibhaṅga*. Muroji also made a comparative edition of Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* and showed its close relation to the PSVY.¹⁴ Matsuda studied the introductory stanzas of the PSVY and proved that they were inserted by Paramārtha at the end of his translation of the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* and in the concluding part of the *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya*.¹⁵

The present author is preparing a critical edition, accompanied with an English translation, of the first chapter, "On ignorance" (*avidyā-vibhaṅga*), of the PSVY.¹⁶ In the following a brief analysis of its contents will be given, together with some additional observations.

No. 5-138/vi, bauddhadarśana 55, Reel No. B23/26; No. of leaves 6; Size 31x5 cm, palm-leaf. Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project, National Archives, Kathmandu. This is the same Ms. which was available to Tucci. See also MUROJI 1993, p. 41.

⁶P Tanjur, vol. *Chi*, fol. 1-71a8; transl. by Surendrākara-prabha and Nam mkha'. CORDIER III, p. 365 (*Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśa*). Cf. *Lhan kar ma* catalogue (ed. Lalou), No. 653.

⁷P Tanjur, vol. *Chi*, fol. 71a8-283b6; same translators as above. CORDIER III, p. 365, (*Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśaṭīkā*). Cf. *Lhan kar ma* catalogue (ed. Lalou), No. 654.

⁸Cf. note 15 below.

⁹FRAUWALLNER 1956, pp. 43-48.

¹⁰MUROJI 1990.

¹¹IIDA, MATSUMOTO 1978.

¹²MUROJI 1986.

¹³MUROJI 1993.

¹⁴MUROJI 1985.

¹⁵MATSUDA 1984 [cf. short summary of this and some of Matsuda's other papers in *IJ* 28 (1985), p. 319f. (Publications received)].

¹⁶The project was carried out by means of a research grant from the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, Hamburg University. Here I would like to express my sincere thanks to the Humboldt Foundation and especially to Prof. Dr. L. Schmithausen, who acted as my host-professor.

First chapter, the “Explanation of ignorance” (*avidyā-vibhaṅga*), is the longest chapter of the PSVY, and in the Tibetan translation it occupies 12 folios. One folio of the Sanskrit manuscript (approx. 1,5 folios of the Tibetan) has been preserved. Generally, one can divide this chapter into four parts as follows¹⁷:

- (a) The text opens with four *maṅgala śloka*s (salutary stanzas); three of them praise the *ratna-traya*m, i.e. Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha; in the fourth the author, having been urged by those desiring to hear the Buddha's teaching, gives the reason for the present compilation.
- (b) Next comes an important part in which the **Sūtra**, i.e. that text which is a basis for the present commentary, is discussed; a characteristic of the Sūtra are the opening words of the Buddha: “I shall preach to you, monks, the 'beginning' (*ādi*) of dependent origination and the 'explanation' (*vibhaṅga*)”.¹⁸ Then Vasubandhu discusses at some length the so-called *sūtra-śarīra*, “body of a sūtra”¹⁹; accordingly, the relation between the two parts of the Sūtra: the *ādi* and the *vibhaṅga*, is like that between *sūtra* and its *vṛtti*.
- (c) The following part is an explanation of the **ādi** or “beginning” of the Sūtra. Vasubandhu's detailed discussion focuses on the so-called general formula of the *pratītyasamutpāda* only, i.e. on the formula: *asmīn sati, idam bhavati | asyotpādād idam utpadyate*.²⁰ Actually the *ādi*-part of the preserved versions of the Sūtra contains also an enumeration of the twelve members of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, in its *anuloma* (“ascending”) order.²¹ Vasubandhu explains, in response to the queries of some opponents, why the Buddha proclaimed the formula in its double formulation: “(a) this having existed, that comes into existence; (b) this having originated, that originates”, and refers to four possible explanations which are also found in the *Abhidharmakośa*. In short, the general formula is meant to reject the notion of an eternal cause (*nitya-hetu*).

¹⁷Guṇamati distinguishes as many as ten sections: 1) *rang gi rigs rkyen du bzhag pa*, 2) *gzhan gyi rigs rkyen du rnam par bzhag pa*, 3) *'du byed kyi rkyen du rnam par bzhag pa*, 4) *mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi mtshan ñid rnam par bzhag pa*, 5) *rab tu dbye ba rnam par bzhag pa*, 6) *rnam grangs rnam par bzhag pa*, 7) *rnam pa rnam par bzhag pa*, 8) *mi mthun pa'i phyogs rab tu dbye ba rnam par bzhag pa*, 9) *ngo bo ñid rnam par bzhag pa*, 10) *byed par rnam par bzhag pa*.

¹⁸Cf. *Nidānasamṃyukta* 16.1 (ed. Tripathi, p. 157): *pratītyasamutpādasya vo bhikṣava ādiñ ca deśayiṣye vibhaṅgañ ca*; Nālandā text (ed. Chakravarti, p. 197(2)) reads: *pratītyasamutpādasya vo bhikṣavaḥ ādi[ṃ] vo deśayiṣyāmi vibhaṅgaṃ ca*. Cf. the golden plate inscription from Djakarta (ed. de Casparis, p. 108 & n. 6).

¹⁹For a detailed explanation see the *Arthaviniścayanibandhana* (SAMTANI p. 71ff.). The “body of a sūtra” consists of the following six parts: *nidāna* (circumstances), *upodghāta* (prologue), *prajojana* (purpose), *uddeśa* (short announcement), *nirdeśa* (detailed exposition), and *anusandhi* (juncture).

²⁰Cf. the discussion of this formula in LVP, *Théorie*, p. 49f.; LVP, *Kośa*, III, p. 81 n. 2; JAYATILLEKE 1963, § 771; KALUPAHANA 1975. See also next footnote.

²¹Cf. LAW 1937.

Here, polemics against the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the preexistence of an effect in its cause (*satkāryavāda*) and various opinions on the meaning of the sequence of the two general formulae are discussed at some length. Vasubandhu refers to the opinion of the followers of the *Yogācārabhūmi* who claim that the formula was uttered in the sense of non-abandonment (*aprahīṇa*).²² In his answer Vasubandhu refers to the **Ādi-viśeṣa-vibhaṅga-nāma-dharma-paryāya*²³ – its three definitions of the *pratītyasamutpāda* correspond precisely to those found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya(bhāṣya)*.²⁴

A grammatical (etymological) explanation of the general formula of *pratītyasamutpāda* is given by Vasubandhu.²⁵ In the *Abhidharmakośa* the grammatical explanation consists of three parts: an explanation approved by Vasubandhu, an objection by the grammarians, and an opinion of bhaddanta Śrīlāta, a Sautrāntika. The first and the last opinion are quoted by Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā*; the last opinion is also quoted in the *Arthaviniścayanibandhana*. The *ādi*-part closes with a discussion of the term “cause” (*hetu, pratyaya*).

- (d) The **vibhaṅga** or explanatory part of the Sūtra contains a detailed exposition of the twelve successive members of the *pratītyasamutpāda*. Vasubandhu’s commentary on the *vibhaṅga*-part begins in the middle of the *avidyā*-chapter. It opens with a discussion of the Buddha’s words: “What is dependent origination? – This having existed, that comes into existence etc. – Which are the elements which have originated in dependence? – Ignorance, karmic formations, etc. up to existence, old age and death, etc.”²⁶

Another topic which is the subject of a long doctrinal discussion is the question of the (eventual) cause of *avidyā*, or ignorance, the very first member of the *pratītyasamutpāda*.

Actually, *avidyā* begins the series of the twelve consecutive links in the standard textual formulation. However, there are some texts which offer different answers. Thus, incorrect judgement (*ayoniśomanasikāra*) is said to be the cause of *avidyā* in the *Sahetusapratyayasānidāna-sūtra*²⁷, whereas in the **Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtra*²⁸

²²YBH, p. 221.16-17.

²³The text, which is preserved in two Chinese translations (T 716, tr. by Dharmagupta, ca. 590-616 A.D.; T 717, tr. by Xuanzang, ca. 645-664 A.D.) and in a few Tibetan fragments, studied in MATSUDA 1982 and in MATSUDA 1983. Cf. also MUROJI 1986.

²⁴Cf. also *Madhyāntavibhāga-tīkā* 3. pariccheda, ad kārikā 18. In the *Arthaviniścaya-tīkā* the full definitions are preserved.

²⁵Cf. the etymological explanations found in the *Prasannapadā*, *Tattvasaṃgraha*, *Arthaviniścaya-nibandhana*, Rol pa'i rdo rje's *Dag yig*, Tibetan Dpang lotsāva Blo gros brtan pa's treatise according to the *Cāndra-vyākaraṇa*, etc. See LVP, *Théorie*, p. 48f.; LVP, *Kośa*, III, p. 78ff.; JAYATILLEKE 1963, § 763, § 767.

²⁶Cf. AKBH ad III.28.

²⁷Cf. DE JONG 1974, p. 144 n. 3. The Tibetan version was edited in MATSUDA 1984, pp. 91-93. The present author has prepared a new edition (Skt. fragments, Tib., Chin.) with an English translation.

²⁸The text does not exist in Sanskrit. SCHMITHAUSEN 1987, p. 338, identified one

it is the fivefold hindrance (*nīvaraṇa*).²⁹

A parallel discussion, in a modified form, is also found in the *Abhidharmakośa*, where it is directed mainly against the Sautrāntika master Śrīlāta (Śrīlābha) who seems to refer to the *Sahetusapratyayasānidāna-sūtra* as his authority. It is interesting that the so-called ancient Vasubandhu (sthavira Vasubandhu, preceptor of master Manoratha)³⁰ also refers to this text in an attempt to reconcile its teachings with the *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*.

The above discussion is followed by an explanation of the meaning of the word *avidyā*, according to a sevenfold meaning of the suffix *nañ* (Pāṇini II.2.6). This is a very interesting issue from the point of view of the history of the grammatical tradition in India. According to the grammarians, the suffix *nañ* has four or six different meanings.³¹ Vasubandhu, in his explanation of the word *a-vidyā*, “that which is in opposition to knowledge” (**vidyā-virodha*),³² refers to a sevenfold grammatical analysis of the meaning of the suffix *nañ*. Thus, the negative suffix can be used in the sense of absence, difference, similarity, contempt, smallness, separation, and contrariety.³³

A very interesting parallel passage is found in the *Rasavaiśeṣika-bhāṣya*,³⁴ a commentary by Narasiṃha on the *Rasavaiśeṣika-sūtra*, a medical text ascribed to Nāgārjuna.³⁵ Here, the word *aroga* is to be understood as a state opposite to illness (*rogavipakṣa*), i.e., as a state of well-being (*svasthatā*). Vasubandhu's definition of *avidyā* in the *Abhidharmakośa*³⁶ and its relation to the six meanings, [viz., similarity, absence, otherness, diminution, impropriety (reproach), and opposition,] has been analyzed by Matilal in his important paper on the Buddhist

**Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtra* in the *Madhyamāgama* (T 26, No. 211), with its Pāli parallel in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (No. 43). Cf. also quotations from the *Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtra* in Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (in MUROJI 1985, pp. 33, 35). So far the quotations from PSVY have not been traced in the above mentioned texts (cf. T 26, p. 791a).

²⁹Cf. BHSD s.v.

³⁰So Yaśomitra, *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* (Wogihara ed., p. 289.6). The whole question is discussed in MEJOR 1991.

³¹*Durghaṭavṛtti*, ed. Renou, vol. 1, fasc. 2, p. 31: *nañarthāḥ prasaṅgād ucyate : catvāro nañarthāḥ : sādṛśyānyavirodheṣu prasaktasya nīvartane | bhāṣye tu ṣaṭ prakīrtitāḥ : tatsādṛśyam abhāvaś ca tadanyatvaṃ tadalpātā | aprāśastyam virodhaś ca nañarthāḥ ṣaṭ prakīrtitāḥ ||*. This aphorism is found also in the *Śabdakaustubha* (Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita), the *Bālaṃanoramā* (Vāsudeva Dīkṣita) [here it is ascribed to the *prācīna*], cf. Renou, *loc. cit.*, n. 10.

³²Cf. Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* (ed. Wogihara, p. 301.5): *virodhe nañ iti darśayati |*

³³PSVY, P Tanjur, vol. *Chī*, fol. 7b5ff.

³⁴Ed. Muthuswami, p. 3.1f.:

pratiśedhe ca sattāyā, anyatve, sadṛśe 'pi ca | kutsālpavirahārtheṣu vipakṣe cāpi nañ bhavet || (I am indebted to Prof. A. Wezler for calling my attention to this text).

³⁵Cf. FILLIOZAT 1979, p. xff.; LINDTNER 1982, p. 14 n. 30.

³⁶“*Avidyā* is a *dharma* (element of reality), a different one, which is the opposite (reversal) of *vidyā*. The negative compound here is to be explained in the manner of *amitra* (‘a non-friend’) or *an-ṛta* (‘untruth’),” MATILAL 1980, p. 161 (see the next footnote).

concept of *avidyā*.³⁷

Four meanings of negation are explained in the *Arthaviniścayaṭīkā*:³⁸ smallness, contempt, opposition, and absence. Here, too, *avidyā* is to be understood as that which is opposed or contrary to knowledge. Also the *Yogasūtra-bhāṣya* (and *Vivaraṇa*) (on YS II.5) contains a short discussion on the meaning of the word *avidyā*,³⁹ as that which is opposed to knowledge.

The discussion explicating the word *avidyā* occupies a considerable space in Vasubandhu's PSVY. It is followed by a long quotation from the Sūtra, i.e. the **Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*, which contains a definition of *avidyā*.⁴⁰

A large number of Sanskrit passages from Vasubandhu's PSVY can be traced in Vīryaśrīdatta's *Arthaviniścayanibandhana*.⁴¹ It can be proven that Vīryaśrīdatta made extensive use of both Vasubandhu's PSVY as well as Guṇamati's *ṭīkā*. In passing, Vīryaśrīdatta's adherence to the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas can be ascertained.⁴²

The discussion in Vasubandhu's PSVY which then follows contains a reference to an opinion of the dharmavādins and to an opinion of a certain *ācārya* whom Guṇamati identifies as Asaṅga.⁴³

Next comes a long quotation from the *Yogācārabhūmi*,⁴⁴ which explains the definition of *avidyā*, which is known to us from the **Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*, *Nidānasamṃyukta*, Nālandā bricks, Brāhmi stone inscription, *Arthaviniścaya*, and Djakarta golden inscription. Actually the Sarvāstivādin and Yogācārin definition of *avidyā* goes back to the formulation found in the *Dharmaskandha* (ed. Dietz, p. 24) and the *Saṅgītiparyāya*,⁴⁵ which are the oldest Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma canonical books.⁴⁶

The closing part of the *avidyā* chapter in Vasubandhu's PSVY contains two

³⁷MATILAL 1980, esp. p. 156f. Matilal refers here to the *Bālamānoraṃā*.

³⁸P Tanjur, No. 5852, vol. *Jo*, fol. 40b7-41a2. Cf. WAYMAN 1984, esp. p. 201f.

³⁹*Paṭaṅjala-Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya Vivaraṇam of Śāṅkara-Bhagavatpāda*, Madras, 1952, p. 137.2-3: *evam avidyā na pramāṇam, na pramāṇābhāvaḥ, kiṃtu vidyāvīparītaṃ jñānāntaram avidyā iti* |.

⁴⁰Cf. *Nidānasamṃyukta (Ādi-sūtra: Sūtra 16.4, ed. Tripathi, from a Turfan Skt. Ms.): avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ity avidyā katamā | yat tat pūrvānte ajñānam, aparānte ajñānam*, etc. Cf. Nālandā brick inscription(s) (ed. Chakravartī); Dunhuang Brāhmi stone inscription (ed. V.V. Gokhale); *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra* ((i) ed. A. Ferrari, (ii) SAMTANI); *Yogācārabhūmi* (ed. Bhattacharya); Djakarta golden plate inscr. (ed. de Casparis). Further cf. the reference in *Śrāvākabhūmi* (ed. Shukla, p. 382.3-4).

⁴¹SAMTANI pp. 103.2-110.10.

⁴²*Arthaviniścayanibandha* (SAMTANI pp. 104.7-105.1) and Guṇamati's PSVY-*ṭīkā* (P vol. *Chi*. 107a6-7). See also SAMTANI, Introduction, p. 137ff.

⁴³P *Chi*. 114a4; C *Chi*. 103a2: *slob dpon 'chad pa ni zhes bya ba ni slob dpon thogs med do* ||.

⁴⁴Ed. Bhattacharya, pp. 204.2-206.9. Some passages are also traceable in the *Arthaviniścayanibandhana*; cf. WAYMAN 1984.

⁴⁵Ed. V. Stache-Rosen, Berlin 1968, pp. 49; 64. Actually the definition of *avidyā* is found under the heading of *moha*; the *Saṅgītiparyāya* explicitly refers to the *Dharmaskandha*'s formulation.

⁴⁶DIETZ 1984, p. 16 & n. 10.

quotations from the **Ādi-viśeṣa-vibhaṅga-dharma-paryāya* and the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

Vasubandhu's PSVY is very rich in quotations from different sources: Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra; constant reference must be made to the *Abhidharmakośa(bhāṣya)*, where many of the topics of the PSVY are discussed, and often in a different way. According to K. Matsuda, Vasubandhu's PSVY represents a Sautrāntika position.

Here, I would like to call attention to the following topics which, it seems to me, are of interest.

First is the question of the text (Ur-text) of the so-called *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra* (please refer to footnote 2). This text is found in several versions in Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese, which show (in places) considerable deviation, especially in the definitions of the first and twelfth members of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, i.e. *avidyā* and *jarāmaraṇa*, respectively. The text was subject to some modifications, which are especially significant for the definition of *avidyā*, given its doctrinal importance. Now, it is interesting to observe that the Pāli tradition did not develop a text fully parallel to that of the Sanskrit *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*. Its definition of *avidyā* (*avijjā*) is much simpler (vide *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* §§ 390; 1061, 1161). On the other hand, the Sarvāstivāda definition (vide *Dharmaskandha*) is very elaborate. The Yogācārin referred to the latter (vide *Yogācārabhūmi*). The affinity of the Buddhist notion of *avidyā* as *mūla-kleśa* ("main affliction") with that of the *Yogasūtras* (and the *Bhāṣya* ad YS II.4) is noteworthy.⁴⁷

Secondly, Vasubandhu's quotations from or references to the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Saḥetusapratyayasānidāna-sūtra* are of special interest from the doctrinal point of view. The former explains the *pratītyasamutpāda* under nine headings⁴⁸ (cf. ten headings in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*⁴⁹). The latter develops a concept of *avidyā* as being conditioned by incorrect judgement (*ayoniśo-manasikāra*), which is supported by the Sautrāntika master Śrīlāta. Incidentally, the issue becomes more important since the older Vasubandhu is involved in the discussion. The *Ādi-viśeṣa-vibhaṅga-sūtra* has been identified by K. Matsuda as a text of Sautrāntika affiliation.

Thirdly, the sevenfold etymological explanation of the suffix *nañ* with reference to the word *a-vidyā* in Vasubandhu's PSVY as well as in Narasiṃha's *Rasaviśeṣika-bhāṣya* bears an importance for the history of the Indian grammatical tradition.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

C	Cone
PSVY	<i>Pratītyasamutpādayākhyā</i>
SK	<i>Sāṃkhyakārikā</i>

⁴⁷It was already noticed by La Vallée Poussin (LVP 1937).

⁴⁸Ed. Bhattacharya, p. 198.14-16.

⁴⁹Ed. Pradhan, p. 26.12-15.

- YBH *Yogācārabhūmi*
- YS *Yogasūtra*
- ARAMAKI 1985 ARAMAKI, N., "On the Formation of a Short Prose *Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra*", *Buddhism and Its Relation to Other Religions. Essays in Honour of Dr. Shozen Kumoi on His Seventieth Birthday*. Kyoto, pp. 87-121.
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Sāmānādhikarāṇya
in Dignāga, Uddyotakara and Dharmakīrti

Michael Torsten Much
(Vienna)

In the Indian version of the discussion of universals the linguistic phenomenon of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* served as a touchstone for the accuracy of the contentions of the various panelists on the meaning of words. The term *sāmānādhikarāṇya* means literally “having the same basis”. A modern equivalent for the term is “referential identity” or “co-referentiality, coreference”. On the grammatical level the term expresses the fact that two or more words within a syntagma may apply to the same thing. This is supposed to reflect a factual level, on which two or more phenomena may occur in the same locus.¹ Words having the relation of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* display concordant endings, as for example in the sentence *tvam pacasi* where the endings *-m* and *-si* agree. In the case of declinable words the words stand in apposition, as in *nīlam utpalam*.² In the latter case they may form a compound, *nīlotpalam*.³ In the context of the discussion of universals it is the case of two or more declinable words standing in apposition that is normally dealt with. In this instance the following questions may be raised: do two words qualify one another (as in *nīlam utpalam* or *vīrapuruṣaḥ*), or do they refer together to one referendum (as in *khañjakubja*)? How is it possible that two or more words refer to the same item? How is referential identity possible?

The grammarians discussed referential identity because Pāṇini prescribed the first case only for words conveying their own basic sense.⁴ In contrast to words

¹Cf. CARDONA 1974, p. 289ff. (n. 56): “Two things or properties ... are *sāmānādhikarāṇa* when they occur in the same (*sāmāna*) locus (*adhikarāṇa*)... If, on the other hand, one considers items qua signifiers, two such item are *sāmānādhikarāṇa* by virtue of referring to the same thing...”

²See e. g. the definition of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* in the NYĀYAKOŚA (for the sense that concerns us here): *śābdikās tu padayor ekārthābhīdhāyitvam sāmānvibhaktikatvaṃ vā, yathā nīlo ghaṭaḥ ityadau nīlapadaghaṭapadayoḥ sāmānādhikarāṇyam*, cf. JOSHI 1968, p. 148, n. 328: “The word *sāmānādhikarāṇa* has two meanings: 1. referring to the same object (*adhikarāṇa* meaning *dravya...*), 2. syntactically agreeing (*adhikarāṇa* meaning *vibhakti*, i.e. either case-ending or verbal ending.”

³See the definition of a *karmadhāraya* compound in PĀṆINI 1.2.42: *tatpuruṣaḥ sāmānādhikarāṇaḥ karmadhārayaḥ* (cf. CARDONA 1973A, p. 48).

⁴PĀṆINI 2.3.46: *prātipadikārthalingaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā*. Cf. THIEME

that are connected by oblique cases, words standing in apposition appear to be unconnected. And since they have different objects of reference (*asamārthatva*), demand arose for an additional rule providing for the nexus of the seemingly unconnected words in apposition.⁵ In this context—considering the example of *vīraḥ puruṣaḥ* and the derivation *vīrapuruṣaḥ*—the Mahābhāṣya says, if an individual thing is the referendum of the word, then there is no semantic connection; but if a quality is the referendum of the word, then there is semantic connection.⁶ It is pointed out that the two qualities have a common substratum (*ekaṃ tayor adhikaraṇam*).⁷

In another passage of the Mahābhāṣya we find a discussion of the expression *kṛṣṇatīlaka*, “black sesame”.⁸ The question is raised as to which of the two words *kṛṣṇa* and *tīlaka* is the main word (*pradhāna*) that is qualified and which one is the secondary word that is the qualifier (*viśeṣaka*). Regarding this question the following statements are made:

“[1.] And where is there any doubt, where both are words for qualities (*guṇaśabda*)? E.g. ‘lame-humpbacked’ [or] ‘humpbacked-lame’. [2.] On the other hand, where the one is a substance (*dravya*) and the other one a quality (*guṇa*), there the substance is the *pradhāna*. ... Certainly one expects (*ākāṅkṣati*) a substance having this quality. [3.] In what way then are such two main words (as) *vrkṣaḥ śiṃśapā* applied simultaneously to one object? For these two it is not necessary to apply (them) together, for there is no *śiṃśapā* that is not a tree.”⁹

The term *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is not mentioned here, but it is clear that according to this paragraph an adjective and a substantive stand in apposition, the former qualifying the latter. Two adjectives may stand in apposition, and it seems to follow from this paragraph that they together cause expectancy, the desire to learn about the main word, the substantive, they refer to, just as a single adjective does. Of two main words, finally, it is said, that there is no necessity of using them together.¹⁰

In contrast to this, we find in Bhartṛhari¹¹ the opinion that in an adjective-

1956, pp. 1-4, and CARDONA 1974, p. 287f. (n. 42).

⁵Vārttika 20 ad PĀṆINI 2.1.1.: *sāmānādhikaraṇeṣūpasamkhyānam asamārthatvāt*.

⁶MBH ad Vārttika 21: *yadi dravyaṃ padārtho na bhavati sāmartyam. atha hi guṇaḥ padārtho bhavati tadā sāmartyam*.

⁷For a translation of the whole passage see JOSHI 1968, p. 148ff., (cf. the review of CARDONA 1973B, pp. 229-231, 235). Cf. also the explanation of the relation *abheda*, “the semantic counterpart of coreference (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*)”, CARDONA 1974, pp. 247-250.

⁸MBH ad PĀṆINI 2.1.57, 399.12-26 (translated in JOSHI-ROODBERGEN 1971, p. 139f.).

⁹*sa cāpi kva saṃdehaḥ, yatrobhau guṇaśabdau. tadyathā kubjakhāñjaḥ khāñjakubja iti. yatra hi anyattarad dravyam anyataro guṇaḥ, tatra yad dravyam, tat pradhānam ... avāśyaṃ tadguṇaṃ dravyam ākāṅkṣati. kathaṃ tarhītau dvau pradhānaśabdāv ekasminn arthe yugapad avarudhyete vrkṣaḥ śiṃśapeti. naitayor āvāśyakaḥ samāveśaḥ, na hy avrkṣaḥ śiṃśapāsti*.

¹⁰One wonders: certainly there are no *śiṃśapās* that are not trees, but are there not trees that are no *śiṃśapās*?

¹¹Cf. KAPILA DEVA SASTRI 1964, p. 42.

substantive phrase like *kṛṣṇaḥ tilaḥ* the “adjective” is not considered as qualifying the “substantive”:

“Necessarily two words denoting a quality (*guṇa*) and a qualified (*guṇin*) have different case endings. For two substance-words referential identity is established [8]. The word *kṛṣṇa* is applied to a substance of which the universal is undetermined, and the word *tila* just occurs for something of which the quality is undetermined [9].¹² Since the *sāmānyas* are [mutually] unconnected, **two** words express the particular. They cannot show the particular [alone] because of their common nature [of being general terms] [10].”¹³

Dignāga (PS *pūrvapakṣa*)¹⁴

Dignāga opens the fifth chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* with the well known verse: “Word (*śabda*) is not a means of valid cognition different from inference, it indicates its own object of reference through preclusion of other [objects of reference] in the same way as [the logical reason] ‘producedness’ etc.”¹⁵ Thus he claims the preclusion of others (*anyāpoha*) as the referendum of words. He proceeds to refute the traditionally assumed referenda, viz. the particular (*bheda*), the universal (*jāti*), the relation (*yoga*, *sambandha*) (between universal and the particular, its instantiation) and the instantiation (*tadvat*). One argument against the universal, the relation and the instantiation is that for such referenda referential identity would be impossible.

To begin with, the universal cannot be the referendum of words,¹⁶ because referential identity would not be explicable. If in a common string of words such as *sad dravyam* the word *sad* referred to a universal, one would have to understand *sattā dravyam* (in the last consequence even *sattā dravyatā*). This is a logically and grammatically impossible construction. (The notions just stand side by side

¹²Helarāja explains that the word *kṛṣṇa* applies to the substance because non-difference is ascribed to the thing (*abhedopacāra*) or, because the possessive suffix of the word *kṛṣṇa* had been dropped *matuplopa*. (*abhedopacārān matuplopād vā kṛṣṇaśabdo dravye vartate*.)

¹³VP 3.14.8-10: *vibhaktibhedo niyamād guṇaguṇyabhidhayinoḥ | sāmānādhikarāṇyasya dravyaśabdayoḥ ||8 || dravye ’niḥñātajātiye kṛṣṇaśabdaḥ prayujyate | anijñātaguṇe caiva tilaśabdaḥ pravartate ||9 || sāmānyānām asaṃbandhāt tau viśeṣeṣam vyavasthitau | rūpābhedāt viśeṣam tam abhivyāñkṛtūṃ na śaknutaḥ ||10 ||* But see VP 3.14.24-25 for a different opinion (apparently in accordance with MBH ad PĀṆINI 2.1.57).

¹⁴At this point I would like to thank Ole H. Pind, Copenhagen, for his support in the study of Dignāga.

¹⁵PS V 1: *na pramāṇāntaraṃ śabdān anumānāt tathā hi saḥ | kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate ||*

For this and the following quotes from PS V cf. the annotated translation of Richard Hayes (HAYES 1988, chapter seven, 252-308).

¹⁶See PS V 2cd and PSV. Dignāga here deals with *jātiśabdas*, but his explanations are valid for all classes of words he accepts. These are mentioned PSV ad PS I 3d: *yadrchāśabda, jātiśabda, guṇaśabda, kriyāśabda, dravyaśabda* (see HATTORI 1968, pp. 25, 83f., cf. HAYES 1988, p. 203).

such as “cow” and “horse”.¹⁷) If one speaks of the universal *sattā*, one can only formulate *sattā dravyasya*, since *sattā* is predicable only **of** something which shows a genitive ending, but does not stand in apposition to *sattā*. In support of the argument the mentioned verse of Bhartṛhari is quoted: “Necessarily two words denoting a quality (*guṇa*) and a qualified (*guṇin*) have different case endings. For two substance-words referential identity is established.”¹⁸

The same argument¹⁹ holds for the relation as referendum. If the word *sad* referred to a relation, the string *sad dravyam* would be impossible, *sad* and *dravyam* could not stand in apposition, because a relation is predicable only **of** something (“*dravyasya*”).

The instantiation cannot be the referendum, because in this case the word *sad* would not refer directly to its own object of reference, but would refer indirectly to an object that is connected with the universal *sattā*. Again referential identity would be impossible, because one quality does not implicitly refer to another quality.²⁰

And finally, if two words standing in apposition had a particular as their object of reference, the two words would become synonyms.²¹

Dignāga: PS *siddhānta* (PS V 14-16, 17-20, 30)

Dignāga’s statement of his own ideas on referential identity is found in PS and PS^V V 14 to 20 and PS V 30. In 14-15a-c Dignāga says: “[Two words like e. g. ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’] that have different objects of reference are incapable of indicating the particulars of their own reference, because they have different objects of preclusion. But they are qualifier and qualified [respectively], because they are of uniform effect for a single [object of reference] (14). It is neither blue in isolation, nor lotus in isolation, because it is the aggregate that is the denotated object (15a-c).”²² This is to say, two words may be considered to apply to one

¹⁷Cf. PSV^K 125.16-19 (PSV^V 124.16-18): *gal te rta dang ba lang dag tha dad pa’i spyi mngon par gsal bar byed pa’i phyir gzhi mthun pa yod pa ma yin no || de bzhin du u tpa la yang yod pa ñid dang rdzas ñid la sogs pa mngon par gsal bar byed pa ñid du mthong ba yin no||*

“If [one accepts that] horse and cow are without coreference, because they manifest different universals, one sees in the same way that the lotos manifests [the different universals] being, thingness etc.”

¹⁸VP 3.14.8 (see n. 13.) in PSV^V 106.33ff., not to be found in PSV^K.

¹⁹See PS V 2cd with PSV.

²⁰See PS V 4a with PSV: *tadvato nāsvatantratvāt |(4a) tathā ca sacchabdo jātisva-rūpopasarjanam dravyam āha na sāksād iti tadgataghatādibhedānakṣepād atabhedatve sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvāḥ.*

²¹PSV^V 120.14f.: *gal te gñis ka yang bye brag gi don du yin na ni rnam grangs pa’i sgra ’gyur te |*

²²*apohyabhedād bhinnārthāḥ svārthabhedagatau jadāḥ| ekatrābhinnakāryatvād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyakāḥ ||14 || na hi kevalam nīlam na ca kevala utpalam | samudāyābhidheyatvāt ||15a-c ||*

thing, because they undergo an integrating semantic operation (*abhinnakāryatvāt*), and because it is an aggregate that is expressed (*samudayābhidheyatvāt*). There is no question of which of the words is the qualified main word and which the qualifying secondary. Both give rise to expectancy regarding their particulars. They stand in a mutual qualifier-qualified relation. And this is only possible because words do not designate their objects of reference, and because they do not preclude them.²³ If a word like *sad* designates in a direct affirmative way its referendum, (especially if the word refers to a real entity that is a universal etc.), it designates just that: it does not imply particulars like *ghaṭa*. Since the word is confined to its referendum, it even rejects them. But, if preclusion is the referendum of the word *sad*, only *asad* is precluded. In the domain that is not precluded, room is left to speak of particulars such as pots etc.²⁴

In another paragraph Dignāga discusses the referential identity of two or more words that do not qualify each other, but refer to a common substratum. In the PS *sāmānādhikarāṇya* always means the relation of referring in a certain context to the same thing, for narrower terms, however, their relation of having the same locus needs explanation. The question is raised how narrower terms (*bhedaśabda*) as words for qualities like “sweet”, “sticky” etc. that preclude the referenda of other narrower terms, (i.e. words that would not normally qualify each other), can stand in apposition. The answer is: for those qualities that may have the same locus (for adjectives standing in apposition) there is no contradiction to a common substratum, since they [also separately] occur in (are applicable to) one and the same substance.²⁵ Dignāga thinks in terms of a hierarchical tree of concepts, similar to the Vaiśeṣika’s hierarchy of universals.²⁶

Finally, one has to bear in mind that for Dignāga the distinction between property and property-bearer is only a mental construction.²⁷ A universal such as the condition of colour (*rūpatva*) is not different from the colours (*rūpa*) blue etc.

²³See PS V 18b2 and PSV.

²⁴Cf. also the statement in PSV ad PS V 4ab: “If there is no pervasion, there is no referential identity.” (PSV^K 109.9f.: *khyab pa yod pa ma yin pa la ni gzhi mthun pa yod pa ma yin te...*) This does not mean that two terms have to be in the relation of pervader and pervaded. Obviously there is no such relation between “blue” and “lotus”. But a term like “lotus” must encompass particulars like “blue lotuses”. This is possible if the term “lotus” precludes that what is not a lotus, but is not possible (as argued in PS V 4ab plus PSV) “lotus” designates an instantiation of lotushood. Cf. also PS V 36 (HAYES 1988, p. 299).

²⁵PSV V 30: *gang zhig gzhi mthun gyur pa ste | yon tan dang ni yon tan gzhan | de rdzas gcig la ’jug pa’i phyir | gzhi yis mi ’gal bar byas ñid |*

PSV^K V 30: *yon tan yon tan gzhan dang ni | gzhi mthun pa ni gang yin pa | de ni rdzas gcig la ’jug phyir | rten gyis mi ’gal ba med pa ñid |*

²⁶For the rules governing the different possibilities of exclusion and implication see KATSURA 1979, pp. 493-491.

²⁷Cf. *sarvam evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhenaiva dharmadharmī-bhedena na bahiḥ sadasattam apekṣate*. This fragment is ascribed to Dignāga in FRAUWALLNER 1959, pp. 104, 163.

The usage of words like *rūpatva* and *rūpa* is just a convention (*laukikavyavahāra*).²⁸

Dignāga's critic Uddyotakara²⁹

For Uddyotakara the objects of reference of words are particulars (*vyakti*), universals (*jāti*), and forms (*ākṛti*).³⁰ One must mention in addition that it is not the particular as such that is the object of a word, but the particular as qualified by a universal.³¹ In a given utterance one of the three is considered—according to an intention—as the principal (*pradhāna*) or the secondary (*aṅga*, *upasarjana*) meaning.³² The objects of the reference of words are regarded as realia. Therefore, *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in this context may also mean “referential identity, reference to one thing”, but it must be understood in the sense of “having the same locus”.

Uddyotakara accuses Dignāga of not understanding the concept of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. He rejects Dignāga's opinion that referential identity is impossible if universals are the referenda of words. In Uddyotakara's opinion *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is a matter of deciding what is *pradhāna* and what is *upasarjana*. If *dravya* is considered as *pradhāna*, as something that realizes (*sādhana*) Being (*sattā*), there is a relation of qualifier and qualified. The words *sad* and *dravyam* can be put in apposition because they have one and the same object (*ekaviśayatvāt*).³³ If Being is considered as *pradhāna*, there is no referential identity. One would formulate “*sattā dravyasya*”.³⁴

In discussing instantiations as referenda the same reason for *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is brought forward: the words *sad* and *dravyam* can be put in apposition, because they have one and the same object (*ekaviśayatvāt*). In accordance with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hierarchy of universals it is added that *sad* implies *dravya*, *guṇa* etc.³⁵

The point is made that it is a contradiction to speak of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*, if words are considered not to refer to particulars (*bhedaśabda*).³⁶

Further, Uddyotakara asks: Is preclusion something separate from the cow or not? If it is separate, is it connected to the cow or not? If preclusion is separate and connected, it can be understood only as something which qualifies the cow. Then the word “cow” designates a quality, and sentences such as “the cow

²⁸See PS V 37-38ab and PSV, pointed out by KATSURA 1979, p. 490.

²⁹For Uddyotakara's critique of *apoha* see HATTORI 1979, 1989; MUCH 1994.

³⁰NS 2.2.66.: *vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthaḥ*.

³¹See NBH 662.5f.: *na dravyamātram aviśiṣṭam jātya vinābhidhīyate, kiṃ tarhi jātīviśiṣṭam*; and NV 676.10f.: *asmakaṃ tu dravyaguṇakarmāṇi sattāviśeṣaṇāny abhidhīyante*.

³²See NV 671.8-672.1.

³³NV 675.11f. (see also NV 677.10): *... yuktaṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyam ubhayoḥ saddra-vyaśabdayor ekaviśayatvāt*.

³⁴See NV 675.8-676.15 and NV 676.2-4 ad PS V 2cd against universals and relation (cf. MUCH 1994, p. 357f.).

³⁵NV 677.8-678.5 ad PS against instantiation, cf. MUCH 1994, p. 359.

³⁶See NV 677.5ff. (cf. MUCH 1994, p. 359), and NV 680.19-686.6 (cf. MUCH 1994, p. 360).

stands” become nonsensical, because referential identity is not possible between the adjective and the verb. If preclusion is not connected to the cow, in what then consists the connection that is visible in expressions such as “the preclusion of the cow”? If at last the preclusion is not something that is different from the cow, nothing at all is gained by introducing the notion “preclusion”.³⁷ Finally, the view that two words standing in apposition qualify each other is criticized once more. It is said that, for two words standing in apposition, in order to establish a relation of qualifier and qualified, it has to be decided which word is regarded as *pradhāna*.³⁸ This is not a problem for those who establish the objects of words in an affirmative way. Substance is qualified by universals and qualities. The *apohavādin* is accused of being unable to point to an object of referential identity.³⁹

Thus, Uddyotakara can never see the question of referential identity eye to eye with Dignāga. The positions are quite contrary: the Buddhists hold that words are mental constructions whose referenda are the preclusions of other objects of reference, and that referential identity is only possible in the realm of an exclusively mentally differentiated object for which preclusions do not preclude each other. The Naiyāyikas on the other hand think in terms of concrete entities, which are referred to by words. Referential identity is the result of entities residing in the same place. Since the grammatical tradition does not generally agree on the point of *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, both sides can claim to be in accordance with grammar.

Dharmakīrti

The question of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* (and the question of the import of words in general) can also be seen from the angle of the status of abstract terms. And for Dharmakīrti this is the important perspective. Dharmakīrti does not repeat Dignāga’s treatment of *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, but concentrates on discussing the preclusion (*apoha*, *vyāvṛtti*) and the precluded (*apodha*, *vyāvṛtta*).⁴⁰

Words are traditionally classified according to their instigating phenomena (*pravṛttinimitta*), the grounds for application.⁴¹ So one may say, e. g., that the word *go* is a *jātiśabda*, because it is occasioned by the *jāti* “*gotva*”.⁴² But for the

³⁷See NV 688.2-6 (cf. MUCH 1994, p. 361).

³⁸Uddyotakara follows here PĀṆINI 2.2.30 (*upasarjanaṃ pūrvam*) when he says that in a compound like *nīlotpalam* the first member qualifies the second.

³⁹See NV 688.16-689.9 (cf. MUCH 1994, p. 362).

⁴⁰For an explication of “reality and concept in Dharmakīrti” see STEINKELLNER 1971; for *apoha*, *vyāvṛtti* and *apodha*, *vyāvṛtta* see AKAMATSU 1986.

⁴¹See MBH ad PĀṆINI Śivasūtra 2: *gauḥ śuklaś calo Dīthah*. Similarly Dignāga in PSV ad PS I 3d: *yadṛcchāśabda*, *jātiśabda*, *guṇāśabda*, *kriyāśabda*, *dravyāśabda* (cf. above n. 16).

⁴²The word *go* is a *jātiśabda* for Naiyāyikas and Buddhists alike. In modern linguistics *go* will be classified as a general concrete term. The word *gotva* is a derivative of *go*. This form, a single abstract term, is not classified as a basic kind of word. Then, what is a *bhedāśabda*? For Dignāga it apparently means the same as *jātiśabda*, but refers to items of rather smaller extensions (like colours, cf. PS V 30). Uddyotakara uses the term *bhedāśabda*; it seems to emphasize that in a certain context (like “referential identity”)

Buddhist there are no universals. Therefore they cannot occasion words. So what is behind expressions like *go* and *gotva*?

Dharmakīrti holds that these word forms, *go* and *gotva*, are conventionally agreed upon. The reason for this convention is the following: If it is intended to communicate something without wanting to take into consideration further preclusions, a word for a preclusion, difference, is used that is provided with the suffix *-tva* or *-tā*, and that stands for a property. If it is intended to communicate something without wanting to neglect further preclusions, a word for something which is precluded, differentiated, is used that is not provided with the suffix *-tva* or *-tā*, and that stands for a property-bearer. In the first case there is no referential identity, because the difference that consists just in *gotva* does not appear to be identical with a property-bearer. And there is no qualifier-qualified relation, because further properties are excluded. In the second case there is referential identity, because a property-bearer that is differentiated by different properties that stand side by side and preclude each other appears in the cognition as one. And there is a qualifier-qualified relation, because it is intended to cognize further preclusions. This distinction of preclusion and precluded (*gotva* and *go*) shows the two sides of the coin, it is not found in the thing itself. They are not distinct entities like the *sāmānya* and the *vyakti* of the Naiyāyikas.

Dharmakīrti says: “Only for this reason in the first instance [in the case of *gotva* etc.] there is no referential identity nor a qualifier-qualified relation, because the word occurs precluding other properties. [E. g. in the sentence] ‘The cowness of this is white’ [there is no referential identity], because on account of the property that consists in this [cowness] only, the cognition that is based on the [cowness] does not appear as identical with [the property-bearer]. And [there is no qualifier-qualified relation], because it is not intended [to cognize other properties]. In the second instance [in the case of a property-bearer as *go*], however there is [referential identity], because on account of presenting a word in accordance with convention the [property-bearer], which is differentiated by properties that occur side by side and exclude each other, appears [in the cognition] as one. And [there is a qualifier-qualified relation], because one wishes [to learn about] further exclusions.

Only this is the difference in every instance between words that denote a thing or a property. With the denoted there is no difference whatsoever [k. 64].”⁴³

words refer to particulars (*nīlam utpalam*). Both *jātiśabda* and *bhedaśabda* are concrete general terms.

⁴³PVSV 33.14-21 plus PV I 64: *ata eva pūrvatra pratikṣiptabhedāntaratvāc śabdavṛtter na sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo vā. gotvam asya śuklam iti tanmātraviśeṣeṇa buddhes tadāśrayabhūtāyā ekatvena nirākāṅkṣatvāc ca. dvitīye tu bhavati. tathā saṃketānusāreṇa saṃhrtasakalavyavacchedadharmair vibhāgavata ekasya iva saṃdarśanena pratibhāsanāt, vyavacchedāntarasākāṅkṣatvāc ca.*

*bhedo ayam eva sarvatra dravyabhāvābhīdhāyinoḥ |
śabdāyor na tayor vācye viśeṣas tena kaścana ||64 ||*

Dharmakīrti argues repeatedly that the assumption of a universal as an existing reality is untenable,⁴⁴ and that referential identity under this assumption is impossible.⁴⁵

Dignāga had said that it is an aggregate that is expressed (*samudāyābhidyatva*) by words standing in apposition. Dharmakīrti explains that the image appearing in the cognition is homogeneous. An aspect of this image, and further aspects of this image, are determined by concepts and words only on account of an intention or interest.

“The [image appears in the cognition] as homogeneous, also if one aspect is made the object [e. g. ‘blue’] and another aspect is not ascertained. A further aspect [e. g. ‘lotus’] is grasped by a [conceptual] cognition only on account of an intention. But also when different objects of words are brought together, (the image) appears as homogeneous in the cognition. For this reason there is neither a contradiction in a common character, a qualifier-qualified relation, and coreference insofar these are conceptual, nor in the distinction of property and property-bearer with regard to the (image). If it is possible to distinguish several objects (and) if it is intended to ascertain or negate the differentiation from another object with respect to an (image), one shows just this thing [either] as an seemingly (*iva*) isolated property expressing (it) with a property-word that has further distinctions excluded, because this is the way it appears in [conceptual] cognition; [or] postulating its further essence in terms of a property-bearer without (other) differentiations. And because insofar property and property-bearer are different, cognition appears as seemingly equipped with differences, [but cognition does not appear this way] on account of a difference in the thing...”⁴⁶

Thus referential identity does not simply reflect a state of realia like *dravyas*, *guṇas* etc. It is a mental construct.

So what is the instigating phenomenon (*pravṛttinimitta*) for the usage of words? It is the efficacy of things. Things are differentiated according to their efficacy. Similar efficacy causes similar judgment. This leads—together with the mental residues (*vasanā*) and convention—to the formation of concepts and words.

The term *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is mentioned by Dharmakīrti in the *apoha*-part of the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* several times in discussing universals and the mental image. But, without mention of the term, a large part of his writings is devoted to the question of how two terms apply to one thing. These are the problems of per-

Cf. also PVSV 42.12-43.18, PV I 80-81, PV I 133-135.

⁴⁴For a translation of the arguments in PVSV see VETTER 1964, pp. 98-110.

⁴⁵Cf. PVSV 34.25-35.4, 42.12-43.18, 65.19-66.1.

⁴⁶See PVSV 44.2-12: *tadabhinnam ekākāraviśayīkaraṇe apy aniścitānyākāram ākārantarasākāṅkṣabuddhigrāhyaṃ bhinnasābdārthopasaṃhāre apy abhinnaṃ buddhau pratibhāti iti sāmānyaviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasāmānādhikaraṇyāni yathāpratīti na virudhyan-te, dharmadharmābhedo ’apy asya. anekārthabhedasamṃbhāve tadekārthabhedavidhipratī-ṣedhajijñāsāyāṃ tad eva vastu pratikṣiptabhedāntareṇa dharmasābdena saṃcodya buddhes tathāpratibhāsanād vyatiriktaṃ dharmam iva aviśeṣeṇa aparam asya svabhāvaṃ dharmī-tayā vyavasthāpya pradarśyate. tāvatā ca aṃśena dharmadharmiṇor bhedaḍ bhedavati iva buddhiḥ pratibhāti, na vastubhedāt...*

vasion (*vyāpti*), the reason that is an essence (*svabhāvahetu*), identity (*tadātmya*), preclusion (*apoha*) as the import of words etc. But these are beyond the scope of this paper.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

NBH	<i>Nyāyabhāṣya</i> (Pakṣilasvāmin): see NV.
NV	<i>Nyāyavārttika</i> (Uddyotakara): <i>Nyāyadarśanam Bhāṣya-Vārttika-Tātparyatīkā-sahitam</i> . Vol. 1 ed. Taranaṭha Nyayatarkatirṭha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirṭha. Calcutta 1936 (Calcutta Sanskrit Series 28). Vol. 2 ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirṭha, Hemantakumar Tarkatirṭha. Calcutta 1944 (Calcutta Sanskrit Series 29). Reprint Kyoto 1982 (Rinsen Sanskrit Text Series).
NS	<i>Nyāyasūtra</i> : See NV.
PĀṆINI	<i>Pāṇini's Grammatik</i> . Herausgegeben, übersetzt, erläutert und mit verschiedenen Indices versehen von Otto Böhtlingk. Leipzig 1887. Nachdruck Hildesheim 1964.
PS	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> of Dignāga, P 5700.
PS V	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> (Dignāga): The <i>Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti</i> of Dignāga. With Jinendrabuddhi's Commentary. Chapter Five: <i>Anyāpoha-parīkṣā</i> . Tibetan Text with Sanskrit Fragments. Ed. by Masaaki Hattori. <i>Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University</i> , 21, 1982, pp. 103-224.
PS ^K V	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> (Dignāga), translation by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab: in PS V.
PS ^V V	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> (Dignāga), translation by Vasudhararakṣita and Seng rgyal: in PS V.
PSV	<i>Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti</i> (Dignāga): in PS V.
PSV ^K	<i>Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti</i> (Dignāga), translation by Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab: in PS V.
PSV ^V	<i>Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti</i> (Dignāga), translation by Vasudhararakṣita and Seng rgyal: in PS V.
PV	<i>Pramāṇavārttika</i> of Dharmakīrti
PVSV	<i>Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti</i> (Dharmakīrti): Raniero Gnoli, <i>The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti</i> . The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes. Roma 1960 (Serie Orientale Roma 23).

- MBH *The Vyākaraṇa=Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*. Ed. F. Kielhorn. Third edition ... by K. V. Abhyankar. [3 Bde.] Poona 1962-1972.
- VP *Vākya-padīya of Bhartṛhari with the Prakīrṇaprakāśa of Helārāja*. Kāṇḍa III, Part ii. Critically ed. by K.A. Subramania Iyer. Poona 1973.
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Dharmakīrti on *prasiddha* and *yogyatā*¹

Tom J.F. Tillemans
(Lausanne)

In the last few years there has been a growing tendency to make a separation between Dignāga's thought and that of Dharmakīrti. This has probably been, on the whole, a good thing, and was arguably long overdue in that for too long we did see the two in an almost interchangeable perspective and thus disregarded virtually all historical evolution. Indeed, in order to understand Dharmakīrti as presenting a particularly sophisticated and profound interpretation of Dignāga, we need to know about the real differences which he introduced in numerous areas of Dignāga's philosophy. Some important points of difference are becoming clearer, such as Dharmakīrti's development of the idea of *svabhāvapratibandha* ("natural relations"), *niścaya* ("certainty", "necessity"), and in general his significantly transforming the looser, inductive Dignāgean logic into a more rigid deductive system, changes which, at least for some of us, might even seem to be an improvement — at any rate, for better or for worse, they eliminate some baroque complexities in Dignāga. There are also some (unconvincing) examples of would-be negative changes, such as Dharmakīrti supposedly misrepresenting Dignāga's scepticism about scripture and perverting the latter's open and neutral philosophy into a Buddhist dogmatic edifice. One area which we personally have begun to investigate is how Dharmakīrti treated Dignāga's definition of the thesis

¹This article results from research done during a project financed by the *Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique*. I have benefited from a recent article in Japanese by M. INAMI, "Dharmakīrti no *paṅśābhāsa* setsu — *pratītinirākṛta* no baai", which discusses the argumentation in this section of PV IV. I have also benefited from discussions with V. ELTSCHINGER.

in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) III and *Nyāyamukha* (NM).² In an earlier article³, we discussed Dharmakīrti’s version of the phrase *svayam iṣṭa* (“intended/accepted by the [proponent] himself”) in this definition, and tried to show what seems to have been a complex dialectic between Dharmakīrti and Īśvarasena on the question as to whether a proponent was not only bound to accept the thesis which he himself advanced, but also everything which the treatises of his school might have said on the matter in question. We will now turn to Dharmakīrti’s treatment of *prasiddha*, viz. the principle that a valid thesis should not be opposed by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*). We shall try to show that Dharmakīrti, in *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) IV, used this apparently banal idea in Dignāga for quite a different purpose than Dignāga had probably ever intended. In particular, he used the clause about *prasiddha* in PS III, k. 2 and the explanation of this passage in Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, to show that Dignāga had a certain theory about the fitness (*yogyatā*) of words to designate their objects, the result being that in this way Dharmakīrti was able to create antecedents in Dignāga’s philosophy for his own anti-Mīmāṃsaka polemic.

1 The critique of the Mīmāṃsakas and other “realists”

Repeatedly, in the last sections of *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) I, in PV IV (k. 109-130), and in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PVIN) II, we find the following semantical principle in Dharmakīrti’s logic:

- I. Words do not have any naturally determined signification, or any naturally existent (*svabhāvika*) relation (*sambandha*) with their objects, so that a certain word would designate (*abhi-DHĀ*) a certain object and not another. To put it in another way, words do not have any intrinsic fitness (*yogyatā*) to designate just one thing and not another.

This is supplemented by another fundamental principle found throughout Dharmakīrti’s philosophy of language:

²For the sake of convenience, here is the *kārikā* in question in *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, viz. PS III, k. 2: *svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo ’nirākṛtaḥ | pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmīni ||* “[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (*iṣṭa*) by [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated (*nirdeśya*) according to its essence alone (*svarūpeṇaiva*) [i.e. as a *sādhyā*]; [and] with regard to [the proponent’s] own subject (*svadharmīni*), it is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perceptible objects (*pratyakṣārtha*), by inference (*anumāna*), by authorities (*āpta*), or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*).” PS Tib.: *rang gi ngo bo kho nar bstan || bdag ’dod rang gi chos can la || mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang || yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba’o ||*. Skt. of *svarūpeṇaiva ... ’nirākṛtaḥ* is to be found in Dharmakīrti’s *Nyāyabindu* (NB) III, 38. The restitution of PS III, k. 2 follows FRAUWALLNER 1957, p. 885; see also VAN BIJLERT 1989, p. 72. Cf. NM, k. 1: *svayam sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakṣo viruddhārthānirākṛtaḥ* | “The thesis is what is intended by [the proponent] himself as the *sādhyā* [and] is not opposed by contradicting states of affairs.” See the edition and translation of NM in KATSURA 1977, p. 109.

³See TILLEMANS 1994.

II. Words designate primarily mentally created fictions. Real objects (i.e. “particulars”, *svalakṣaṇa*) are ineffable.

Corollaries of I and II: The designatum (*abhidheya*; *vācya*) being a fiction, the relation and fitness between a word and its object are also mentally created fictions. As a result, this relation can be as one wishes: any word can, if one so wishes, designate any thing: the fitness of words (*śabdāyogyatā*) is unrestricted by any ontological factors. The relation between word and object is thus established purely by *vivakṣā* (“speech intention”).

Now, the adversaries being refuted by principle I are various non-Buddhist philosophers who held that words have a permanent relation with their meaning and that this relation is somehow not dependent on anything else (e.g. man, God, etc.), but is an uncreated, inherent fact belonging to the nature of the words and things. As the underlying theme motivating adoption of such a semantic theory was invariably to explain Vedic language as not subject to human creation and hence to human error, it is not surprising, then, that Dharmakīrti and his commentators found it necessary to refute this position *in extenso* in order to be able to trivialize Vedic language as having no special authority whatsoever. Indeed, the polemical anti-Vedic thrust of the debate is brought out in full force when Dharmakīrti and his commentators argue that the words “One who desires heaven should offer the *agnihotra* sacrifice” are equally fit (*yogyā*) to mean “One should eat dog-meat, etc.” (*śvamāṃsabhakṣaṇādī*), for, following Dharmakīrti, there is nothing innate in the words of the injunction *agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* which would preclude that it could also very well be a provocative, indeed offensive, anathematism against Vedic religion.⁴ The stakes are therefore quite clear, and the debate is by no means insignificant.

In *Pramāṇavārttika* I and *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II, the adversary is portrayed by the commentators and by Dharmakīrti himself as being a Mīmāṃsaka, one whose fundamental position is as found in the well-known formulation of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* I.1.5: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ* (“The relation between a word and its meaning, however, is innate”). True, as Steinkellner has pointed out, the term *yogyatā* which figures in the context of PV I and PVIN II does not correspond to the actual terminology of the Mīmāṃsaka himself, who, to take the case of Kumāriḥ, rather speaks of words having an innate or natural power (*śakti*). It is indeed more usual that *yogyatā* would belong to the grammarians’ philosophies, and in particular to Bhartrhari, who clearly does have this notion in the

⁴See PVIN II, k. 37 (= PV I, 318). See also PVBH ad PV IV, k. 112 (530.26-28): *na khalu bhāvinī bhūtā vā yogyatā pratiśedhena nivartayituṃ śakyā śabdasyāgnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma ityādeḥ śvamāṃsabhakṣaṇādau arthamātrānurodhivāt | tatrāpy arthe ’pratikūlatā yogyatā* | “Neither future nor past fitness can be blocked by any interdiction, for words such as ‘One who desires heaven should offer the *agnihotra*’ are in keeping with the mere [conceptual] object in case of [them meaning that one should engage in] eating dog-meat and so forth. There too, there is no opposition with regard to the object, i.e. there is fitness (*yogyatā*).”

Sambandhasamuddeśa of his *Vākyapadīya*.⁵ Perhaps certain Mīmāṃsaka currents of the time had themselves made a rapprochement between *śakti* and *yogyatā*. Although we do need more information on this potential synthesis of Mīmāṃsaka and Vyākaraṇa ideas⁶, there is at least a passage in the *Svavṛtti* ad PV I, k. 283 (ed. Gnoli p. 150) which shows clearly that Dharmakīrti himself had no compunctions about substituting *yogyatā* for the Mīmāṃsaka notion of *śakti*: *yā ca śabdaśaktir yogyatākhyā ’rthapratipatyāśrayo jaiminīyair varṇyate | sārthāntaram eva na bhavati*.⁷ Commentators on Dharmakīrti’s PV I and *Svavṛtti* did however broaden the range of adversaries which would be refuted — Karṇakagomin, for example, cites somewhat later Sphoṭavādins, such as Maṇḍanamiśra, and even Bhartṛhari himself was cited on occasion.⁸ For the sake of convenience, let us therefore speak of the general view of a naturally existent *saṃbandha* and *yogyatā* as being a type of “realism”. Realism was, no doubt, the view of the Mīmāṃsakas which Dharmakīrti was primarily refuting in PV I and PVIN II, but it was also the view of quite a number of other philosophers, some of whom, like Bhartṛhari, may have played a role, albeit obscure, in the development of Dharmakīrti’s thought. At any rate, the anti-Mīmāṃsaka polemic about *yogyatā* in PV I and PVIN II is basically due to Dharmakīrti himself — he is not commenting on Dignāga here and only cites him very occasionally in the *Svavṛtti* in an incidental way. It seems unlikely that Dignāga himself was particularly concerned with the notion of *yogyatā* at all, as it seems to play no prominent role in his own works. The notion of *yogyatā* does, of course, figure prominently in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* of Bhartṛhari and we know that the *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, attributed (rightly or wrongly) to Dignāga, corresponds to k. 53-85 of this portion of the *Vākyapadīya*. But the *kārikās* on *yogyatā* in Bhartṛhari occur earlier on (e.g. k. 29), and do not figure in the *Traikālyaparīkṣā*.

Now, what is the logical relation between principle I and II? Intuitively speaking, it seems that accepting the unreality of objects of words advocated in principle II would entail that one rejects realism concerning *saṃbandha* and *yogyatā*, but that the implication only holds in one direction: principle II implies principle I, but not vice versa. In short, principle II seems to be considerably stronger than principle I. And indeed, historically speaking, Indian philosophers did treat II as stronger than I. In other words, there certainly were philosophers who accepted principle I but not principle II. Some non-Buddhists thought it quite possible to deny that there was a naturally existent, intrinsic *saṃbandha*, *śakti* or *yogyatā*, but to maintain nonetheless that the object of a word was a real entity. This seems to

⁵See STEINKELLNER 1979, n. 211, 220.

⁶Cf. STEINKELLNER 1979, n. 208.

⁷“The power of a word, which is called *yogyatā* and is said by the Jaiminīyas [i.e. the Mīmāṃsakas] to be the basis for understanding meaning, that [power] does not exist as a separate entity.”

⁸STEINKELLNER 1979, n. 222 points out that Jñānaśrībhadrā, in commenting on PVIN II, even cites as a “Mīmāṃsaka” verse, *kārikā* 29 from the *Vākyapadīya*’s *Sambandhasamuddeśa*, an important *kārikā* in which Bhartṛhari speaks of *yogyatā*.

have been the usual Naiyāyika perspective (stemming from *Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.55⁹), in that these thinkers accepted that words designated real entities, but maintained that words were simply conventional, or “governed by agreement” (*sāmayika*), and did not possess any natural or innate powers to designate such and such an object and not another.

Dharmakīrti, however, did accept principle II, which is much of what is involved in the Buddhist *apoha* theory of language: words cannot directly designate particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), but directly designate only conceptually created fictions, i.e. universals or *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. It is worthwhile to stress that this basic theoretical stance on words designating *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (and not directly designating *svalakṣaṇa*) is common to both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, in spite of what certain contemporary writers claim. This matter has been taken up elsewhere¹⁰: suffice it to say that the attempts to make a separation between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on this matter have been very unconvincing.

It is clear that Dharmakīrti himself in *Pramāṇavārttika* and elsewhere, and certainly his commentators, saw principle II as entailing principle I. He and his commentators give the argument that whatever is an object of a conceptual cognition (and is hence an unreal fiction), can be designated by whatever word one wishes. In short, conceptual objects entail that there is intrinsically unrestricted *yogyatā*. Durvekamiśra, in commenting on *Nyāyabindu* III.51 and Dharmottara’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, actually gives the formal reasoning (*prayoga*) in all its details.

Dharmottarapradīpa (DMP) 184.16-17: *evaṃ tu prayoga draṣṭavyaḥ yo ’rtho vikalpaviññānaviṣayaḥ sa sāmketikena śabdena vaktuṃ śakyah | yathā śākhādīmān artho vṛkṣaśabdena | vikalpaviññānaviṣayaś ca śāśīti |*. “The *prayoga* should be regarded as follows: ‘Whatever entity is the object of a conceptual cognition, can be designated by an agreed upon word, just like the entity having branches and so forth [can be designated] by the word ‘tree’. Now, *śāśīn* is the object of a conceptual cognition.’” (The conclusion is that *śāśīn* can be designated by the agreed upon word *candra*).¹¹

⁹NS 2.1.55: *na sāmayikatvāc chabdārthasampratyaayasya* (“This is not so [i.e. there is no eternal connection between word and object], because the knowledge of the meaning of a word is governed by agreement.”)

¹⁰See e.g. KATSURA 1991, pp. 129-133.

¹¹The usual Tibetan formulation of the *prayoga* is: *ri bong can la zla ba zhes pa’i sgras brjod rung ba yin te | rtog yul na yod pa’i phyir |* “That which is hare-marked is fitting to be designated by the word ‘moon’, because it exists as an object of conceptualization.” The reason is classified as a *svabhāvahetu*, because it has an essential identity (*tādātmya*) with the property to be proved. See *Yōnis ’dzin rtags rigs* (ed. ONODA), p. 46; cf. dGe 312.6- 313.1: *’gro ba la grags pa rtog yul na yod pa chos can | ri bong can zla ba’i sgras brjod rung du sgrub pa’i rang bzhin gyi rtags yang dag yin te | de sgrub kyi sgrub rtags yang dag gang zhig | zla ba’i sgras brjod rung la bdag gcig tu ’brel ba’i phyir |*. See our remarks to PV IV, k. 92 in TILLEMANS 1995. Cf. also Śākyabuddhi’s PVT P 328b 1-2: *’dir sbyor ba yang ’di ’dra ba yin te | gang zhig ’dod pa tsam gyi rjes su ’jug pa de ni*

This reasoning is not just a later commentator's invention: it is based on the same logical reason which Dharmakīrti had alluded to in PV IV k. 92 as being a *svabhāvahetu*, a reason which is an essential property of what is to be proved. Noteworthy too is that Dharmakīrti, in works subsequent to *Pramāṇavārttika*¹², went so far as to significantly change Dignāga's definition of conceptual thought (*kalpanā*) so that it would explicitly include mention of the idea of *yogyatā*. This new definition of *kalpanā* is to be found in *Nyāyabindu* I.5 and *Pramāṇaviniścaya: abhilāpasamśargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā*: "Conceptual thought is a cognition in which a representation is fitting to be associated with a verbal designation."¹³ By the time of the *Nyāyabindu* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, then, it had become integral to Dharmakīrti's explanation of conceptual cognition (*kalpanā* / *vikalpa*) that any and all conceptual representations were fitting to be associated with any and all words (*abhilāpasamśargayogya* / *śabdākārasamśargayogya*). It is thus not at all artificial that Dharmottara, in commenting on Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* III.51, where the question of refutation by *prasiddha* is discussed¹⁴, understood the key points in this discussion as turning on the Dharmakīrtian definition of *kalpanā* with its explicit mention of *yogya* / *yogyatā*.¹⁵

2 Dharmakīrti's sources for *yogyatā* in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*

Dharmakīrti finds sources for the idea of unrestricted *yogyatā* in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III, k. 2's specification of four sorts of opposition which a valid the-

thams cad du yod pa yin te | dper na yid kyi rtog pa ran rgyud pa 'ga' zhig lta bu'o || 'dod pa'i sgra yis brjod par bya ba ñid kyang 'dod pa tsam gyi rjes su 'jug pa yin no zhes bya ba ni rang bzhin gyi gan tshigs yin no ||* (*P reads *gyis*). "Here the *prayoga* is as follows: 'Whatever conforms to mere wishes pertains to everything, just like a free conception of the mind. Now an intended word's designatum also conforms to mere wishes.' This is a reason which is an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*)." (The conclusion is that an intended word's designatum pertains to everything.)

¹²We adopt here Frauwallner's ordering of Dharmakīrti's works. See FRAUWALLNER 1954.

¹³Two variants are possible here, the first being to read °*pratibhāsā* (hence a *bahuvrīhi*), the second being to read °*pratibhāsapratīti* (i.e. a genitive *tatpuruṣa*). The latter corresponds better with PVIN 252b.4: *rtog pa ni brjod pa dang 'drer rung ba snang ba'i shes pa*, since *pratibhāsapratītiḥ* = *snang ba'i shes pa*. This was the reading adopted by HATTORI 1968, n. 1.27, p. 85, who translated as follows: "a cognition of representation which is capable of being associated with a verbal designation." There is, however, some important support for the *bahuvrīhi* reading of °*pratibhāsā* in that Dharmottara's NBT explicitly takes the compound in this way. NB Tib. gives no clues, as it does not seem to have the word *shes pa*, but ends with *snang ba* = *pratibhāsa*. See also TILLEMANS 1990, p. 274-275, n. 367.

¹⁴NB III.51: *pratītinirākṛto yathā acandraḥ śaśīti* ("It is opposed by a concept, as when one says that 'what has a rabbit (*śaśīn*) is not the moon' "). Note that Dharmakīrti deliberately changes Dignāga's term *prasiddha* to *pratīti*; see n. 18 and Appendix.

¹⁵See Appendix.

sis must avoid, that by perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), authorities (*āpta*) and by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*). In particular, it is the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV), Dignāga's own commentary on k. 2 which forms the basis for Dharmakīrti's commentary on *prasiddha* in PV IV 109-103. Here is the passage from PSV in full:

tadyathā | aśrāvaṇaḥ śabda nityo ghaṭa iti | na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthānīti pratiṅṅāmātrena | yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śābdaprasiddhena viruddhenārthenāpohyate yathā'candraḥ śāśī sattvād iti nāsau pakṣaḥ.

“For example: [1] ‘sound is not audible’; [2] ‘a vase is permanent’; [3] because of simply accepting it, [a proposition like] ‘there are no *pramāṇa* which have as their objects *prameya*’; [4] and where, though there is no [valid] inference since [the latter] would be over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇatva*), [a proposition] is opposed by a contradicting proposition because of something which is commonly recognized through verbal knowledge (*śābdaprasiddha*), as in [the reasoning] ‘that which has a rabbit (*śāśī*) is not the moon (*acandra*) because it exists’ — this [too] is not a [valid] thesis.”¹⁶

The first thesis (viz. ‘sound is not audible’) is refuted by perception (*pratyakṣa*), the second by inference (*anumāna*), or more specifically, “inference which functions due to the force of real entities” (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*). In the case of the third thesis, Dignāga not only presents the proposition itself, but also gives the specific cause for its being invalidated. Accepting that there are no *pramāṇas* is self-refuting (much like the liar paradox), for by merely accepting that proposition as true, it is understood that one recognizes that there is at least **one** *pramāṇa*, viz. the one which validates the proposition itself. The fourth type of invalidation

¹⁶Skt. of *yatrāpy ... nāsau pakṣaḥ* in TSP ad TS 1395. The Skt. of *tadyathā ... apohyate* is found in PVBH ad k. 130 (PVBH 545.8-10): *tadyathā | aśrāvaṇaḥ śabda nityo ghaṭa iti | na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthānīti pratiṅṅāmātrena | yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śābdaprasiddhena viruddhenā[rthenā]pohyate na sa pakṣa iti* |. See also KITAGAWA 1973 n. 169. We should, however, read *śābdaprasiddha* instead of KITAGAWA's *śābdaprasiddha*. Furthermore, KITAGAWA, in his translation, seems to have chosen PSVa's reading of *sbyor ba* (“use”) instead of PSVb's *sel bar byed pa* (“oppose”), the latter being the equivalent of *apohyate*. KITAGAWA's translation is, accordingly, difficult to justify. The passage *yatrāpy ...* also occurs in NM, T. XXXII 1628 1a 19-20; see KATSURA 1977 §.1.3; INAMI 1988, p. 383. In both the Chinese of NM and the Tibetan of PSVa P 43b 1-2 and PSVb P 125a 4-5 (see KITAGAWA p. 472), there is no equivalent of the words *nāsau pakṣaḥ* found in TSP's quotation. However, PVIN P 296b 5-6 also cites this passage and does include *nāsau pakṣaḥ: gang la thun mong ma yin pa'i phyir ... de yang phyogs ma yin no zhes so*. Note that in PV IV k. 130 and PVBH we see that *śābdaprasiddhena* is taken as showing the cause (*hetu; rgyu*) for invalidating the thesis *acandraḥ śāśī*, just as “mere acceptance” (*pratiṅṅāmātrena*) of a thesis like *na santi pramāṇāni prameyārthāni* is the cause for invalidating that very thesis. Hence, we have translated the instrumental of these phrases by “because of ...”.

— where propositions like *acandraḥ śaśī* are refuted because of what is recognized through verbal knowledge (*śābdaprasiddha*) — is the subject of PV IV, k. 109-130.¹⁷ The key passage in Dignāga which inspires this section is thus *yatrāpy ... nāsau pakṣaḥ*.

Now, Dignāga, in the PSV passage quoted above, had given the following example of a bogus thesis which would be refuted by *prasiddha* / *śābdaprasiddha*: “That which has a rabbit (*śaśī*) is not the moon (*acandra*), because it exists (*sattva*)”. The basic idea here is that a thesis should not contradict established verbal usage, in other words, given the verbal conventions of Sanskrit speakers, it just contradicts *prasiddha* to say “That which has a rabbit (*śaśī*) is not the moon (*acandra*)” — there is absolutely no conflict with observable or inferable biological facts about rabbits or astronomical facts about the moon, but only with some elementary and generally acknowledged facts about usage of language. Dignāga therefore held that there was no inference functioning objectively, or due to the force of entities (*vastubalapravṛttānumāna*), which would be able to prove either *candraḥ śaśī* (“that which has a rabbit is the moon”) or the contrary, viz. *acandraḥ śaśī*, for logical faults like *asādhāraṇatva* would ensue. This is what is specified in the PSV’s words *asādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve*, viz. “though there is no [valid] inference since [the latter] would be over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇatva*).” We will not, however, go into the details of this fallacy here as it would take us too far afield, especially given that Dharmakīrti himself has a rather particular interpretation of *asādhāraṇatva* in this context.

In Dharmakīrti’s hands, in PV IV k. 109-130, however, the interpretation of this passage from PSV becomes quite complex. He first of all significantly reinterpreted the bogus thesis in question so that it not longer was just “*śaśī* is not *candra*”, but rather “*śaśī* is not the designatum of the word *candra*” (*candraśābdavācya*), or equivalently, “*śaśī* is not fitting (*yogyā*) to be the designatum of the word ‘*candra*.’” Following Dharmakīrti, then, the bogus thesis *acandraḥ śaśī* in Dignāga was taken to be that of some type of realist, someone who wanted to say that while words designate objects in virtue of naturally existent *yogyatā*, *candra* and *śaśī* are **not** linked by this *yogyatā*. Perhaps, this opponent thought that the word *candra* would only have such fitness for the moon, and not for something like *śaśī*, which is only the moon by conventional agreement. This point was not developed by Dharmakīrti, nor by his commentators — nor was it made clear by anyone whether the thesis *acandraḥ śaśī* was actually advanced by any historical adversary, or whether, as seems more likely, it was purely hypothetical. At any rate, for Dharmakīrti, this thesis is false, because *śaśī*, and for that matter, **everything else**, is intrinsically fit to be the designatum of the word *candra* — in short the thesis is bogus because there are absolutely no restrictions on *yogyatā* inherent in the words themselves: whatever people wish to use a word for, that

¹⁷Note that Dharmakīrti in PV IV dealt with these four invalidations in a different order from that given by Dignāga: he commented upon *āpta* (k. 93-108) and *vastubalapravṛttānumāna* (k. 91-92) earlier on in PV IV and took up invalidation by *pratyaḅṣa* (k. 131-135) after the section on *prasiddha*.

they **can** use it for. The only factor governing whether something is fit or not to be dubbed by such and such a word is whether we intend the word to be used in that manner.¹⁸

3 Final remarks: What was Dharmakīrti up to here?

Certainly, introducing the Dharmakīrtian position on *yogyatā* into PS III, k. 2 and PSV, yields an interpretation of Dignāga’s treatment of theses like *acandraḥ śāśī* which goes far beyond the simple refutation of absurd propositions which contravene speech-conventions in Sanskrit. I think, however, that almost inevitably we have a sense that Dharmakīrti was up to something strained and artificial in treating Dignāga’s explanations on *prasiddha* in this way. And indeed, it seems that this artificiality was not entirely lost on the Indian commentators either. Vinītadeva in his *Tīkā* (NBT_v) on the *Nyāyabindu* III.51, alluded to a fairly banal, but more intuitively plausible, interpretation of Dignāga’s actual words, one which held that the thesis *acandraḥ śāśī* was false, not because of anything abstruse or philosophical to do with intrinsically unrestricted *yogyatā* of words, but simply because of the commonly known facts about Sanskrit usage.

*la la zhig ri bong can ni zla ba’i sgrar brjod par bya ba ma yin no zhes
dam ’cha’ bar byed na | de ni ri bong can zla ba’i sgrar brjod pa ñid
du gnag rdzi mo tshad grags pas sel bar byed do || yang na don thams*

¹⁸Important to mention in this connection is Dharmakīrti’s switch from the Dignāgean terminology *prasiddhabādhā* (“invalidation by what is commonly recognized”) to *pratītibādhā* (“invalidation by concepts”). The term *pratīti* appears regularly in this context in PV IV (see e.g. kk. 118, 120, 123). True, in PV IV, k. 92, Dharmakīrti had retained a more usual understanding of *prasiddha* in the context of PS’s thesis-definition, referring to it by the term *jagatsthiti*, “worldly custom”. But in PV IV, kk. 109-130 and NB III.51 it is clear that he understood *prasiddha* as *pratīti*, deliberately using the term *pratītinirākṛta* (“opposed by a concept”), rather than *prasiddhanirākṛta*. In PV IV he was also obliged to reinterpret the phrase *śābdaprasiddha* in PSV as being non-literal. (In PV IV, k. 110cd Dharmakīrti argues that there are other examples of non-literal terms in the thesis-definition in PS III, k. 2. The word *pratyakṣa* in k. 2 means “direct perception”, nonetheless, it can also metaphorically designate the **objects** of direct perception, in other words, perceptible objects — this is the case when Dignāga speaks of a thesis not being opposed by “perceptible objects” (*pratyakṣārtha*.) The idea behind Dharmakīrti’s using *pratīti* rather than *prasiddha/prasiddhi* is that it is not actually Sanskrit verbal usage itself which would refute thesis *acandraḥ śāśī*, but rather the concept (*pratīti*) that *śāśīn* can, or is fit to be, dubbed *candra*. This concept of a word being fit (*yogya*) for such and such a fictional object is completely dependent on intentions and upon the ensuing intentionally governed verbal practices — nothing in the word or object themselves dictates fitness. In short, fitness is objectively unlimited, but it is determined by intentions, and it is these intentions which constitute the “concept” (*pratīti*) which opposes theses like *acandraḥ śāśī*. Some references from PV IV and NBT are given in Appendix.

cad la sgra thams cad kyi brjod par byar rung bas sel bar byed de | sgra dang don du 'brel ba ni brda'i rtags pa yin pa'i phyir | dper na bum pa la yang zla ba'i sgrar brjod par bya ba ñid du rung ngo ||

“If someone maintains that *śāśin* is not the designatum of the word *candra*, he is refuted since it is commonly recognized (*grags pa = prasiddha*) by everyone from cowmaids on up that *śāśin* is designated by the word *candra*. Alternatively (*yang na*), he is refuted because all objects are fitting (*rung ba = yogya*) to be the designata of all words, since the relation (*'brel ba = sambandha*) between words and objects is marked by agreement (*brda = samketa*), just as, for example, a vase too is fitting to be the designatum of the word *candra*”.¹⁹

The first interpretation mentioned by Vinītadeva is what we might term the “simple” or “intuitively plausible” interpretation of Dignāga’s words; the second interpretation is that of Dharmakīrti. Alas, we do not know who held the “simple interpretation”, but it may have been the so-called “commentator on [Dignāga’s] *Nyāyamukhā*” (*nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra*) who appeared earlier in PV IV, but whose identity remains a mystery. In PV IV k. 27, this *nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra* — whom Śākyabuddhi had named as “Mang po len pa’i bu”, a name which corresponds to no-one at all that we know of in Buddhist logic — was being ridiculed for an inept and inelegant refutation of Naiyāyika arguments proving that the thesis-statement (*pakṣavacana*) was a legitimate means of proof (*sādhana*).²⁰ Dharmakīrti, in k. 27, had dismissed this refutation as an “irrelevant farce” (*vidambanā asaṃbaddhā*). Now the same *nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra*, who seems to be treated as little better than a buffoon in PV IV, reappears in the section on *prasiddhabādhā / pratītibādhā* in PV IV and offers a rival and simpler interpretation of Dignāga’s idea of *asādhāraṇatva*, one against which Dharmakīrti argues in detail in PV IV, k. 121 et seq. This simpler interpretation of *asādhāraṇatva* harmonizes very naturally with what we are terming the “simpler” or “intuitively plausible” interpretation of Dignāga’s words on *prasiddha*. It is logical, then, that the curious *ṭīkākāra*, about whom we know so little, must also have offered a simpler interpretation of Dignāga’s use of *prasiddha*, one which would have been at least along the same general lines, if not identical, to the “intuitively plausible” interpretation alluded to in passing by Vinītadeva. What is supremely ironic is that the *nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra*, if indeed it was he, might very well have gotten Dignāga dead right. The inescapable impression is that the Dharmakīrtian version is a philosophically interesting, but overly complex tangent on what was a fairly trivial subject for Dignāga. In short, Dharmakīrti needed to legitimize an anti-Vedic polemic by finding sources in Dignāga, and he “found” them in a very unlikely place. The much-maligned *ṭīkākāra*, or whoever it was that took things more simply, was probably more accurate in reflecting Dignāga’s thought.

¹⁹NBT_v on NB III.51, p. 106 (ed. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN).

²⁰See WATANABE 1976, TILLEMANS 1987 pp. 155-159 and 1991 pp. 403-406.

Appendix

Some references on *pratīti* from PV IV:

PV IV, k. 109:

artheṣv apratiśiddhatvāt puruṣecchānurodhinaḥ |
*iṣṭaśābdābhidheyatvasyāpto 'trākṣata*vāg²¹ *janaḥ ||*

“An intended word’s designatum (*abhidheya*) which is in keeping with people’s wishes, is unrestricted with regard to objects. Therefore, the person, whose speech is unopposed, is an authority here [i.e. with regard to the designatum of an intended word].”²²

PV IV, k. 110:

*uktaḥ prasiddhaśābdena dharmas tadvyavahārajaḥ |*²³
*pratyakṣādimitā mānaśrutyāropeṇa sūcitāḥ ||*²⁴

“The [conceptual] *dharma* [known as ‘fitness’ (*yogyatā*)], which arises from that [verbal] practice (*vyavahāra*), was indicated [by Dignāga] by means of the word *prasiddha* (commonly recognized).²⁵

The [objects] which are cognized (*mita*) by perception and so forth are indicated by superimposition of the names of the means of cognition (*māna*).”

²¹PV-k(I),(II) *vākṣata* ; PV-k(III) and MIYASAKA’s reading *'trākṣata*^o is in accordance with PVP. Note that PV Tib., in Peking, sDe dge and sNar thang editions, reads *gnod med ngag skye bo rnam* 'dod *yid ches yin*. However, it seems that 'dod might well be an error for 'dir (= *atra*).

²²See PVV 491.7-8: *tataś cātreṣaśābdābhidheyatve viṣaye āpto vyavahartā jano 'kṣata*vāg *apra*tiśiddheṣṭavacanaḥ |. Devendrabuddhi, however, glosses *atra* (= 'di) as *śābda*-*prasiddhārtha* (= *sgra las byung ba'i grags pa'i don*). Thus *atra* is interpreted by him as “with respect to something commonly recognized through verbal knowledge (*śābdaprasiddha*).” See PVP P 347b 3-4: *bkag pa med ñid phyir 'di | sgra las byung ba'i grags pa'i don la | gnod med tshig ste | rang gi 'dod pa ston par byed pa'i yul can gyi tshig ma bkag pa can gyi skye bo yid ches pa yin no zhes bya ba'i don to |* (D 291a 4-5).

²³MIY. *tad vyavahārajaḥ*. Devendrabuddhi clearly takes *tad* as compounded with *vyavahāra*. PVP P 347b 4-5: *slob dpon gyis tha sñad de las skyes pa'i chos rab tu grags pa yis bstan |* (D 291a 5-6). PV Tib. seems to have erroneously taken *tad* as qualifying *dharmas*: *tha sñad las ni skyes pa yi || chos de grags pa'i sgra yis brjod ||*.

²⁴MIY. misread k. 110cd as *pratyakṣādīm iti mānaśrutyāropeṇa sūcitāḥ*. PV-k(I), (II), (III) read *pratyakṣādimitā mānaśrutyāropeṇa sūcitāḥ*, which is supported by PV Tib. *mngon sum sogs kyi gzhai bya yang || 'jal byed sgra sgro btags nas brjod ||*.

²⁵See PVV 451.13-14: *candraś candra ityādiśābdavyavahārajāto dharmas kalpanāviṣayo yogyatākhyā ācāryeṇa prasiddhaśābdena tadyathā śābdaprasiddhenetyādinoktaḥ |* “The *dharma*, which arises from verbal practices such as that the moon is termed ‘moon’, and which is an object of conceptualization (*kalpanā*) [and] which is known as *yogyatā*, was indicated by the Master by means of the word *prasiddha* in the following [phrase in PSV]: *śābdaprasiddhena [viruddhenārthenāpohyate]* etc. etc.”

PV IV, k. 116 along with **PVP's introduction to k. 116:**

“Since all words are established for all objects, then why did [Dignāga] speak of ‘what is commonly recognized through verbal knowledge’ (*sgra las byung ba'i grags pa* = *śābdaprasiddha*). Here [Dharmakīrti replies] as follows [k. 116]:”²⁶

saṃketasaṃśrayāḥ śabdāḥ sa cecchāmātrasaṃśrayaḥ |
nāsiddhiḥ śabdāsiddhānām iti śābdaprasiddhavāk ||

“[Dignāga used] the word *śābdaprasiddha* for the following reason: Words depend on agreement (*saṃketa*), and this [agreement] depends upon mere intentions (*icchāmātra*). [So] the [designations] established by words are not unestablished.”²⁷

Finally, we should note that Dharmottara has a rather unusual explanation of *pratīti*, taking it to be equivalent to the logical reason, *vikalpavijñānaviśaya*, in the proof that *śāśin* is fit to be dubbed *candra*. (See the passage from DMP quoted above and n. 11.) Dharmakīrti, in PV IV, k. 110 and k. 116 seems to have taken *pratīti* to be the simple concept, dependent upon intentions, that a word is to be used for such and such an object. Dharmottara takes *pratīti* to be the (fictional) objects themselves, i.e. the objects which are designated by words and conceived of by thought: any such object is, in its nature, a *pratīti* and can hence be dubbed with any verbal label. See *Nyāyabinduṭīkā ad NB III.51*:

pratītyā nirākṛtaḥ acandra iti candraśabdavācya na bhavati śāśiti prati-
jñātārthaḥ | ayaṃ ca pratītyā nirākṛtaḥ | pratīto 'rtha ucyate vikalpavi-
jñānaviśayaḥ | pratītiḥ pratītatvaṃ vikalpavijñānaviśayatvaṃ ucyate |
*tena vikalpavijñānaviśayatvena*²⁸ *pratītirūpeṇa śāśinaś candraśabdavā-*
cyatvaṃ siddham eva | tathā hi yad vikalpavijñānagrāhyaṃ tac cha-
bdākārasaṃsargayogyam | yac chabdākārasaṃsargayogyam tat sāmke-
tikena śabdena vaktuṃ śākyam | ataḥ pratītirupeṇa vikalpavijñānavi-
śayatvena siddham candraśabdavācyatvaṃ acandratvasya bādhakam |
svabhāvahetuś ca pratītiḥ | yasmād vikalpaviśayatvamātrānubandhinī
sāṃketikaśabdavācyatā tataḥ svabhāvahetusiddham candraśabdavācyat-
vaṃ avācyatvasya bādhakaṃ draṣṭavyam ||

²⁶PVP P 349a 3: *gal te gang las sgra thams cad don thams cad grub pa yin na | gang gis na sgra las byung ba'i grags pa zhes brjod ce na | 'dir 'di ltar |* (D 292a 6-7).

²⁷See PVV 453.4-6: *saṃketam antareṇa vācakādṛṣṭeḥ saṃketasaṃśrayāḥ śabdāḥ sa ca saṃketaḥ puruṣecchāmātrasaṃśrayaḥ tadatiriktasyāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvāt | tasmāc chabdasiddhānām abhidheyatvādīnām kvacid apy arthe nāsiddhiḥ | iti hetoḥ śābdaprasiddhir ācāryasya ||* “Since expressions are not found apart from agreements, words are dependent upon agreements. And this agreement depends solely on the intentions of people, for there is nothing to be taken into consideration over and above that [intention]. So, those things which are established by words, viz. designations and so forth, are not unestablished with regard to any objects. Thus, for [this] reason, the Ācārya’s [use of the phrase] *śābdaprasiddhi*.”

²⁸Note that MALVANIA read *vikalpajñānena* in keeping with DMP; however the variant *vikalpavijñānaviśayatvena* occurs in several mss. of NB and is supported by NB Tib. *rnam par rtog pa'i rnam par shes pa'i yul ñid des.*

Translation: “The following is [a case of a proposition] being opposed by *pratīti*: the thesis ‘śāśin is not the moon (*acandra*)’ [or in other words] ‘it is not the designatum of the word *candra*’. Now this is opposed by *pratīti*. An entity is said to be conceived of (*pratīta*) when it is an object of conceptual cognition (*vikalpavijñānaviśaya*); ‘concept’ (*pratīti*) or ‘the fact of being conceived’ (*pratītatva*) is said to be ‘the fact of being an object of conceptual cognition’ (*vikalpavijñānaviśayatva*). Śāśin’s being the designatum of the word *candra* is established by this property of being an object of conceptual cognition, i.e. its being in essence a *pratīti*. As follows: Whatever is to be grasped by a conceptual consciousness is fitting to be combined with the image (*ākāra* imageŽ/ aspectŽ) of a word. Whatever is fitting to be associated with the image of a word can be designated by an agreed upon word. Thus, [śāśin’s] being the designatum of the word *candra* (*candraśabdavācyatva*), which is established on account of its being an object of conceptual cognition, i.e. in essence a concept, serves to invalidate (*bādhaka*) *acandratva* (‘not being the moon’). Now *pratīti* (conceptŽ) is a reason which is an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*). Since the property of being the designatum of an agreed upon word (*sāṃketikaśabdavācyatā*) is necessarily connected with the simple fact of being an object of conceptual cognition (*vikalpaviśayatvamātra*), therefore *candraśabdavācyatva*, which is established by means of a *svabhāvahetu*, should be seen to invalidate the property of not being a designatum [of the word *candra*].”

References and Abbreviations

- D sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon. *sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka*, *bsTan ’gyur Tshad ma*. Tokyo, 1981ff.
- DGE *Tshad ma rnam ’grel legs par bshad pa gzhan don rjes dpag gi le ’u’i rnam bshad* of the First Dalai Lama, rGyal ba dGe ’dun grub pa (1391-1474), included in *Collected Works*, Vol. 5. Gangtok, 1981.
- DMP *Dharmottarapradīpa* of Durvekamiśra. See NB.
- FRAUWALLNER 1954 E. FRAUWALLNER, “Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti’s”. *Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller*. Leipzig, 1954, pp. 142-154 (= *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 677-689).
- FRAUWALLNER 1957 E. FRAUWALLNER, Review of R. SĀṆKṚTYĀYANA’s edition of the *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya*. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 77, pp. 58-60 (= *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 883-885).
- HATTORI 1968 M. HATTORI, *Dignāga on Perception: being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Harvard Oriental Series 47. Cambridge, Mass., 1968.

- INAMI 1988 M. INAMI “Dharmakīrti no *pakṣābhāsa* setsu — *pratītinirākṛta* no baai”, *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū)*, 37, 1, 1988, pp. 383-380.
- K./KK. *kārikā(s)*.
- KATSURA 1977 S. KATSURA *Inmyō shōrimonron kenkyū* I. *Bulletin of the Faculty of Letters of Hiroshima University* 37, 1977, pp. 106-127.
- KATSURA 1991 S. KATSURA “Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on *apoha*”, in STEINKELLNER 1991, pp. 129-146.
- KITAGAWA 1973 H. KITAGAWA *Indo koten ronrigaku no kenkyū. Jinna no taikai*. Tokyo, 1973. (Includes an edition and Japanese translation of parts of PS and PSV.)
- MIY. Y. MIYASAKA ed. *Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2, 1971/2, pp. 1-206.
- NB *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti, with *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmottara and Paṇḍita Durvekamiśra’s *Dharmottarapradīpa*. Edited by D. MALVANIA. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 2. Patna, 1955.
- NBT *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmottara. See NB.
- NBT_v *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Vinītadeva. Edited by LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, *The Tibetan Translation of the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti with the Commentary of Vinītadeva*. Bibliotheca Indica No. 171. Calcutta, 1913, reprinted 1984.
- NM *Nyāyamukha* of Dignāga, T. XXXII, 1628. Ed. and Japanese translation in a series of articles by S. KATSURA entitled *Inmyō shōrimonron kenkyū*, *Bulletin of the Faculty of Letters of Hiroshima University*.
- NS *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama. Ed. with the *bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana by P. SHĀSTRĪ and H. SHUKLA. Kashi Sanskrit Series 43. Varanasi, 1970.
- ONODA 1981 S. ONODA, *The Yoñs ’dzin rtags rigs* — A manual for Tibetan logic. *Studia Asiatica* 5. Nagoya, 1981.
- PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga, P 5700.
- PSV *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* of Dignāga. (a) transl. Vasudhararakṣita and Seng rgyal, P 5701. (b) transl. Kana-kavarman and Dad pa shes rab, P 5702.
- PV *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti (PV I = *Svārthānumāna*; PV II = *Pramāṇasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*). Sanskrit and Tibetan texts edited in MIY.

- PVBH *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* or *Vārttikālaṅkāra* of Prajñākaragupta, edited by R. SĀṆKṚTYĀYANA. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 1. Patna, 1953. Tib. P 5719.
- PVIN *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti, P 5710. Chapter II ed. and transl. in E. STEINKELLNER 1973 and 1979 respectively.
- PVP *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* of Devendrabuddhi, P 5717.
- PVT *Pramāṇavārttikatīkā* of Śākyabuddhi, P 5718.
- PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Manorathanandin. In *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a Commentary by Manorathanandin*. Edited by R. SĀṆKṚTYĀYANA in the appendices to *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 24, 1938, Part III.
- SKT. Sanskrit.
- STEINKELLNER 1973, 1979 E. STEINKELLNER, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, Zweites Kapitel: svārthānumānam*. Teil I, 1973. Teil II, 1979. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 1973/79.
- STEINKELLNER 1991 *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition*. Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference Vienna, June 11-16, 1989. Edited by E. STEINKELLNER. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 8. Vienna, 1991.
- TIB. Tibetan.
- TILLEMANS 1987 T. TILLEMANS, "Pramāṇavārttika IV (2)", *WZKS* 31, 1987, pp. 141-161.
- TILLEMANS 1990 T. TILLEMANS, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*. The *Catuḥśataka* of Āryadeva, chapters XII and XIII, with the commentaries of Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti: Introduction, translation, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese texts, notes. *WSTB* 24,1 and 24,2. Vienna, 1990.
- TILLEMANS 1991 T. TILLEMANS, "Dharmakīrti on Some Sophisms", in E. STEINKELLNER 1991, pp. 403-418.

- TILLEMANS 1994 T. TILLEMANS, "Pre-Dharmakīrti Commentators on Dignāga's Definition of a Thesis (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*)", in T. SKORUPSKI and U. PAGEL (eds.), *The Buddhist Forum*, Vol. III, Papers in honour and appreciation of Prof. David Seyfort Ruegg's contribution to Indological, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies. School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1994, pp. 295-305.
- TILLEMANS 1995 T. TILLEMANS, "*Pramāṇavārttika* IV (5)", *WZKS* 39, 1995, pp. 103-150.
- TS *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita. In *Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Śrī Kamalaśīla*. Edited by D. SHĀSTRĪ. Bauddha Bhāratī 1. Varanasi, 1981.
- TSP *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla. See TS.
- VAN BILJERT 1989 V.A. VAN BILJERT, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority*. The development of epistemology and logic in the old Nyāya and the Buddhist school of epistemology with an annotated translation of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* II (*Pramāṇasiddhi*) vv. 1-7. *WSTB* 20. Vienna, 1989.
- WATANABE 1976 S. WATANABE, "*Sadvitīyaprayogaḥ*. Indo ronrigaku no ichi danmen", *Mikkyōgaku* 13, pp. 194-209.

Some Rare Oirat Manuscripts in the Collection of the St. Petersburg University Library

Vladimir L. Uspensky
(St. Petersburg)

The collection of the Mongolian manuscripts and xylographs kept in the Library of the St. Petersburg University ranks as one of the world's best for its completeness and selection. This is also true of its Oirat (Kalmuck) sub-section. The Oirat manuscripts were acquired mainly from the Volga Kalmucks by the Russian scholars A.V. Popov, K.F. Golstunsky and A.M. Pozdneev. Many of these books are very rare and deserve special notice. Catalogue-style descriptions of the manuscripts mentioned in the present article will not be given. Rather, the descriptive remarks are reduced to the extent necessary to indicate the important specific features of a manuscript if compared with the already known copies.

I. The Oirat manuscripts of the Manchu prince Kengse, alias Yun-li (1697-1738). The private library of the Mongolian books which belonged to prince Kengse, the youngest son of the emperor Kang-xi, was purchased by the future Academician V.P.Vassiliev in Peking during the 1840s.¹ Among the hundreds of Mongolian books there are several Oirat manuscripts which appear to originate from the Koko-Nor (Qinghai) area. Under the imperial order in 1734-35, Kengse - together with lCang-skya Rol-pa'i rdo-rje accompanied the Seventh Dalai Lama to Tibet, and passed through the Oirat-inhabited territories. Included in these manuscripts are:

1. The translation of the *Pañcarakṣa* by Za-ya paṇḍita, pt. 1: Calm. D 33/1 (Q 432), ff. 1-59a; pt. 2: Calm. D 33/2 (Q 433), ff. 1-74a; pt. 3: Calm. D 33/3 (Q 434), ff. 1-49a; pt. 4: Calm. D 33/4 (Q 435), ff. 1-37a; pt. 5: Calm. D 33/5 (Q 436), ff. 1-14a. All five parts are written on one kind of paper, partly in red ink. However, the folios differ in

¹WASSILJEW, "Die auf den Buddhismus bezüglichen Werke der Universitäts-Bibliothek zu Kasan". *Mélanges asiatiques tirés du Bulletin historico-philologique de l'Académie Impériale des sciences de St.-Pétersbourg*. Tome 11, 4e livraison. St.-Pétersbourg, 1855, p. 351; WASSILIEV, "Notice sur les ouvrages en langues de l'Asie orientale, qui se trouvent dans la bibliothèque de l'Université de Saint-Pétersbourg". *Ibid.*, tome 11, 6e livraison. St.-Pétersbourg, 1856, pp. 566-67.

size. These manuscripts are illuminated. The colophon is found in the fifth part (ff. 13b:1-14a) and agrees with the copies already known.²

2. The translation by Za-ya paṇḍita of the *Bu chos*: Calm. E 12 (Q 431).³ This copy is incomplete and was severely damaged (it had undergone restoration work). It consists of three parts with different pagination (the first chapter; chapters 2-6; chapters 7-22). The folios of this manuscript seem to be intermingled in some places, therefore a thorough line-to-line collation with the Tibetan original is required to put the text in order. Since the text consists of 22 chapters, it is clear that the two chapters of the *Khu chos* are also added to the *Bu chos* itself. According to an unpaginated folio attached to the main text (the colophon of an unknown scribe), the manuscript should have numbered 394 folios.
3. The translation by Za-ya paṇḍita of the autobiography of the First Panchen Lama Blo-bzang chos-kyi rgyal-mtshan (1570-1662), entitled *Nom ögüliqci toyin sumadi darma doca-yin yabudal-i-yin yosu todorxoya üzüülüqci erdeni erike kemēkü orošiba*: Calm. E 10 (Q 372), ff. 1-184a.⁴ This biography was completed by the Second Panchen Lama Blo-bzang ye-shes (1663-1737). The Mongolian translation of the second part is also found in the book collection of Kengse: *Banč'in sumadi dharm-a duvača-yin čadig todorqai üjügülegsen čintamani erike-yin adarγ orosiba*: Mong. D 23 (Q 374), ff. 1-45a.

II. **Üzeqsēr tusatai cuxula kereqtü kemēkü**: Calm. E 2 (Q 560), ff.1-76b.⁵ This manuscript was originally the property of the unidentified "honourable citizen" Stepanov and was acquired by the University in 1863 by Prof. K.F. Golstunsky. Though it was received from the Volga Kalmucks it is written not on the Russian paper; it seems to be an old copy originating from Jungar or Koko-Nor (it resembles the Oirat books from the collection of Kengse).

The work is known to have been translated by Za-ya paṇḍita, but the manuscript has no colophon. It was mistakenly taken by some scholars for the translation of the *Shes bya rab gsal* by 'Phags-pa Blo-groš rgyal-mtshan.⁶ The name of its Tibetan original was given by Sh. Bira as *Ñe mkho mthong ba don yod* and the author's name is listed in the somewhat strange form Blo bčaṅ bzaṅ po'i dpal.⁷ This work could be the same one which was used by Saṅg Sečen for compiling the *Erdeni-yin tobči*, and by Blo-bzang tshe-'phel

²LUVSANBALDAN, p. 125, no. 2; p. 234, no. 0246.

³LUVSANBALDAN, p. 126, no. 23; p. 209, no. 0015; VOSTRIKOV, pp. 206-208.

⁴LUVSANBALDAN, p. 126, no. 30; p. 210, no. 0019; VOSTRIKOV, pp. 308-09.

⁵LUVSANBALDAN, p. 126, no. 26; p. 210, no. 0024.

⁶ČE. DAMDINSÜRÜNG, *Mongγol uran jokiial-un degeži jaṅun bilig orosibai*. Ulaṅan-baṅatur, 1959, p. 328, no. 40.

⁷SH. BIRA, *Mongol'skaya istoriografiya XIII-XVII vv.* Moscow, 1978, pp. 190-91.

for compiling the *Hor chos 'byung*. It was entitled in Mongolian and Tibetan respectively as *Gayiqamsirγ-a üjegdeküi čeeq-ün čomurlirγ neretü šastir* and *Me tog gi tshoms mthong ba don ldan*⁸ The book is an exposition of Buddhist teaching very close in content to the *Čiqula kereglegči* by Guuši Čorji.

III. Two Oirat xylographs are kept in the University Library.

1. *Xutuqtu biligiγin činadu kürüqsen tasuluqči očir kemekü yeke kölgöni sudur orosibu*: Calm. B 3 (Q 564), ff. 1-52a; 21.5 x 8 (19 x 5.3) cm, 17 lines. This xylograph was acquired by A.M. Pozdneev in the Astrakhan province in 1875. The book contains a colophon (ff. 51b:14-52a) saying that it was translated by *Za-ya paṇḍita*.

Three Oirat xylographical editions of the *Vajracchedikā* numbering 55, 56 and 26 folios have been described already.⁹ But the University copy is not one of them.

2. *Blama burxani yoga maši xurāngγui orošibu*: Calm. E 5 (Q 648); ff. 1-6a; 52 x 10.3 (44 x 8) cm; 37 lines. This xylographical edition of a work on the *guru-devatā-yoga* practice is not mentioned anywhere. It was acquired by A.M. Pozdneev during his expedition to Mongolia in 1876-79. According to the colophon (ff. 5b:27-6a), the author was sGo mang *čürpa* Blo neretü, i.e., "the former lama (Tib. *bla zur pa*) of the sGo-mang [grwa-tshang of the 'Bras-spungs Monastery] named Blo". He is also said to have been a direct disciple of 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa'i rdo-rje Ngag-dbang brtson-'grus (1648-1722) (Oirat *xamugi ayiladuqci Mančušri müšėkü*). This information is confirmed by the fact that he was also the author of the petition to 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa'i rdo-rje and his previous incarnations entitled *bKa' drin gsum ldan rin po che'i skyes rabs rnam thar gsol 'debs byin rlabs myur du 'jug ma*.¹⁰ His name is styled in Tibetan in the same way: *sGo-mang bla-zur Blo ming-can*. *Blo* is obviously the first syllable of his name.

The *gsung-'bum* of 'Jam-dbyangs bzhad-pa'i rdo-rje also contains a work which is an exposition of teachings on the *guru-yoga* practice entitled *Bla ma'i rnal 'byor tsinča maṇi'i 'phreng mdzes kyī yang sñing*.¹¹ The author's name is given in the colophon as sGo-mang bla-zur Siddhiḥ lakṣmī, i.e., "the former lama of the sGo-mang [grwa-tshang] named dNgos-grub". It is also said that he was "the preceptor (Tib. *mkhan po*) of the Oirats and the *dānapati* of the Yellow Hat [Teaching] in

⁸G. M. ROERICH, "The Author of the *Hor-chos-hbyun*" In: *Izbrannye trudy*. Moscow, 1967, pp. 226, 228.

⁹LUVSANBALDAN, pp. 117-18, no. 6, 7, 8; LUVSANBALDAN/BADMAEV, pp. 82-83, no. 2, 3; A.G. SAZYKIN, "Mongol'skiye rukopisi i ksilografy, postupivshiy v Aziatskiy muzei Rossiyskoi Akademii nauk ot B.Ya. Vladimirtsova," in: *Mongolica*. Moscow, 1986, p.288, no. 64.

¹⁰YOSHIMIZU, p. 447, no. 2130.

¹¹YOSHIMIZU, p. 446, no. 2127.

the Northern Country” (Tib. *byang phyogs zhva ser gyi sbyin bdag os rod mkhan po*). The work was composed in the ”great capital of the Oirats” (Tib. *os rod kyi rgyal khab chen po*) in the water-sow year (1743). There are good reasons to suppose that Siddhiḥ and Blo were one and the same person.

The Oirat book was printed in the water-mouse year (1744) under the auspices of Galdan-Tsering (Tib. *dGa’ldan tshe-ring*; Oirat *Dgā ldan çe ring*; 1695-1745). The latter was the ruler of the Jungar State in 1727-1745.

The scribe for the wood-blocks was *dge-tshul* Rin-chen bkra-shis (Oirat *dge çül* Rincen bgrašis).

3. Manuscript copy of the xylographical edition of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra*: Calm. D 23 (Q 563), ff. 1-89a. This manuscript was acquired by A.M. Pozdneev in 1875 in the Astrakhan province. This sutra was translated into Oirat by Za-ya paṇḍita and was later printed from the wood-blocks twice: by the Volga Kalmucks and the Oirats of Jungar.¹² The manuscript in question is a copy of the second edition, executed in a fine artistic manner. The original was printed in 1741 under the auspices of the above-mentioned Galdan-Tsering (this information is taken from the colophon on the f. 89a:5-20). No printed copy of this edition has yet been found. The Mongolian Institute of Language and Literature (Ulan Bator) also possesses just a manuscript copy of it.

IV. The translation by Za-ya paṇḍita of the *Ma ṇi bka’ ’bum*. It is a well-known fact that Za-ya paṇḍita translated the *Ma ṇi bka’ ’bum* into Mongolian in 1644, i.e., before inventing the *todo üzüg* writing. This Mongolian translation consists of eleven chapters, though some Tibetan versions of this book are more voluminous.¹³

The University manuscript has been divided by putting different library catalogue numbers to its different parts. This partition was already made by A.V. Popov who acquired the manuscript from the Volga Kalmucks (one portion was given the library number Q 494, another - Q 503). All these manuscripts can be put together in the following sequence:

- chapter 1: Calm. D 22 (Q 494), inventory no. 1786
- chapter 2: Calm. D 37 (Q 503), inventory no. 1797
- chapter 3: Calm. D 22 (Q 494), inventory no. 1788
- chapter 4: Calm. D 32 (Q 503), inventory no. 1798
- chapter 5: missing
- chapter 6: Calm. D 22 (Q 494), inventory no. 1789

¹²LUVSANBALDAN/BADMAEV, pp. 87-92.

¹³VOSTRIKOV, pp. 42-45.

chapter 7: Calm. D 32 (Q 503), inventory no. 1799
 chapter 8: Calm. D 37 (Q 503), inventory no. 1800
 chapter 9: missing
 chapter 10: Calm. D 37 (Q 503), inventory no. 1801
 chapter 11: missing

It should be added that the manuscript Calm. C 1 (Q 530) contains incomplete chapters 2 (ff. 1-8b) and 11 (ff. 31a-50b) of the *Ma ni bka' 'bum*, the latter with a colophon by Za-ya paṇḍita.

Especially interesting is a section of the *Ma ni bka' 'bum* Calm. D 22 (Q 494), inventory no. 1787; ff. 1-69b; cover and left marginal Tibetan signature: *kha*. This is the section which was not included in the Mongolian version, viz., *Sangs rgyas shākya thub pa'i bstan pa la mdzad pa'i lo rgyus* (a biography of the king Srong-btsan sgam-po) and *Sangs rgyas gzhan gyi bstan pa la mdzad pa'i lo rgyus* (ten stories of the previous incarnations of Srong-btsan sgam-po).¹⁴ This serves witness to an interesting fact, that the Oirat version of the *Ma ni bka' 'bum* is more complete than the Mongolian one.

V. A versed biography of Tsong-kha-pa entitled *Bzongkaba-yin tuuji*:

Calm. C 13 (F 65), ff. 1-25b. This biography was acquired by K.F. Golstunsky from the Volga Kalmucks in 1856-57. It is a very rare work written at the request of Oirat princes in the end of the 17th century by Bya-khyung mkhan-po xutuq-tu, i.e. an incarnation of an abbot of the Bya-khyung theg-chen yon-tan dar-rgyas gling Monastery in Amdo.¹⁵ Among the books from the collection of Kengse there is its Mongolian translation entitled *Bçônggaba-yin čadig*: Mong. E 14 (Q 368), ff. 1-26a. I was unable to locate its Tibetan original.

VI. A collection of biographies written by the Second Panchen Lama entitled *Bodhi mōriyin ündüsün blamanariyin tuuji: čaγan lingxu-a-yin erike*:

Calm. D 36 (Q 500), ff. 1-84a. This collection was acquired by A.V. Popov from the Volga Kalmucks in 1838. The title of its Tibetan original is *Byang chub lam gyi rim pa'i bla ma brgyud pa'i rnam par thar pa pad ma dkar po'i 'phreng ba*.¹⁶

According to the Oirat colophon (ff. 83b:1-84a) it was translated by *masi ketürkei* Sumadi kemēqci, i.e. *Rab-'byams-pa* Blo-bzang. He was the Kalmuck Buddhist leader in the mid-18th century and participated in the preparation of the xylographical edition of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra* mentioned above.¹⁷ The fact that this almost contemporary Tibetan work was translated into Oirat shows that the spiritual contacts between Tibet and the Volga Kalmucks were firmly established in the 18th century.

¹⁴VOSTRIKOV, p. 44.

¹⁵VOSTRIKOV, p. 282.

¹⁶VOSTRIKOV, pp. 110-11, 294-95.

¹⁷LUVSANBALDAN/BADMAEV, pp. 88-90.

Among the books from the collection of Kengse there is the Mongolian translation of this work entitled *Bodi mör-ün jerge-yin ündüsün blam-a-nar-un čadig čaγan lingqu-a-yin erike kemekü orošiba*: Mong. D 64 (Q 375), ff. 1-50a.

VII. A history of the tantra of Tārā by Tāranātha (1575- ca. 1635) entitled *Dare ekeyin ündüsüni γarxoi γarulγa tododxon üiledküi tuuǰi altan eriken kemekü orošibu*: Calm. D 30 (Q 531), ff. 1-35a. The title of its Tibetan original is *sGrol ma'i rgyud kyi byung khungs gsal bar byed pa'i lo rgyus gser gyi phreng ba*.

According to the colophon (ff. 34b:26-35a), it was translated by Radna-Bhadra (Skt. Ratnabhadra = Tib. Rin-chen bzang-po). He was one of the disciples of Za-ya paṇḍita and assisted his teacher as a scribe. While a few of his translations are known, this is not one of them.¹⁸ The name of the initiator of this translation is given as *dayani ezen* Će dbang bü 'krid (Tib. ? *khyab bdag* Tshe-dbang-po 'khrid). I was unable to identify this person.

The colophon also says that Radna-Bhadra was translating on the basis of the precepts of *gürü blama* and Rab-'byam-pa Ćorǰi, (i.e. his teacher) and Rab-'byams-pa chos-rje. The latter is also known as Dar-rgyas dka'-bcu and Ras-chung nom-un qan.¹⁹

The Mongolian translation of this work was published xylographically by the learned Buriat lama Rincen Nomtoev (1820-1907). It is entitled *Dar-a ekeyin ündüsün-ü wγ-i todoraγuluγčiči domoγ altan erike neretü orošibai*: Mong. D 264 (Q 623), ff. 1-51a.

VIII. *Furban sanvariγin teyin talbil orošibu*: Calm. E 5 (Q 649), ff. 1-107a. This manuscript was acquired by A.M. Pozdnev during his expedition to Mongolia in 1876-79. A comparison of the texts shows that this is a translation of the *sDom pa gsum gyi rnam par bzhag pa mdor bsdus te gtan la dbab pa'i rab tu byed pa thub bstan rin po che'i byi dor* by mKhas-grub dGe-legs dpal-bzang-po (1385-1438).²⁰ His name is styled in Oirat as Sayin Buyani Coq. It is unknown if a Mongolian translation of this work exists.

Conclusion

The collection of the St. Petersburg University Library contains many other Oirat manuscripts which deserve special notice for their scholarly value and artistic execution, including an exposition of Buddhist teaching by a Kalmuck lama Jinjang (Tib. ? mKhyen-bzang) *dge-slong* (d. 1852) entitled *Uxani toli kemekü debter* (Calm. C 12), written at the request of Prof. A.V. Popov; a luxurious manuscript of Za-ya paṇḍita's biography (Calm. C 20), and many others. This article merely reflects the immediate impressions of a catalogue-compiler upon finishing his work.

¹⁸LUVSANBALDAN, pp. 152-55.

¹⁹LUVSANBALDAN, p. 144, no. 27.

²⁰YOSHIMIZU, p. 240, no. 1667.

Abbreviations

LUVSANBALDAN	KH. LUVSANBALDAN, <i>Tod üseg, tüüniy dursgaluud</i> . Ulaanbaatar, 1975.
LUVSANBALDAN/ BADMAEV	KH. LUVSANBALDAN and A.V. BADMAEV, "Kalmyt-skoye ksilograficheskoye izdaniye sutry <i>Altan gerel</i> ", in: <i>320 Let starokalmytskoi pis'mennosti</i> . Elista, 1970.
YOSHIMIZU	CH. YOSHIMIZU (ed.), <i>Descriptive Catalogue of the Naritasan Institute Collection of Tibetan Works</i> . Vol. 1. Naritasan, 1989.
VOSTRIKOV	A.I. VOSTRIKOV, <i>Tibetskaya istoricheskaya literatura</i> . Moscow, 1962.